Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



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Prepared by the
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

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Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

408
Angell, Robert C. THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A TREND REPORT AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. Current sociology; sociologie contemporaine, v. 14, no. 1, 1966: 3-62.
Z7161.C8, v. 14

Presents an overview, analysis, and bibliography of work done primarily during the period from 1950 to 1964 in the sociological analysis of international relations. The annotated bibliography is broadly classified (with subcategories within the major breakdowns) into three of the four major areas of study that Angell sees as apparent within the discipline: intranational effects of transnational experience, national social structure and foreign policy, and structure and process in the world society. A fourth major concern, international politics, is not strictly within the scope of the sociology of international relations, and the bibliography adds as its fourth category objectives and methods of research in the sociology of international relations. An author index follows the 448 items of the bibliography. From his review of the literature Angell concludes that sociologists have made an important contribution when research was done "within a national society and the applicable methods of research . . . are familiar to them"; on the other hand, they have contributed little to the theory of intersocietal relations. Angell suggests that studying the relevant phenomena at lower levels of societal organization, such as the interaction between neighboring cities, might aid in developing such theory.

409
Appelbaum, Stephen A. THE WORLD IN NEED OF A 'LEADER': AN APPLICATION OF GROUP PSYCHOLOGY TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. British journal of medical psychology, v. 40, Dec. 1967: 381-392.
RC321.B83, v. 40

Through the study of small-group behavior it becomes apparent that the world needs a "superordinate leader," analogous to the leader of training groups in group psychotherapy. Such groups lack formal structure, as do the nations of the international community. Moreover, nations are increasingly cognizant of one another as a group within the definite limits of the earth's surface. Training groups pass through various stages in their perceptions of the leader. At first members attribute to him qualities and capabilities far beyond reality and respond to him with "an extreme passion for authority." The leader uses this immense power to maintain the existence of the group. Later the group begins to divide into subgroups with various kinds of common loyalties, and reamalgamates to some extent into alliances and ententes. Shifts are made on flimsy excuses, and hostilities arise easily. Eventually members, through their experiences within alliances gain some feeling and desire for community feeling. It is at this stage that nations find themselves today. In the further development of the training group, members find themselves threatened by growing feelings of psychological closeness. This phase may be shortened if the group begins to view the leader as the outside enemy. Desires to replace the leader or become his favorite then vanish. The group can now function without the leader and "deal with common problems commonly." In the analogous international situation the United Nations represents the sole attempt at outside leadership, but the United Nations cannot impose group unity because it is not considered superior by any of its members. No real alternative to effective leadership exists; the world will be unified politically either voluntarily and cooperatively or, in the words of Toynbee, by "one great surviving power who imposes peace on the world by conquest."

410
Atwater, Elton, Kent Forster, and Jan S. Prybyla. WORLD TENSIONS: CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts [1967] 396 p.
D421.A8

Contents.--The problem of understanding world affairs.--The contemporary sovereign state system.--The nature of man, conflict, and war.--Nationalism.--Ideology and world conflict.--Economic underdevelopment and competing economic systems.--Democracy, communism, and the conflict of method.--Coexistence, security, and the organization of peace.--Regional international organization.--Conclusion--the race against time.

Studies the mechanics, dynamics, and motivating forces of international conflict. The nuclear era has rendered war a much more destructive means of resolving intergroup conflict and has made the price for survival of civilized man intolerably high. Despite this there does not seem to be any politically acceptable formula or plan to solve the problem of war.

411
Beugel, Ernst H. van der. THE NEED FOR ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, winter 1967-68: 507-511.
D839.A85, v. 5

"Notes for a speech in the Stadium of Leyden University, October 13, 1967."

Lists several international developments that have halted the process of European integration: the emergence of the Third World and of Red China as a world power, American involvement in Vietnam, the change in the Soviet threat, and the détente. The author notes that political union in Europe is unrealistic and that if Britain is refused entry into the Common Market a power vacuum in Europe will be created, which will be filled by Russia. For this reason, he contends, the Atlantic alliance must remain a viable

military and political entity. Europeans must be dedicated to Atlantic solidarity--which is the essence of NATO--at least until there are brighter prospects for European unity.

412
BEYOND IMPERIALISM. New republic, v. 158, Jan. 27, 1968: 7-8. AP2. N264, v. 158

The age of imperialism has come to an end; empires are falling apart and "prickly" new nations are being born. Many of them are rocked by internal struggles, and the Great Powers may be tempted to intervene. Yet the vision of peacekeeping by imperial military control is rapidly fading as the idea of self-determination is catching on. The decline of empires is not limited to the capitalist world; "international communism," too, is splitting under nationalist pressures. The Russians and the Chinese, like the Western powers, are "learning the limits of great power." There is a need for an entirely different approach to the less favored societies; their aspirations cannot be satisfied through "territorial expansion, commercial subjugation or gunboat diplomacy." Only a combined effort of better-off nations can help the "troubled and troubling" newer nations. The Alliance for Progress is a good idea--why shouldn't it be directed and financed "multinationally" and extended beyond the Western Hemisphere? Now is the time for the United States to plan for the era beyond imperialism--an era in which "non-coercive, collective social and economic effort by the advanced nations" will contribute to the progress of developing countries.

413
Borchgrave, Arnaud de. EUROPE LOOKS AGAIN TO U.S. LEADERSHIP. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, winter 1967/68: 564-568.
D839. A85, v. 5
"Reprinted...from Newsweek, October 16, 1967."
AP2. N6772

The technology gap between the United States and Europe is causing Europe to abandon its plans to become a third world power; instead Europe is drifting toward "neo-Atlanticism." Among the reasons for this is economic stagnation in Europe. For the first time since the 1950's the United States is expanding at a faster rate than Europe. Politically Europeans are realizing that only the United States can lead Western Europe into negotiations to end the partition in Europe. De Gaulle's plans to undermine the United States have been weakened by developments in military technology. Advances in the ABM could negate any nuclear force, joint or otherwise, that Europe could produce to use as a political lever. Any European settlement that is reached will depend on the policies of Washington and Moscow, not Paris or London. A politically and militarily unified Europe as a third world power is "simply more than anyone is prepared to undertake." The Common Market is still years away from becoming a truly common market, and France's continued objections to British entry could result in Britain's disenchantment with the whole idea of the Common Market. Indeed Great Britain may follow the example of Japan which is unencumbered by huge defense outlays, expensive international commitments, and problems of "getting into Asia (as opposed to getting into Europe)."

414
Brandt, Willy. [A SECOND WIND FOR DÉTENTE POLICY] Entspannungspolitik mit langem Atem. Aussenpolitik, v. 18, Aug. 1967: 449-454.
D839. A885, v. 18

East-West détente in Europe has to some extent been a result of East European national interests taking precedence over Communist ideology. The détente would hardly have taken place, however, without the Western allies' readiness to jointly defend themselves against possible aggression. The declining threat of war in Europe by no means reduces NATO's military role; only when a just and permanent peace settlement is made and the European security problem is solved will that role be fulfilled. Although Moscow's policy in recent years has increasingly been motivated by pragmatism, Communist ideology nevertheless still figures largely in that policy and is responsible for the Communist leaders' biases about the West. The recent Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist Parties interpreted the Federal Republic of Germany's efforts toward rapprochement with Eastern Europe as an attempt to play the East European nations against each other and isolate "Germany's other part" [East Germany] from the rest of the world. The conference also restated the Communist's illusionary hopes for NATO's disintegration and the elimination of the American presence in Europe. Significantly, of all NATO members only the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are villains in the eyes of the Communists. The Federal Republic of Germany has been accused of militarism and revenge seeking. Nevertheless its efforts in the area of détente have already brought about some visible improvement in the Federal Republic's relations with Eastern Europe--e.g., the exchange of ambassadors with Rumania. Continued progress in détente, with the Western allies each pursuing it in its own way, will pave the road to European peace and a security settlement that will include German reunification. The security settlement might consist of either the establishment of a certain relationship between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO or gradual liquidation of the two alliances and their replacement by a new treaty. In the absence of a durable and just European peace settlement the suggested replacement of the Warsaw Pact Organization by bilateral agreements would be totally irrelevant to the European security problem.

415
Brugmans, Henri. EUROPEAN UNITY AND THE FEDERALIST IDEA. Orbis, v. 10, winter 1967: 1022-1030. D639. O68, v. 10

The dilemma of European union or federation is that, while France is the most important country on the European Continent and the natural leader of any union movement, it has rejected the concept of federalism since the end of the 18th century. Historically the French Revolution was the touchstone of progressive thinking, yet it was the idea of the royalists to restore the traditional provinces to their ancient rights, which compromised federalism more than anything else. The left in France inherited the Jacobins' patriotic ethos and viewed democracy as a means of national emancipation of the people; federalism would rid them of their national identities. Nevertheless a European union must adopt a federalist system, however contradictory, that is centrally strong enough to check the "centrifugal force of disintegration" but stable enough

to preserve the autonomy and national identity of each state. In essence, there must be union without unification. An integrated Europe must unite not only states but regions. Regional planning by the European Economic Community will create a redistribution of regional administrative power and ensure that European minorities have a direct link with the supranational authorities. Many groups that have dreamed of a homogeneous state of their own "look to federalism for the solution of their problems." "Europe is not a national entity" and should not become a state of the Jacobin type. The first emphasis of federalism should be on the continuation of diversity, but if this diversity is to be upheld without damage to the community, "it will have to be checked by strong central executive powers."

416
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. THE FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST RECONCILIATION. Foreign affairs, v. 46, Jan. 1968: 256-275. D410. F6, v. 46

Standing alone, neither the Atlantic concept of a European partnership with America, De Gaulle's vision of a "European" Europe, nor the Soviet idea of a European security arrangement is a realistic approach to East-West reconciliation. The Atlanticists arouse suspicions of U.S. hegemony in Europe and only exacerbate the German problem by confronting the East Europeans with the specter of West Germany as a nuclear partner in an Atlantic security arrangement. While De Gaulle's proposals to dissolve the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact and to establish a loosely organized Europe based on bilateral state relations may attract Eastern cooperation, the implementation of the proposals would probably lead to new European tensions. The Soviet solution to the European problem involves an East-West security arrangement. Since such an arrangement would weaken West European-American security ties and legitimize the status quo in Central Europe, it serves Soviet objectives rather than solving the problems created by postwar upheavals in Europe. For a gradual increase in East-West cooperation, which is needed to end the partition of Europe, a new pattern of relationships must develop that would eliminate the factors of instability inherent in the status quo. Security, economic, and political arrangements linking the United States, the Soviet Union, and Eastern and Western Europe could provide an institutional framework for cooperation among the participants. Most likely, as the Communist states become aware of their growing social and economic complexity, they will moderate the more militant aspects of Communist ideology and permit gradual decentralization of their national economies. The development in the East of a European-minded technical and economic elite could encourage liberalization of attitudes within the political elite. Perhaps in the 1970's a special East-West economic assembly and some type of East-West political assembly will be established that will pave the way for discussions on European security between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The United States should allow NATO to become the Western component of an all-European security system and endeavor to strengthen American economic and technological ties with Europe.

417
Buchan, Alastair. FIFTEEN ALLIES OR LESS. In his The future of NATO. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967. p. 32-36. (International conciliation. Nov. 1967, no. 565)
JX1907. A8, no. 565

Europe is beginning to be regarded as "an area of tranquility in an increasingly troubled world." Willful Soviet aggression appears rather unlikely, and thus security considerations are expected to play a lesser role in both transatlantic and East-West relations. Nonetheless, security problems do exist in Europe, and they have to be taken into consideration prior to any speculation about NATO or any other cooperative form of European security. Twenty years ago, NATO founders were vacillating between a multilateral security organization and a working alliance of powers with similar objectives. Today diverse security problems and different diplomatic leanings are dividing the alliance into three groups: the central European, the Mediterranean, and the strategic or geographical "outliers." None of the Western European powers really considers its security closely related to the Greek and Turkish problems, which stem from local or internal conflicts and do not pose a general threat to Europe. NATO membership is of little advantage to an "outlier" country like Iceland. Canada's security is closely linked with that of the continental United States; hence continued NATO membership doesn't directly serve Canada's interest. Actually the future of the NATO alliance rests on 10 countries--the United States, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux countries, Italy, Norway, and Denmark. They have in common their exposure to risk in case of a European crisis plus the fact that their "long-term security is directly related to a solution of the German problem." NATO may be regarded "as a form of inter-state obligations and relationships between the United States and Western Europe." In the 1970's a new arrangement may emerge for NATO: one in which the 10 countries would take on the features of a commonwealth; a European-American relationship close to President Kennedy's "partnership of equals"; or an alliance that would serve as an instrument of a European security system covering the central and northern parts of Europe. In any case, "considerations of security, political freedom, and finance have to be balanced in different measure."

418
Farrell, James T. MILITARY POWER AND COMMUNISM. Eagle, v. 55, Nov. 1967: 8-9. illus.
HS1510. E23E3, v. 55

The Communists have understood the significance of Clausewitz's dictum, 'war is the continuation of politics by other means,' better than anyone else. They have inherited, from over the past 30 years, a military tradition that espouses the study of war and tactics as part of politics and economics. To them power, although sustained by the military, is derived from the integration of political, economic, technological, and even cultural thought. Americans have failed to understand the problems of power, military affairs, and history. Unless they begin to comprehend the interaction of military, economic, political, and technological thought, they will continue to be baffled by the policies forged by Moscow and Peking.

419
Fîntîneru, Ion. THE GROWING ASSERTION OF THE ROLE OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE. Romania today, Nov. 1967: 21. DR201. R78, 1967

Affirms the importance of equality in the relations of big powers with small and medium-sized nations for strengthening world security. The independence and sovereignty of weaker nations should be fully respected by big powers. Medium-sized and small countries, which now constitute a majority in the United Nations, "refuse to be simple pawns on the chessboard of the world." Each of them, Fmtfnaru stresses, has the legitimate right "to be free of any form of domination." Full respect for their rights by big powers "in no way diminishes" the latters' responsibility "for the fate of peace."

420

Galtung, Johan. ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. Journal of peace research, v. 4, no. 4, 1967: 305-333.
AS9.J6, v. 4

The author attempts to present an image of a likely development of the international system in the rest of this century. This is not a prediction in the same sense as in the natural sciences since trends existing today obviously may be counteracted. But the effort is made to see where the trends in the world today are most likely, according to the author, to lead the world. Some possible political initiatives that may arise to reinforce or stop some of these trends are also indicated. For this purpose a distinction is made between a society, which is held to be a self-sufficient unit that would remain essentially the same if the rest of the world were removed, and a nation-state which is a political unit based on geographical continuity. Four types of societies are distinguished: the primitive, traditional, modern, and neo-modern societies, differing in level of agricultural productivity and percentage of population working in the tertiary sector. The world is then divided into nation-states too small for the societies, and nation-states too big for the societies within them: a distinction similar to the distinction between developed and developing countries. The author predicts that the first type of nation will penetrate so deeply into each other that the nation-states will wither away and that national loyalty will be more and more superseded with sub-, cross-, trans-, and supra-national identities. A tightly integrated region from Alaska to Japan is envisaged. For the second type of societies growing nationalism is predicted as the primitive and social segments become increasingly modern and coincide in size with the nation-state. For the relation between the two types of societies it is predicted that the neomodern nations will try to take them one at a time, and that this will be so much resented that the poorer nations will unite to form increasingly effective trade-unions of poor nations. Further, they will bargain with the rich nations for better prices for their commodities threatening with delivery strikes, and also bargain for welfare world policies with taxation of nations and redistribution. If this does not succeed, the possibility of major wars is seen as very likely. (Abstract supplied)

421

Geen, Russell G., and Leonard Berkowitz. SOME CONDITIONS FACILITATING THE OCCURRENCE OF AGGRESSION AFTER THE OBSERVATION OF VIOLENCE. Journal of personality, v. 35, Dec. 1967: 666-676. BF1.J66, v. 35

An experiment utilizing University of Wisconsin undergraduates demonstrated a higher tendency toward aggression on the part of subjects who had witnessed a film depicting a boxing match. Moreover, the subjects apparently showed heightened aggressiveness toward a target who had been associated with the boxing film. This reaction was interpreted as "(a) the observed aggression lowering inhibitions against subsequent aggression, and also (b) the available target eliciting the aggressive responses because his association with the victim of the observed violence heightened his cue value for aggression."

422

Geoffroy, Jean. [THE YEAR 2000: THE VISIONS OF HERMANN KAHN] L'an 2000: les visions de Hermann Kahn. Nouvel observateur, no. 161, Dec. 13, 1967: 6-7.
AP20.O2, 1967

The year 2000 will see peace but not justice; the disparity between the rich and the poor will be reflected in the comparison of total annual incomes of those peoples who live in the postindustrial states (Germany, Japan, the United States, etc.) and those who live in the preindustrial states (in Africa and Asia). Peace will prevail because most of the countries in the world will have a nuclear capability. There will be less likelihood of nuclear war since the Russians will have overcome the missile gap and attained parity with the United States. During this same period the United States and the Soviet Union will have produced defensive and offensive outer space weapons. There will also be weapons capable of destroying the world, machines that can change climates, and new types of psychological warfare.

423

Glaubitz, Joachim. [THE CHINESE VARIANT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD] Die chinesische Variante und ihr Einfluss in der Welt. Osteuropa, v. 17, Oct./Nov. 1967: 781-791.
DR1.O8, v. 17

Believes that Peking's variant of communism has little chance of being followed anywhere outside China. Red China's considerable popularity in the Third World in the midfifties is now largely gone. Despite increased diplomatic contacts between China and Western Europe, Peking's influence on European politics is negligible. Yet China will have to be more and more taken into consideration in any long-range view of world politics. Glaubitz also discusses the history of the Chinese Communist revolution, Sino-Soviet relations, the influence of nationalism on Maoist politics, and Peking's policy of "a shortcut toward communism."

424

Gleditsch, Nils P. TRENDS IN WORLD AIRLINE PATTERNS. Journal of peace research, v. 4, no. 4, 1967: 366-408. tables. AS9.J6, v. 4

The article sets forth a general theory of interaction patterns between nations, based on theory and empirical research mainly in social psychology and international relations. A number of predictions generated from the theory are tested on data concerning airline connections for 125 countries in 1930, 1951, 1958, and 1965. Affiliation with a colonial system, geographical distance, and the rank of nations in the international system are all found to have a major impact on the airline patterns at all time-points, with geography and rank increasing in importance and colonial affiliation first increasing, then decreasing in the last time-period. There conflict lines are investigated; the 'old' East-West conflict, the new Cold War around China,

and the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the former sharply limited air interaction in the 'fifties,' its impact is now decreasing dramatically, while the new Cold War, if anything, is becoming more pronounced, and the Arab countries and Israel remain totally disconnected as far as air interactions are concerned. The author concludes that this interaction network is developing more rapidly at the top than at the bottom of the international system and that the rank of a nation is becoming increasingly important over time as a determinant of interaction. A policy which aims at creating a 'welfare world' with decreased discrepancies between topdogs and underdogs must also take into account the differences in interaction possibilities. A few suggestions are given as how this might be done. (Abstract supplied)

425

Gurr, Ted. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN CIVIL VIOLENCE. World politics, v. 20, Jan. 1968: 245-278. D839.W57, v. 20

A revised version "of a paper read to the panel on 'The Psychology of Political Unrest,' at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, New York, September 2-6, 1966."

Political scientists must view violent civil conflict as a relevant topic of political inquiry. Not only is it capable of explanation, but "we know enough about the sources of human violence to specify in general, theoretical terms some of the social patterns that dispose men to collective violence." Psychological explanations of violence have generally fallen into one of three categories: that it is innate, that it is solely learned, or that it "is an innate response activated by frustration." The latter--the frustration-aggression approach--seems to bear the most promise. Deprivation relative to the environment's value capabilities forms the necessary precondition, creating a frustration to which the emotional response is anger. The greater the anger, the more aggression; the greater the modal strength of collective anger, the greater the civil violence. From an analysis of the sources of frustration--the disparity between value expectations and value capabilities--and of the operation of mediatory variables, such as social control or social facilitation, a model consisting of 11 theoretical propositions can be derived. This framework is formally restricted to physical violence but is probably applicable to nonphysical social unrest such as bloodless coups, etc. It does not constitute "a theory of the revolutionary process or of the outcomes of strife, but of the conditions that determine the likelihood and magnitude of strife." Empirical studies, of both the comparative and case varieties, should be pursued with this framework, which aids in specifying the types of information and variables to be sought.

426

Haas, Michael. BRIDGE-BUILDING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A NEOTRADITIONAL PLEA. International studies quarterly, v. 11, Dec. 1967: 320-338. D839.B2, v. 11

Assesses the "behavioralist-traditionalist" dispute in the discipline of international relations and suggests that the two can productively synthesize.

427

Hamon, Léo. RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA: A FRENCH VIEWPOINT. NATO letter, v. 15, Nov. 1967: 20-22. D845.2.A44, v. 15

When the Atlantic Pact was initiated Europe was in ruins and was willing to relinquish certain areas of sovereignty to ensure its security. However, with the return of prosperity and the relaxation of East-West tensions, European countries are again anxious to assert their identities. An "Atlantic Europe" only exacerbates the problems of political division, so Europeans must look to a "European Europe" to solve their problems. True European unity can only evolve slowly, through meaningful cooperation that will treat the common problems--yet respect the diversity--of all the states. An assumption by Europeans of their own responsibilities does not exclude cultural and economic links with the United States. A "European Europe" can still be the friend of America "provided both parties understand that to be 'different' is not to be enemies but means that both sides have much to contribute to the common friendship."

428

Herz, John H. [EFFECTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Auswirkungen des wissenschaftlich-technischen Prozesses auf die internationalen Beziehungen. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, v. 8, Sept. 1967: 391-411. JA14.P63, v. 8

A slightly revised form of a paper read at the American University, Washington, D.C., in a series of lectures, "Theories of International Relations."

The acceleration of modern technology in the long run brings about national and international instability. The modern arms race, for instance, which threatens mankind's survival, requires the international control of individual nations by a world authority, to some extent at least. But the development of sophisticated control devices may pave the way for tyranny, especially if authorities tend to ignore the social and moral consequences of the technological means at their disposal, if they are too simplistic in applying those means, or if the applied control measures foster conformism. A remedy against these threats is "technological disobedience," which in such cases becomes a moral duty.

429

Hildebrandt, Walter. [THE EASING OF TENSIONS. PERSPECTIVES AND PREREQUISITES] Entspannung. Perspektiven und Voraussetzungen. Moderne Welt, v. 8, no. 3, 1967: 291-316. D839.M58, v. 8

Reviews contemporary writings on, and doctrines of, the relaxation of East-West tensions, human society and international relations. Among the authors discussed are: Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Marshall D. Shulman, Henry A. Kissinger, Ludwig Freund, Karl Jaspers, Karl Barth, Hannah Arendt, Ralf Dahrendorf, Herbert Marcuse, Hans Kelsen, Leopold Labedz, Leszek Kołakowski, Hannelore Hamel, Merle Fainsod, Franklin Mark Osanka, Arnold Bergstraesser, Ernst Niekisch, Michael Oakeshott, Hans Peter Dreitzel, Heinz Hartmann, Gerhard Wurzbacher, Gilberto

Freyre, Fritz Kopp, Karl J. Newman, Herbert J. Muller, Hans Maier, Antoine Oldendorff, Franz Klüber, Martinus G. Plattel, Harold Wilson, Dirk U. Stikker, Uwe Nehrlich, Raymond Aron, and Martin Shubik.

430
Hinton, Harold C. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ARMS CONTROL. In Dougherty, James E., and J. F. Lehman, eds. Arms control for the late sixties. Princeton, N. J., D. Van Nostrand [1967] p. 115-120.
JX1974. A75

China began nuclear weapons development in 1956 because of its mounting concern over the reliability of Soviet strategic protection. In 1960 Soviet technical and military assistance to China was terminated because of increasing anxiety resulting from Chinese behavior and policies toward peace and war. Today China is working to make at least a token entry into the superpower club. In the main the Chinese favor nuclear proliferation because they realize that, except for West Germany, there will probably be no more big nuclear powers. Proliferation of national nuclear forces might also frighten Russia and America into considering nuclear disarmament along the lines advocated by the Chinese. The Chinese use disarmament as a convenient political tool. In 1962 when the Soviet Union and the United States were on the verge of signing a test ban treaty, China was demanding complete and general disarmament. To the Chinese the test ban treaty was a conspiracy to rule the world; it weakened any chances for Soviet strategic superiority, which the Chinese believed was an essential prelude to any disarmament. After the treaty was signed China made more sweeping demand--complete nuclear disarmament, including the destruction of both American and Soviet stockpiles and delivery systems, and atom-free zones. After their first nuclear test in 1964, the Chinese dropped their demand for atom-free zones in favor of a no-first-use pledge, which if accepted by the a United States would have amounted to "trading one test for the neutralization more or less of the entire American strategic nuclear force." China is against international peacekeeping machinery and opposes any intervention by the United Nations, a policy stemming from bitter memories of the Korean War, when it was condemned for aggression by the U. N. It seems unlikely that China will participate in any formal disarmament or arms control negotiations until it is seated in the U. N. Its condition for joining the international organization, that the Chinese Nationalists be expelled, precludes any multilateral arms control or disarmament arrangement in the foreseeable future.

431
Kaplan, Harold. THE NEW COLD WAR. New leader, v. 51, Jan. 1, 1968: 3-6.
HX1. N37, v. 51

There is a cold war between the United States and France. And the French are quite frank about it. General Ailleret, the French Chief of Staff, stated recently that France's nuclear strategy is headed toward an "all-azimuth" defense, with missiles aimed eastward as well as westward. A Gaullist commentator, George Broussine, went even further by announcing that future French foreign policy "will be essentially oriented against the predominance of the United States in all fields and in all parts of the world where it is exercised." De Gaulle's official line is that American power dominates the world, posing a threat to small nations; hence the French can forget about other threats and concentrate on the one lurking in the West. There are three roads to world order--through international institutions, through superpower alliances "to keep the peace by the simple effect of stalemate," and through balkanization, in which small nations plot with the big ones, each building its foreign policy around interests rather than friendships.
De Gaulle sees only two ways of organizing the world: collusion between superpowers or balkanization. His refusal to join disarmament talks, disregard of the nuclear test ban, nonsupport of U. N. peacekeeping projects, and provocation in Canada all add up to a destructive peacebreaking policy. In a recent statement in New York, Jean Monnet of France admonished that "great entities with comparable dimensions and resources" are essential for world stability. He also stressed that other nations will realize their aspirations only in a "climate of peace created by the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe on the road to unification." If this is the right formula for peace then France's attempt to undermine the power of at least two in this trio is "a contemporary tragedy."

432
Kohnstamm, Max. UTOPIA IN A NUCLEAR AGE. Interplay of European/American affairs, v. 1, Aug./Sept. 1967: 9-14. P&GP RR

While the utopia of peace through a policy of "back to normalcy" or total disarmament defies past history and human nature, the utopian model of a united Europe in partnership with the United States with both partners bound by common laws, rules, and institutions seems more reasonable and less in conflict with historical experience. To create this model the participants must attempt to overcome the anarchy of international relations and establish an international structure. The European Economic Community, despite its deficiencies, is the "indispensable means of preparing the ground for inventive action that can only be launched through new decisions enacted within the existing national structures." Nations can lessen tensions and endeavor to prevent war only if they are tied together by laws. These laws, which would be enforceable, would evolve out of a long process of cultural and economic contacts between East and West; such contacts would also gradually build up peaceful sentiments that would create conditions suitable for the introduction of collective institutions.

433
Lumsden, Malvern. SOCIAL POSITION AND COGNITIVE STYLE IN STRATEGIC THINKING. Journal of peace research, v. 4, no. 3, 1967: 289-303.
AS9. J6, v. 4

An experiment was carried out where 30 psychology students played 100 trials of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. They also completed a questionnaire giving indicators of their own and their father's social position, and their attitudes and knowledge of international affairs, and the Cantril scale measuring expectations of change for the self and the nation. Sex was the only indicator of social position of the students themselves which discriminated between them. It was shown to correlate highly with the level of co-operation in the game, and with knowledge of but not attitudes to international affairs. For women, but not for men, there was a strong negative correlation between social

position and high expectations of improvement for the nation. It is suggested that the acculturation process undergone in becoming a student is reflected in the cognitive style of the subjects. This is shown in responses to opinion questions, which become increasingly homogenous in spite of the social background of the respondents. In contradistinction there is the cognitive mode, employed in choosing between strategies of competition and co-operation in the game. This is not so influenced by the student sub-culture and is more determined by the basic influences on personality such as sex and the social background and situation. Thus the findings do not support at the individual level the hypothesis of a linear relationship between attitudes to international affairs and level of co-operation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, rather, they suggest that the picture is complicated by intervening variables. (Abstract supplied)

434
THE MULTI-SUPERPOWER WORLD. Economist, v. 225, Oct. 21, 1967: 254-256.
HG11.E2, v. 225

Prospects are not bright for the maintenance of world order following the end of the cold war. Today there are only two superpowers; and they both have the capability for and an interest in restricting conflict. However, by the mid-1970's there could be as many as five superpowers, which would enormously complicate control of the world system. The emergence of a united Western Europe could upset the balance of power in Europe. If Japan and China attain Great Power status in the 1970's as expected, they would join Russia and the United States in a dangerous competition for influence in Asia. The situation in Asia would become even more dangerous if Japan acquired nuclear weapons. The new world order would also be threatened by the struggles of the underdeveloped countries. Since crises in underdeveloped areas often involve Great Power rivalries, they would be more likely to escalate into major conflicts when more Great Powers enter the scene. Although there is little hope for an organized world during the next decade, there is at least one major hope for world peace. The industrial nations have shown that they are interested in keeping world peace and perhaps they might cooperate in enforcing it.

435
North, Robert C. CHINESE COMMUNISM. New York, McGraw-Hill [1966] 256 p. illus. (World university library) DS740.N6
Bibliography: p. 238-248.

The history and development of communism in China North discusses mainland China's recent history in the final chapter, "Communist China in a nuclear world," describing Peking's role in today's world of cataclysmic changes. A chronology, "biographical register," and bibliography conclude the book.

436
Odescalchi, Edmond P. THE NATURE AND CONTROL OF AGGRESSION. Modern age, v. 11, fall 1967: 374-380. AP2.M628, v. 11

Since man is a product of evolution it is important, in seeking workable substitutes for war, to examine the natural laws that govern human social behavior. Almost all vertebrates and many invertebrates behave aggressively because of their biological drive for spacing and selection; i.e., the distribution of territory and the survival of the fittest. Many subhuman species have evolved a pattern of ritualistic fighting that avoids excessive damage to individuals while allowing for the release of aggressive tendencies. Mortal combat is unnecessary as long as the control of the territory or social dominance is maintained. Nature's controls on aggressive behavior have not yet embraced man, because with the invention of weapons he obtained power far beyond his genetic development. In order to inhibit intracommunity violence in human social groups, aggression is often redirected against an outside enemy. The hierarchical structure within a society also tends to inhibit intracommunity aggression by establishing patterns of dominance and submission. As long as these patterns remain undisturbed, law and order can be maintained. History has shown that man cannot legislate aggression out of existence. He will tend to fight when cornered and to sacrifice the well-being of others in his quest for power and prestige. His only hope is that in following the natural pattern he will find ways to ritualize his military conflicts, channel competitive urges into constructive outlets, and release tension by verbalizing grievances on an international level.

437
Pearson, Lester B. NATO AND A CHANGING EUROPE. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. Canadian weekly bulletin, v. 22, Dec. 13, 1967: 1-2.
P&GP RR

Excerpts "from an address by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson at the Mansion House, London, England, on November 27."

The dream of an Atlantic community of interdependent states willing to pool their sovereignty to achieve collective security has failed because NATO has not been able to take effective measures for collective political action. Indeed collective security has lost some of its immediate urgency because of greater cooperation between East and West European states. The political and military realities on which NATO was founded have changed as a result of the fluid international situation and the fact that the threat to Western Europe has been superseded by tensions and conflicts in other parts of the world. If NATO is to adapt effectively to these changes it must take into account Western Europe's new strength and confidence and its desire for a greater share in the control of the alliance and its policies. These changes are a challenge not only to NATO but also to the progress of a united Europe--a Europe with its own political and military role but closely associated with the United States.

438
Petković, Ranko. EUROPE AND LOCAL WARS. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Oct. 20, 1967: 17.
D839.R4, v. 18

The year 1967 started rather optimistically with the feeling that the unbridgeable obstacles hindering European rapprochement had vanished. The Vietnam War and other minor conflicts in the world were regarded as marginal episodes not constituting any threat to Europe, and the concept of the indivisibility of peace began to seem obsolete. In this situation the Middle East War acted as a shock. It demonstrated that the negative repercussions of local wars inevi-

tably affect more or less the whole world, and if peace is jeopardized anywhere, European security is also endangered. The events in Vietnam and in the Middle East represent a link in the political chain of which Europe is a part. Therefore the end of the Vietnam War is an essential premise for a stable situation in Europe. Recent events have reaffirmed the idea of the indivisibility of peace, which had been thoughtlessly placed in jeopardy.

439
Rummel, Rudolph J. UNDERSTANDING FACTOR ANALYSIS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Dec. 1967: 444-480. JX1901.J6, v. 11

Confronted with entangled behavior, unknown interdependencies, masses of qualitative and quantitative variables, and bad data, many social scientists are turning toward factor analysis to uncover major social and international patterns. The problem of communicating their results is formidable, however, because many other scholars are unfamiliar with this type of analysis. The aim of this paper is to draw a conceptual map of the method and clarify the technical paraphernalia so that consumers of factor studies can interpret them usefully. Topics include the relationship of factor analysis to scientific method; the factor model; interpreting factor tables; and factor rotation. Sample international data are used as illustrations, and the paper includes a bibliography of factor analysis in conflict and international relations. (Abstract supplied)

440
Scalapino, Robert A. NATIONALISM IN ASIA: REALITY AND MYTH. Orbis, v. 10, winter 1967: 1176-1184. D839.O68, v. 10

Nationalism is the strongest political factor in Asia and has affected mostly the Communist countries of that area. Nationalism was born in the Far East as a reaction to Western domination. However, today it no longer thrives on anti-Westernism as its source of inspiration except in a few totalitarian states like Communist China that cultivate xenophobia and anti-Western feeling; recent "Red Guard" actions were reminiscent of the Boxer era. With the exception of Japan the institutionalization of nationalism is nonexistent in Asia. Because of the absence of a modern socioeconomic infrastructure, nationalism exists instead in the concept of the cult of personality; Nehru was India and Sukarno was Indonesia. The peasant or "common man" has adhered to his regional traditions and identifies himself with his nation through a personality such as Mao Tse-tung. Only the political elite in Asia have embraced nationalism, and its impact has produced a deep ambivalence among them in regard to values and policies. Postindependence Asian leaders face a unique problem as a result of their desire to identify with the ethnic majority and their being "Westernized" because of foreign or foreign-supervised higher education. This is basically the cause for the love-hate attitude that many of the elite have toward the West. They are also ambivalent about policy; they advocate nonalinement, on the one hand, and, on the other, request foreign aid from world powers while sharply criticizing them. However this kind of Asian nationalism, which has developed since 1945 and is encouraged by Western sympathy and a Western guilt complex related to the colonial era, is ending. A revisionist attitude in the West that "recoils from the ideological and sentimental excesses of the past" is presenting a growing challenge to the new direction in Asian policies. This revisionism, which is taking the form of a spirited Western nationalism, may exacerbate elitist-mass relations in Asia. However, the age of Western aid and Western-Asian cooperation is not over. In fact "it is entirely possible that the trends indicated may make such activities far more worthwhile and vital than in the past."

441
Sicher, Lydia, and Harold H. Mosak. AGGRESSION AS A SECONDARY PHENOMENON. Journal of individual psychology, v. 23, Nov. 1967: 232-235. BF1.J65, v. 23

Classic Freudian psychology holds human aggression to be innate and cites as evidence the widespread enjoyment of murder mysteries and prizefights, not to mention fighting itself. Adler and his followers in psychology, however, consider aggression only part of "a general upward striving" in man--"in the mentally healthy person in a socially useful, contributive direction." Vicarious aggression does not really evidence blood lust in most instances. In such "blood" sports as bullfighting and boxing, again the technical skill of the participants provides the major thrill for enthusiasts--the gore is secondary. Partisanship also contributes to the excitement of such sports, as does identification with the underdog. Actual hostility and aggression--the universal fighting among men that sometimes even takes priority over the sexual drive--are apparently motivated by fear and greed directed toward "physical survival and psychological survival." Fears concerning survival, coupled with the belief that the best defense is a good offense, can lead to the advocacy of preventive wars. An individual who calls for such wars is not necessarily hostile and aggressive but may only be frightened, not only for his physical but also his psychological survival--the survival of his value system or ideology. Greed can reinforce these fears when status is based on possession. Being a have-not under such conditions seems unfair, and greed and its concomitant hostility becomes legitimized. If fascination with the beauty and excitement of action motivates vicarious aggression, and fear and greed bring about actual fighting, human aggression is probably not innate or universal.

442
Staar, Richard F. [EAST EUROPE IN TRANSITION. AN APPRAISAL] Osteuropa im Wandel. Eine Bestandsaufnahme. Moderne Welt, v. 8, no. 3, 1967: 258-278. D839.M58, v. 8

Considers the changes in the Soviet bloc in Europe since 1947, especially since Khrushchev's downfall. Staar discusses personnel changes in Communist leadership in the East European nations, intrabloc conflicts, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the limitations of East-West détente. He sees as the main limitations of détente the coercive forms of government in Eastern Europe and the determination of the Communist regimes to preserve their rule against the will of the majority of the population.

443
Stagner, Ross. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. Belmont, Calif., Brooks/Cole Pub. Co. [1967] 234 p. illus. (Contemporary

psychology series) JX1255.S8
Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. 219-277)

Partial contents.--Men make policy decisions.--Images and wars.--Images in the cold war.--The dynamics of national loyalty.--The dynamics of national hostility.--Emotion and ideology.--Economic influences on thinking.--Social role and policy decisions.--Group influences on decisions: the power elite.--The emerging nations.--Negotiation: the dialogue of the deaf.--An arms race in reverse.--International organization.--The long road to peace.

Discusses international conflict in terms of human behavior. Although Stagner emphasizes that psychological science alone cannot lead to an understanding of international affairs, he feels it provides valuable insight into the decisionmaking process of a nation's leaders and citizens. Since national policy is made and executed by men, it is influenced by human emotions, aspirations, and attitudes as well as the traditions and structure of the society. Disputes between nations are often caused by man's aspirations for security and power. Stagner points out that human nature is dynamic, and thus there will always be groups of people who will agitate for a more satisfactory environment. However, he says that this does not mean war is inevitable, for it is possible that a means may be found for attaining peaceful conflict resolution.

444
Vellut, Jean-Luc. SMALLER STATES AND THE PROBLEM OF WAR AND PEACE: SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE EMERGENCE OF SMALLER STATES IN AFRICA. Journal of peace research, v. 4, no. 3, 1967: 252-269. AS9.J6, v. 4

The recent increase in the membership of our international system points to the need of a reappraisal of the international role of small powers. A new category should in fact be introduced in an analysis of international membership, that of the very small states. There are at least two schools of thought on the relevance of small powers to the problems of war and peace. One school holds that small powers lead to conflict, and should be closely supervised by great powers. The other adheres to the view that small powers reduce tension by acting as shock-absorbers among the big powers. The creation of smaller states on a large scale indicated that great powers more than ever practice the policy of reducing conflict through the smaller states. This policy may be self-defeating. Though developed states cover some of the visible cost of setting up new very small states by satisfying the membership requirements of the international system, the smaller states are nevertheless paying a hidden cost for their formal status of sovereignty: the gap between formal and real status tends to be widening in the case of the very small states. Such fresh rank disequilibrium hardly coincides with the optimistic view that smaller states are conducive to the relaxation of international tension. (Abstract supplied)

445
Wagenlehner, Günther. [THE WORLD'S GENERAL IDEOLOGICAL SITUATION UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF SOVIET COMMUNISM] Die ideologische Gesamtsituation in der Welt unter dem Einfluss des Sowjetkommunismus. Osteuropa, v. 17, Oct./Nov. 1967: 767-780. DR1.O8, v. 17

The first historical example of a new concentration of state power, the totalitarian state, has been produced by Soviet communism. This has influenced not only world Communist ideology but other ideologies and movements for a new world order as well. To a world that distrusts existing authorities, escape lies in "an abstract authority," especially if the abstract authority offers a panacea for all the world's ills, as communism has. However, the modern industrial society now emerging in the Soviet totalitarian system makes the latter increasingly susceptible to non-Communist influence because communism, along with all other existing ideologies, has proved to be completely useless in alleviating the world's greatest social problem, the contrast between the rich and poor nations.

446
Washburn, A. Michael, and Willard H. Mitchell. WALT ROSTOW, VIETNAM, AND THE FUTURE TASKS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: TWO "SECOND GENERATION" DISSENTS. [Princeton, N. J.] Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1967. 45 p. (Princeton University. Center of International Studies. Policy memorandum no. 33) E744.W2955

Contains Dr. Walt W. Rostow's Sir Montague Burton Lecture delivered on February 23, 1967, at the University of Leeds, England, entitled "The Great Transition: Tasks of the First and Second Postwar Generations" and two analyses of the lecture by master's degree candidates at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. In his lecture Dr. Rostow outlined the failures and achievements of the first postwar generation and the work to be done by the second generation to create a viable world order. In reviewing trends in international affairs he concluded that the world is in the midst of a transition from the cold war period to a more humane and constructive era. The two student essays are presented as examples of second-generation response to Rostow's contention that "if we have the common will to hold together and get on with the job--the struggle in Vietnam might be the last great confrontation of the postwar era." Washburn wrote from the perspective of the student of intellectual history and of human behavior and Mitchell from that of the student of international politics. Both students challenged a number of Dr. Rostow's assumptions and felt that his approach had little chance of leading to world peace and security.

447
Westen, Klaus. [THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD'S JURISPRUDENCE] Die Sowjetunion und ihr Einfluss auf das Rechtsdenken der Welt. Osteuropa, v. 17, Oct./Nov. 1967: 811-837. DR1.O8, v. 17

After the Soviet legal system had spread to Eastern Europe, interpretation of Soviet legal institutions became more ideologically unorthodox. Consequently, Soviet jurisprudence is influenced less and less by ideological maxims. This development portends better cooperation between the East and West on legal problems. The influence of Soviet law on the Third World has thus far been inconclusive.

448
Wohlstetter, Albert. ILLUSIONS OF DISTANCE. Foreign affairs, v. 46, Jan. 1968: 242-255. D410.F6, v. 46

Frustration over the long-term American involvement in remote battles and the feeling that long-distance troubles do not concern the United States have encouraged the growth of a new isolationism in America. The new isolationists believe that big powers should confine their activities to their own "spheres of influence." However, they fail to consider the impact of modern technology, which will penetrate the geographic barriers that they claim circumscribe a country's military capability and national interests. Future technological improvements in transport and communications will enhance the capacity of the major powers for fighting classical wars in remote theaters. Improvements in long-distance communications and transport will multiply remote cultural and economic contacts. Trade and capital investment on a world-wide scale will often benefit a country more than membership in a grouping based only on geographic proximity. On the other hand, by enlarging the "neighborhood," modern technology increases the potential for antagonism as well as for cooperation. A country's basic safety interests will extend farther beyond its boundaries than ever before. Since almost any country would be affected by the coercion of some nonnuclear country by a nuclear power, the question of nuclear guarantees arises. A regional multilateral nuclear force would not suit certain diverse regions such as Asia and would tend to extend the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, long-distance nuclear commitments by big powers to protect nonnuclear powers against long-distance nuclear threats are the best existing guarantees for world stability.

449
Zartman, I. William. AFRICA AS A SUBORDINATE STATE SYSTEM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. International organization, v. 21, summer 1967: 545-564. JX1901.I55, v. 21

Describes and analyzes the subordinate state system of Africa "as a fact in contemporary world politics, showing the actions that have expressly or involuntarily tended to perpetuate it." Zartman defines the components of a subordinate state system, pointing out their relevance to African relations. African political organization serves inwardly as a framework for relations between members and outwardly as an alliance, and the African system is autonomous although not independent. It is open to outside influences whenever its burdens exceed its capabilities. Zartman also elaborates on the configuration and distribution of African power, the nature and patterns of relations, and guidelines for policy governed by the three primary goals of the African states: independence, development, and unity. He concludes by suggesting areas where the current system could change.

450
Zinnes, Dina A. AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE BALANCE OF POWER THEORIES. Journal of peace research, v. 4, no. 3, 1967: 270-288. AS9.J6, v. 4

This study examines the literature concerning the 'balance of power' concept, and abstracts from these discussions seven hypotheses which postulate the international consequences of a balance of power system. The dependent variable of these hypotheses is generally agreed to be either peace or the preservation of the system. Considerable variability, however, is found in the possible interpretations of the independent variable, a 'balance of power.' Seven different definitions of a balance of power are constructed from the literature and then compared. One of the hypotheses, proposed by Singer and Small, has been subjected to empirical tests. However, due to certain difficulties in their research design, the results of their study are not yet applicable to a further understanding of the validity of any of the balance of power theories. The present author examines some of the difficulties of this analysis and suggests where the problems lie and several alternative solutions, with the hope that this initial study will be further pursued to provide the needed tests of at least one of the balance of power theories. (Abstract supplied)

B. FOREIGN POLICIES

451
Adam, Thomas R. WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC REALM. New York, Random House [1967] 246 p. map. (Studies in political science, PS61) DU29.A3

Contents. --A note on the Pacific realm. --The West and the Pacific realm. --The consequences of Western dominion. --The character of British interests. --The Malaysian Federation. --The policies of Indonesia. --France in the Pacific. --The place of the antipodean nations: Australia and New Zealand. --The territorial stake of the United States. --The United States alliance network. --The prospects of regionalism. --Some speculations.

Studies the political, economic, and strategic interests of the major Western powers, particularly the United States, in the broad area of the Pacific known as Oceania. Adam also examines the effects that Western policies have had on the development of the lands and the people of this region during and after the era of colonial domination.

452
Andrén, Nils B. E. POWER-BALANCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT. A PERSPECTIVE ON SWEDISH FOREIGN POLICY. Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell [1967] 212 p. DL867.A67
Bibliography: p. 209-210.

Partial contents. --A historical perspective. --Neutrality and international solidarity. --A foreign policy of non-alignment. --NATO or joint Scandinavian defense? --Sweden and the peace promoting activities of the United Nations. --The concept of European unity. --Sweden and the Nordic countries. --Sweden and the underdeveloped countries. --Defense, nuclear weapons, disarmament. --The conditions of non-alignment.

Surveys the significant aspects and phases of Swedish foreign policy after World War II. In the hope of remaining neutral in the event of a Great Power war, Sweden has consistently followed a policy of nonalinement in its approach to world affairs. Since the world scene is dominated by the disputes between the Great Powers, Sweden has been forced to approach international politics rather passively, even though its nonalinement policy is self-imposed and not governed by an international guarantee or treaty. However, by keeping free of Great Power commitments Sweden is now in a position to actively serve the interests of world peace as an objective moderator in international disputes.

453
THE ANTI-CHINESE ALLIANCE: USA, USSR, INDIA. Minority of one, v. 9, Nov. 1967: 2-4. illus.
AP2. M55985, v. 9

Soviet and American attitudes toward Red China are undoubtedly concurrent; their compatibility is reflected in the two countries' friendly relations with India. India, as a result of its border dispute with China, has become a political as well as military ally of the United States. The border clashes of 1962 were perpetrated by India in an effort to obtain American aid and to aline itself at any cost with the West. India's role in the anti-Chinese alliance has been thankless and unprofitable. It has shed blood on its border but has failed to extract economic benefits. Whatever benefits there are have already been collected by the superpowers, who cleverly avoid confronting each other while commonly confronting Red China. India's dispute with China, along with the Vietnam War, figures in America's continental Asia strategy, which is designed to escalate the "Asian hot war from its Vietnamese to its Chinese phase." Russia has not responded to this unilateral escalation. Instead both the United States and the Soviet Union are directing an anti-Chinese policy that is reflected not only in the nuclear test ban treaty but in the harmonization of Russian and American domestic antimissile defenses, which are directed against the Chinese threat rather than the Russian or American.

454
Apalin, G. [PEKING'S POLICY IN ASIA AND AFRICA: INTENTIONS AND RESULTS] Politika Pekina v Azii i Afrike: zamysly i itogi. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 11, Sept. 1967: 8-11. DS1. S7, v. 11

China is trying to force its hegemony on Africa and Asia, and it considers the Soviet Union the main obstacle in its path. The African and Asian countries want to strengthen their political and economic independence and to prevent neo-colonial expansion into their territories. The Soviet Union has granted 4 billion rubles on favorable terms to these countries for economic development; Peking also assists them, but basically in agriculture and light industry. However, according to Peking, the poor peoples of Asia and Africa should have no confidence in the rich countries, whether they are capitalist or Socialist. Peking's prestige is diminishing because of its policy of undermining Socialist solidarity; its revolutionary example in the struggle of the world countryside (Asia, Africa, and Latin America) against the world cities by "national wars" has not been adopted by the developing countries; and its adventurist political course is being rejected by the peoples of Asia and Africa. In the years 1960-64, 11 African countries established diplomatic relations with Peking. By 1966 four of them had broken off relations; but the constructive and fruitful foreign policy of the Soviet Union is respected and praised.

455
[BERLIN-BONN PACT] Democratic German report, v. 16, Oct. 6, 1967: 137-139.
DD261. D3, v. 16

Contents. --Berlin-Bonn pact mooted. --GDR Government proposals for negotiations.

Reports on East German proposals to West Germany on normalizing relations. The text, in English, of the September 18, 1967, letter from East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph to West German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger is given. Accompanying the letter was an East German draft of a proposed treaty between the two German states, which calls for establishment of normal relations between the parties, mutual renunciation of the use of force against each other, recognition of the existing boundaries in Europe, recognition of West Berlin "as an independent political unit," and the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the two Germanies.

456
Braunmühl, Claudia von. [POINTS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE. AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRESENT POLICY OF ALLIANCE] Konfliktstoffe zwischen USA und Frankreich. Eine Untersuchung über heutige Bündnispolitik. Politische Meinung, v. 12, no. 2/3, 1967: 49-60.
H5. P75, v. 12

Examines the history of France's progressing split with the United States over the Atlantic alliance and the political unity of Western Europe. Among the topics discussed are NATO's role; the nuclear policies of the United States, Great Britain, and France; and nationalism as a motive for French and American policies toward the alliance.

457
Bromke, Adam. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1960'S. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 7, Oct. 1967: 13-15.
P&GP RR

The discrepancy between Marxism-Leninism and the conduct of Soviet foreign policy has presented the Kremlin leaders with a serious dilemma. Under Lenin, and especially under Stalin, Soviet foreign policy had a dual character: the protection of Russia's national interests with, and the spreading of communism exemplified by Soviet territorial expansion after World War II. After Stalin's death Khrushchev realized that the triumph of communism could not be achieved by nuclear war; instead he used the policy of "peaceful coexistence" as a strategy to gain prestige and convert the underdeveloped world to communism. However Khrushchev did not realize any significant gains, and as a result of the dispute with Red China the harmony between Russia's national interests and the objectives of international communism was disrupted. By 1964 Khrushchev had chosen a policy of rapprochement with the West--a policy since followed by Brezhnev and Kosygin. It appears that Brezhnev and Kosygin "have opted for the protection of the Soviet state at the expense of world-wide Communist revolution." The present transformation of Soviet policy is a hopeful sign that there may one day be a true rapprochement between Russia and the United States.

458
Brown, J. F. [RUMANIA--AN INSUBORDINATE ALLY. RUMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE YEAR 1967] Rumänien--der unbotmässige Verbündete. Die rumänische Aussenpolitik im Jahre 1967. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Dec. 25, 1967: 875-885.
D839. E86, v. 22

Sees signs that Rumania is leaning toward neutralism and growing more detached from the Warsaw Pact

293-980 O - 68 - 2

Organization. Brown discusses, among other things, the effect on Rumania of its partial alienation from the Soviet bloc.

459
Cottam, Richard W. COMPETITIVE INTERFERENCE AND TWENTIETH CENTURY DIPLOMACY. [Pittsburgh] University of Pittsburgh Press [1967] 243 p.
JX1417. C67

Questions the contemporaneity of American diplomacy, whose bureaucracy has grown while its style has remained ad hoc and intuitive.

460
Coulmas, Peter. [NATIONALISM AND THE EASING OF TENSIONS] Entspannung und Nationalismus [by] P. C. Moderne Welt, v. 8, no. 3, 1967: 235-241.
D839. M58, v. 8

American, Soviet, and French policies for easing East-West tensions each pursue different goals. "The Soviets vigorously aim at changing the status quo," the United States at preserving it, and France at the eventual establishment of a "European Europe of Fatherlands" to serve as a moderator between the two superpowers. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as to the future world order persists despite their respective détente policies. But the two blocs have become less cohesive, and the polycentrism that has ensued need not break the existing military alliances and may well enhance the relaxation of East-West tensions. Radical anti-Americanism in the West is, however, incompatible with an effective détente policy. Détente should not be a goal in itself but a means for establishment of a peaceful international order.

461
Delmas, Claude. [THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE "BOMB"] La tension Sino-Soviétique et "la bombe." Revue de défense nationale, v. 23, Dec. 1967: 2034-2043. D410. R45, v. 23

A brief history of the causes of the Sino-Soviet conflict including examination of each country's attitude toward its nuclear power. The main causes of the split are Russia's refusal to give the Chinese the formula for the atom bomb and its policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States. Delmas concludes that Russia has recognized the responsibilities that go along with nuclear weapons, while China refuses to recognize these reponsibilities and carries out a foreign policy based on threats to use nuclear weapons; this in itself is one of the fundamental aspects of Sino-Soviet tension.

462
[DOCUMENTATION ON THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY] Dokumentation zum VII. Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 19, June 1967: 4-36.
DD261. D4, v. 19

Statements on international peace and European security at the congress of East Germany's ruling (Communist) party, held in April 1967. Included are excerpts from the report of the First Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, Walter Ulbricht; a speech by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev; and the congress' discussion of foreign policy. Full texts of Ulbricht's closing speech and the congress resolutions are given. Congress participants pointed to Bonn's obstructionism with regard to East-West détente and disarmament and called for coexistence between the two German states. They condemned the American aggression in Vietnam and appealed to the citizens of the German Democratic Republic to intensify their class struggle and the fight against imperialism and capitalism.

463
14 EXPERTS LOOK AT U.S. FUTURE IN ASIA. U.S. news & world report, v. 64, Jan. 1, 1968: 29-31.
JK1. U65, v. 64

"From a statement on U.S. policy on Asia, drafted by 14 prominent political scientists and historians" at a 3-day conference sponsored in October 1967 by the Freedom House Public Affairs Institute. The full report was made public on December 20, 1967, and sent to 3,600 scholars. American policy in Japan, China, and Southeast Asia is discussed, and the conference participants stress that the stakes in Vietnam "go far beyond that nation." Withdrawal--i.e., acceptance of a Communist victory in Vietnam--"would serve as a major encouragement to those forces in the world opposing peaceful coexistence," and would "gravely jeopardize the possibilities of a political equilibrium in Asia," conditions scarcely conducive to peace. At the same time the United States should demonstrate a capacity to go down as well as up in limited war. No simple solution is feasible.

464
François-Poncet, André. GOODBYE TO NATO. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, winter 1967/68: 504-506. D839. A85, v. 5
Translated from Le Figaro, Paris, Oct. 10, 1967.
NEWSP

France withdrew from NATO because its leaders believed that the threat from Russia had disappeared--but has it? The Soviet Union has not changed its basic objective--world domination--but only its methods of achieving it. It has not, as Red China imputes, relinquished its "grand design." It has not freed those peoples under its control and has not abolished the Warsaw Pact; it has instead increased defense expenditures. For these reasons NATO has not lost its reason for existence. Indeed NATO is not only a military pact but a political organization headed by the North Atlantic Council, which it is hoped one day can bring about European union. By abandoning the Atlantic alliance France is helping Russia to destroy the shield that protects all Europeans from Communist oppression.

465
Fulbright, James William. THE ARROGANCE OF POWER. New York, Random House [1967, c1966] 264 p. E744. F886
Based on the Christian A. Herter lecture series, Johns Hopkins University, 1966.
Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. 259-264)

An examination of the direction of American foreign policy based on three lectures entitled "The Higher Patriotism," "The Revolution Abroad," and "The

Arrogance of Power." Fulbright expresses the hope "that America will escape those fatal temptations of power which have ruined other great nations and will instead confine herself to doing only that good in the world which she can do, both by direct effort and by the force of her own example." The United States must not exploit its position of power to enforce its view in an intolerant fashion but must approach world problems with understanding and generosity. Fulbright's outlook for America is optimistic; he feels that America's humanist traditions will give it the magnanimity to overcome the dangers of the "arrogance of power," even if this might involve the "loss of certain glories."

466
GOP STATEMENT ON NATO. Freedom & union, v. 22, Dec. 1967: 14-16. JX1901. F6, v. 22

Now that the potential price of failure is nuclear war, statesmen must succeed in adapting institutions for the maintenance of peace to evolutionary changes in the international order. U.S. policies toward Europe have delayed the updating of NATO in terms of the problems and opportunities of the 1960's and 1970's. The United States tends to blame NATO's troubles on De Gaulle; it reacts to crises only with stopgap measures; and it has undermined European confidence in American sincerity by its preference for bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. Because it has taken no new initiatives toward settling the German problem, the American Government has risked alienating West German political leaders. U.S. support of nuclear nonproliferation measures conflicts with its proposals for nuclear sharing in the alliance. The U.S. Government has virtually ignored article 2 of the NATO treaty, which was designed to enable the alliance to expand its functions from the military into the economic and political realms. And, finally, it has allowed its preoccupation with Vietnam to make it neglect European problems. A meaningful examination of NATO in terms of its current role would include consideration of a comprehensive Western trade policy toward the East, new proposals to end the division of Germany, and exploratory steps for the gradual political integration of the North Atlantic community. A NATO self-study should also include discussion of Europe's defense problems between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, creation of a permanent North Atlantic parliamentary body, procedures that would lead to the formation of a common North Atlantic foreign policy, and a multilateral North Atlantic aid program for the developing countries.

467
Gaulle, Charles de, Pres. France. [EVERYTHING COMMANDS US TO COME CLOSER TOGETHER] Poland (American edition) no. 162, Feb. 1968: 6, 22 illus. DK401. P45, 1968

English texts of De Gaulle's three speeches in Warsaw given on September 6, 1967; to the Polish Seym on September 11, 1967; and over Polish radio and television on September 12, 1967. (Władysław Gomułka's reply to the French President's public pronouncements in Poland is abstracted as item no. 469 in this bibliography.)

Détente, entente, and cooperation among peoples "from the Atlantic to the Urals" are the best means of solving the German problem and establishing a collective security on an all-European basis. Polish-French solidarity has a long tradition. The two nations' past experience proves that the fate of one of them has always had repercussions on the other. "Poland and France have not always been in accord with each other," but they have never fought or opposed each other, and "how high the price they had to pay when their alliance was not strong enough." Now France is able to play an increasingly independent role in Europe and the world, and Poland, with its "fully justified and well established frontiers," is gathering strength for its new prominent role. Political necessities compell the two nations to ever-closer political cooperation, "irrespective of the weight of the colossuses of this world." Thus France and Poland can eventually "consult each other regularly on specific problems." In addition to political cooperation, there is ever-growing economic, cultural and scientific cooperation between the two countries. The artificial barriers erected by the cold war must finally disappear.

468
Gerberding, William P. VIETNAM AND THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. Virginia quarterly review, v. 44, winter 1968: 19-42. AP2. V76, v. 44

Although it is impossible to predict the full impact of the Vietnam War upon future U.S. foreign policy before the war is concluded, the war has precipitated a widespread reappraisal of the fundamental principles of U.S. policy. Responsible leaders from both political parties have now joined the radical left in questioning the policy of worldwide containment of Communist aggression, which was the original rationale for U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. However, in spite of concern that the U.S. may be overextended militarily, economically, and politically, there are powerful intellectual-psychological barriers to alterations in the containment doctrine. It is not easy to discard the assumption that all aggression must be stopped, particularly when alternative criteria have not been formulated on which to base policy judgments. The existence of so many formal commitments with other countries also presents a barrier to any radical changes in foreign policy--it would prove difficult for the United States to "reduce such commitments without sullying her honor and her credibility and, therefore, her interests." Furthermore, many political leaders would cling to the old doctrines in preference to being accused of "not standing up to Communist aggressors." Thus, while the Vietnam War may not result in any immediate radical changes in U.S. foreign policy, it has at least pointed out the enormous increases in the costs and risks of the old policy and given some insight into the advisability of long-distance intervention.

469
Gomułka, Władysław. [WE ARE FOR EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY] Poland (American edition) no. 162, Feb. 1968: 23. DK401. P45, 1968

A September 11, 1967, speech in the Polish Seym addressed to De Gaulle. De Gaulle delivered his own address to the Seym on the same day. See item no. 467 in this bibliography.

President De Gaulle's wartime, postwar, and present contributions to the cause of his own country, Europe, and the world are well known in Poland. His

firm stand on Poland's western frontier along the Oder and Neisse rivers is fully appreciated by the Polish nation. That frontier, which France was "the first of all the Western states to recognize . . . as final and inviolable," is of crucial importance to European peace and security. Poland shares the French President's views on the need for an all-European settlement of Europe's security problem and on "liquidating the artificial barriers erected by the cold war." However, postwar Poland has drawn important conclusions from its historical experience. Its prewar political and military alliance with France failed to save the two countries from defeat. In World War II Poland's liberation and destiny were "decided on the eastern front." Thus the reborn Poland sees in its alliance with the Soviet Union and "other socialist countries of central, eastern and southern Europe" a fundamental guarantee of its security. Poland thinks that the only solution to the German problem that serves peace would be recognition of the existence and equal rights of the two German states. Poland attaches great importance to Franco-Polish rapprochement, "backed by broad economic, scientific and cultural cooperation."

470
Hassner, Pierre. [DÉTENTE POLICY À LA FRANÇAISE] Entspannungspolitik à la française. Moderne Welt, v. 8, no. 3, 1967: 242-257.
D839.M58, v. 8

De Gaulle's policy of East-West détente has apparently been inconsistent. Its prime function is to serve France's "grand design" for Europe. This explains the fluctuations and reversals of the French policy. De Gaulle one moment calls for the end of the cold war and the next works with Adenauer against Soviet-American accommodation; he proposes a revival of a traditional "concert of Great Powers" and then stresses the importance of the right of small nations to self-determination. France's tactical political considerations motivate its short-term détente policies, while its political strategy decides the long-term one. The relation between the two is determined in part by the amount of international tension.

471
Houn, Franklin W. THE PRINCIPLES AND OPERATIONAL CODE OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT. Journal of Asian studies, v. 27, Nov. 1967: 21-40.
DS501.F274, v. 27

Discusses the principles governing China's relations with its enemies. Since the emergence of the People's Republic in 1949, Peking has used catchy phrases to express the essence of its policy and to prescribe norms of individual behavior. Although the rules for its foreign policy have not been spelled out publicly, its internally tested strategies could apply to the international arena as well. In dealing with its adversaries Peking will rely on political warfare supported by military power. Communist China will not assent to an international agreement permitting its foes to retain their nuclear superiority while restraining it to an inferior status in the nuclear field. Peking can be expected to fight for its territorial integrity and political independence, but it will not always resort to "drastic measures against foreign trespassers without regard to consequences." Peking is aware of the frustrations of many Asian, African, and Latin American nations and also feels that its major foes are trying to isolate it. It will therefore try to organize a united front against "imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism" and thus to reduce the threat to itself.

472
Iriye, Akira. ACROSS THE PACIFIC: AN INNER HISTORY OF AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS. Introd. by John K. Fairbank. New York, Harcourt, Brace & World [1967] 361 p.
DS518.8.I73
Bibliography: p. 333-345.

Partial contents.--East Asia in America.--The Asian response to America.--The end of the century.--Imperialism--Japanese and American.--The genesis of American-Japanese antagonism.--Chinese nationalism and the United States.--America's failure to assist China.--Toward Pearl Harbor.--Images of the Pacific War.--Chinese communism and post-war Sino-American relations.--The military confrontation.--Epilogue: toward a more peaceful Pacific.

Describes the major phases and incidents of American relations with Japan and China since the end of the 18th century and includes an analysis of the successive images that these nations have had of one another over the years. Iriye states that after nearly two centuries of forming images of each other "Americans and Chinese seem only to have reached the point where any two nation-states would be at the initial stage of confrontation." He notes also that China's continued military growth has made imperative its cooperation in discussions of disarmament; nuclear disarmament agreements without China are ineffective. The possibility of a Chinese-American war has served not only to force policymakers to reconsider the U.S. attitude toward China but to focus attention on the question of Japanese national security. Whether the Japanese will continue to depend on America's "nuclear umbrella" or whether they will develop their own nuclear capabilities remains to be seen, but the question is bound to arise. The author concludes that "only when American-East Asian relations are seen as an intellectual problem," without propaganda, emotionalism, and "excessive empiricism," will it become possible to "transcend the past and look toward a more peaceful Pacific."

473
Lamberg, Robert F. [MOSCOW AND THE THIRD WORLD: THE ADVANTAGES AND DANGERS OF PLURALISM] Moskau und die Dritte Welt: Vorzüge und Gefahren des Pluralismus. Osteuropa, v. 17, Oct./Nov. 1967: 792-802. DR1.O8, v. 17

Considers Moscow's policies toward the Third World a failure. With the growing economic emancipation of uncommitted nations and the development of pluralism in their political systems, Soviet chances to win over these nations to communism will diminish rather than increase.

474
Lippmann, Walter. [JOHNSON AND DE GAULLE] Johnson und de Gaulle. Neue Rundschau, v. 78, no. 4, 1967: 543-548. AP30.N5, v. 78

Even with the political and cultural chasm between them, President Johnson and De Gaulle have one thing in common: each is attempting to achieve while in

office a change in the world situation requiring at least a generation and much greater potentialities than his nation now has. The fact that the United States has to tolerate Castro's Cuba and is in no position to guarantee an independent South Vietnam testifies to the limitations of its policies. De Gaulle's latest switch from alliance with Israel to support of the Arabs has been partly motivated by his growing fear of the American threat to the world balance of power. But this switch has not changed the balance at all. De Gaulle's hasty moves on the Continent, dictated no doubt by the realization that he has little time left for the unification of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, have been patently ineffective. The effectiveness of a nation's foreign policy is related to its domestic strength, to a sound social and political situation at home that makes it more effective in its international role. Otherwise power politics leads only to frustration, as is evident in Soviet foreign policy failures. France cannot conduct its foreign affairs effectively, nor can the United States reshape Asia, without first solving its burning domestic social and political problems.

475

Malnashan, Aurel. POSTULATES AND GOALS OF RUMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Oct. 5, 1967: 9-11. D839. R4, v. 18

The basic principles of Rumanian foreign policy are friendship, alliance, and fraternal cooperation with all Socialist countries. These principles are based on a common Socialist system, a unity of goals, and a common interest in the triumph of socialism, world peace, and the struggle against imperialism and reaction. Rumania desires cooperation not only with all Socialist countries--no matter what approach to socialism they have adopted--but also with other countries living under a different sociopolitical system. Its primary objective is to establish good relations with all the Balkan states and to improve the atmosphere in the area. Rumania feels that communism is now a constituent part of the world; therefore no settlement of international conflict can be achieved in the United Nations without the participation of the Communist countries. The cessation of the Vietnam War is today the central problem in international affairs. Israel must withdraw from all areas occupied during the recent war, including Jerusalem. All peaceful forces must unite to achieve security in Europe. Rumania recognizes the postwar boundaries of Germany and the two German states and wants good relations with both; its newly established diplomatic relations with West Germany are a first step. Since mankind's fundamental need today is disarmament, Rumania advocates prohibition of the production and use of nuclear weapons and liquidation of stockpiles. A nonproliferation treaty will be a positive step toward peace, international security, and the preservation of nations if measures are taken to prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons, permit all countries free access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and offer "security guarantees to atomic powers to the point of complete liquidation of nuclear weapons and a precise and honorable system of supervision based on the equality of states." Respect for the principle of equality among states and their equal participation in the settlement of international problems is a sine qua non of any improvement of the international environment.

476

Ojha, Ishwer C. CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM: THE LIMITS OF THE ALLIANCE. Current history, v. 54, Jan. 1968: 42-47. D410. C82, v. 54

North Vietnam has "zigzagged" its way through the Sino-Soviet conflict by remaining neutral or taking sides "when [its] national interests so dictated." Since 1964 and the Tonkin Gulf incident Russia has been unsuccessfully trying to pressure the North Vietnamese into making a negotiated settlement. Although the Russians played a part in influencing the North Vietnamese to accept the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Conferences, Hanoi, unimpressed with the results of the Conferences and aware of the heavy sacrifices it was making in the name of its so-called alliance with Russia and China, has resisted Soviet attempts to convene a new Geneva Conference. On the other hand Red China's insistence that North Vietnam fight a "protracted war" in the face of a continuously expanding American military commitment has caused relations between those two countries to deteriorate. In addition Red Chinese exhortation to the North Vietnamese to fight at a level that "will continue to allow China to pursue a policy of indirect confrontation with a minimum risk of direct involvement" is in conflict with Hanoi's national interests. Despite the aggravation of relations between North Vietnam and China and North Vietnam and Russia, the North Vietnamese continue to carry on the war with the much needed assistance of its northern neighbors in order to achieve their primary goal: the unification of Vietnam.

477

Ravisov, I. [AN UNPOPULAR POLICY] Nepopuliarnaia politika. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 11, Sept. 1967: 12-13. DS1. S7, v. 11

As the Arab press shows, the Arab peoples condemn the "cultural revolution" in China and Mao Tse-tung's reprisals against his political opponents. The newspapers stress that China is sliding into a military dictatorship headed by Mao and report ridicule of Chinese Moslems, their customs, and traditions by the ruling group. The press also points out Mao's attempts to arouse nationalistic feelings among the Arabs and the peoples of Africa and Asia and to turn them against the West and America. He even advises them to establish their own united nations organization. However, the Arabs and the Afro-Asian peoples understand that Mao is aiming at Chinese hegemony. Mao's anti-Soviet campaign and his call for a front against American imperialism that excludes the Soviet Union have provoked indignation among the progressive Arabs; efforts to isolate the Soviet Union from the revolutionary forces will serve the interests of imperialism and of the Americans in Vietnam. The Chinese leaders' activities in the Arab East create favorable conditions for the reactionaries in their efforts to undermine the front of the progressive forces in the area and discredit the ideals of socialism.

478

Rusk, Dean. AMERICAN PURPOSES AND THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN DIGNITY. In U. S. Dept. of State. News letter, no. 78, Oct. 1967: 2-5. JX1. U542, 1967

"The American position on Vietnam was stated by Secretary Rusk in an address before the American Legion National Convention in Boston on August 29."

Remembers past delusions that geographically distant conflicts do not concern the United States and the bitter awakening of a whole generation thrust to faraway places to face tasks it was not prepared for. Rusk recalls the birth of the United Nations, the cold war, and American responses to aggression since the midforties. He reviews U.S. involvement in Vietnam --from the August 1964 overwhelming vote for American assistance in defense of freedom in Southeast Asia, to the recent antiwar protests--and pits U.S. loyalty to its security treaties against Peking's militancy. The same ideas of appeasement that led to the Second World War were unearthed in the late 1960's, and they may again lead to disaster unless the United States deals with aggression, shares in building a reliable peace, and cooperates across national borders to create a chance for simple human dignity.

479
Shumskii, Vladislav S. [POLICY WITHOUT A FUTURE; THE ANTICOMMUNISM OF THE RIGHT-WING LEADERS OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY] Politika bez budushchego: antikommunizm pravykh liderov SDPG. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1967. 342 p.
JN3970.S6S47

Criticizes the rightist leadership of the West German Social Democratic Party [SDP] for supporting Bonn's revisionist stand on Germany's post-World War II boundaries, its claim to sole representation of all the German people, and its request for nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr. The SDP counts on NATO's transformation into a nuclear state to allow them to "swallow" the German Democratic Republic.

480
Sommer, Theo. WILL EUROPE UNITE? Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, winter 1967/68: 551-558.
D839.A85, v. 5

"Summary of an address made at the Fifth Annual Banff Conference on World Affairs, August 21-26, 1967."

Prospects for European unity are dim. The cold war for all intents and purposes is over, and the threat from the East has diminished considerably. The revival of nationalism has hindered the achievement of union. And the spirit of the founding fathers, Schuman, Adenauer, and Gasperi, is gone. Collectively these factors have contributed to the diminishing popularity of the community idea. However of all the types of future Europes that could be assembled--an American Europe, a Gaullist, fragmented, or status quo Europe --the one most likely to succeed by the end of the 20th century would be a European confederation. This confederation would be composed of 33 Federal states, a central parliament, and two parties within each state. Only such a Europe could contain disruptive nationalisms, provide the Europeans with mass markets, and "be a meaningful factor in world politics."

481
Sorensen, Theodore C. REPORT FROM RUMANIA. Saturday review, v. 50, Dec. 30, 1967: 14-15.
Z1219.S25, v. 50

The Soviet bloc, with its dozen countries rallied under the red banner, is no longer a monolith. The most recent "dropout" is Rumania. Prompted more by nationalism and economic necessities than by its ideological ties, Rumania is following its own road--"friendly to all, beholden to none." Unlike Yugoslavia's Tito, Rumanian party leader and President Ceausescu shies away from any new bloc building, favoring rather "a network of bilateral relationships as the true road to peace." Ceausescu and his colleagues may complain of Soviet economic pressures but do not denounce the Kremlin; they are aware of its propinquity and are careful not to upset the slow progress toward complete independence. It would be wrong to read too much into Rumania's foreign policy initiative. Yet it would be equally wrong to refute its efforts as "nothing more than international meddling by a nation of natural brokers that has historically played both sides." True, Rumania maintained good relations with Peking and the Kremlin, with Hanoi and the Americans, with the Jews and the Arabs, and with members of NATO as well as those of the Warsaw Pact. This and its strong support of the United Nations, which constitute Rumania's "potential contribution to a resolution of current conflicts and a reconciliation of Europe," should not be underestimated. But this potential has not been recognized by the United States. American reluctance to establish better relations with Rumania is clearly reflected in prohibitive U.S. trade measures which undermine not only American business chances in Europe but also Rumania's quiet struggle for independence from the Soviet bloc. Rumanians feel that trading goods will bring countries closer together than trading diplomatic notes. Yet their thinking is not simply materialistic. They see in the Americans of today the Europeans of yesteryear who ventured into a new world and demonstrated "what a free and creative people can do." Their respect for the American success, however, also carries "great expectations of the United States"--that it will be true to the American revolutionary past and to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

482
Wilson, Harold. BRITAIN'S APPROACH TO EUROPE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, winter 1967/68: 528-532.
D839.A85, v. 5

"Excerpt from an address given at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, Guildhall, London, November 13, 1967."

The European community must face several facts in relation to the technology gap. America has the advantage not only because it has a wider "common market" but also because each year the technological threshold gets so high that Europe cannot begin to compete; and Europeans are also operating on too small a scale to catch up with the United States; one large American company spends more on research and development than any of the largest European companies. One method of closing the gap would be for Britain to "embark on bilateral projects with any European partner ready to respond for technological cooperation in any field." Another method would be for it to sponsor a multilateral European Institute of Technology to examine means to greater European cooperation. If Europe is to compete with the United States, it must consider more mergers on a European scale and proceed to a more truly multilateral approach.

483
Winzer, Otto. OUR COMMON ASPIRATION--AN ACTIVE POLICY OF PEACE AND SECURITY. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Nov. 5, 1967: 6-8.
D839.R4, v. 18

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the German Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia in addition to cementing the two states' determination to resist West German imperialism and militarism has heightened awareness that the German Democratic Republic is a significant factor for peace and security in Europe. While the German Federal Republic has applied the infamous Hallstein Doctrine against Yugoslavia there is evidence that the doctrine has become "bankrupt" in the light of the close and beneficial cooperation that has developed between East Germany and Yugoslavia. Collaboration in the field of science, culture, and technology and cooperation between political parties and socio-political organizations of the two countries reflects the favorable development of relations. The German Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia are working side by side toward the relaxation of tension and the creation of an atmosphere of security in Europe. Both countries are striving to establish relations with all European countries. However West Germany is attempting to exclude the German Democratic Republic from the circle of European states; this obstructs "all-European cooperation and must therefore sooner or later suffer defeat." Growing revanchism and neonazism has made the German Federal Republic the principal stumbling block to the peaceful development and security of the nations of Europe. Until West Germany renounces the use of nuclear weapons in any form and recognizes the new borders, especially those between the two German states, the chances for peaceful coexistence between the two Germanies are slim.

484
Yarmolinsky, Adam. UNITED STATES MILITARY POWER AND FOREIGN POLICY. [Chicago] University of Chicago Center for Policy Study [1967] 28 p. UA23.Y3
"Address delivered at the University of Chicago Center for Policy Study."

Analyzes the relationship between U.S. military power and foreign policy, pointing out that the real test of a military establishment is how it serves the country's foreign policy. American ability to deter, prevent, and arrest aggression is consistent with the "limited goals of U.S. foreign policy in a nuclear world." Yet foreign policymakers frequently disregard the "relationships between resources and objectives" while in the military realm, policy and programs are inseparable. In this respect foreign policymakers can learn from the military. Brief biographies of Fellows of the Center for Policy Study at the university are appended.

485
Zartman, I. William. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE NEW AFRICA. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall [1966] 175 p.
DT31.Z3

Surveys the development of foreign relations between the countries of North and West Africa from 1956 to 1965. Zartman has concentrated on the interrelationships of this group of 17 states and, while he gives some attention to the foreign policies of the individual states, he attempts to analyze the policy of the region as a whole. The development of national interests has impeded intra-African unity in the past, and Zartman feels that as long as primacy is given to the state's interests and to ideology no enduring regional alliance will be formed in the immediate future.

486
Zelt, Johannes, and Karl Reissig. UNITY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE USSR. German foreign policy, v. 6, no. 5, 1967: 400-409.
DD261.4.D353, v. 6

Comments on an article by A. Bovin in Moscow's Izvestiia that stresses the use of nationalism in Socialist states for international Socialist ends. The authors point out the refinements in German national consciousness made by Marxism-Leninism, particularly by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany now ruling in the German Democratic Republic. They criticize West German leaders for being influenced by "U.S. chief theorist" Prof. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, whose writings they say recommend a policy designed to isolate the Socialist countries from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic from all other Socialist states.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

487
Baldwin, John. THE ECONOMICS OF PEACE AND WAR: A SIMULATION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Dec. 1967: 383-397. illus.
JX1901.J6, v. 11

The paper describes a game that permits players to win either by peacefully trading goods with each other or by warring and plundering each other's resources. The various strategies that appeared as the game was played are analyzed and related to the conditions under which the strategies were used. A situation similar to Hobbes' war of all against all prevailed until the players developed strategies (and norms) to control wars. After sufficient experience with the game, most players learned that earning a reputation for trustworthiness and generosity was of great strategic value in forming stable, peaceful associations with others. (Abstract supplied)

488
Bond, Brian. THE INDECISIVENESS OF MODERN WAR. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Dec. 1967: 46-55.
Z6723.U35, v. 47

Less and less does war achieve for its winner the realization of goals, and the "special problems created by nuclear weapons may provide no more than a climax to a long historical development." As defined by Clausewitz, war is far from a purely military activity and must be controlled by national policy. It has, of course, always been overdestructive, with modern weapons merely magnifying that aspect. Technology has brought with it the tactical stalemate, which is merely a symptom of the increasing indecisiveness of war. For example, as governments mobilize their populations in support of the war being waged, prowar sentiment gets out of hand--"in the First World War, none of the major belligerents were able to adhere to its original war aims." Since the total economy must be mobilized in order to support a major war the distinction between military and civilian elements in the society tends to blur, giving rise to a world trend toward total war. At the same time strategic theory disappears. All these factors, plus numerous others, combined to produce the indecisiveness of the First World War, but the war also brought the return of strategic analysis. Prominent among the ideas formulated was B. H. Liddell Hart's concept of the "indirect approach," an articulation of what was becoming increasingly clear--that war in the traditional sense can no longer secure permanent political benefits. Total strategy, as practiced by Mao Tse-tung, gives a country "a good chance of prevailing over a stronger opponent who relies primarily on traditional methods." Yet this in itself may produce a new form of indecisiveness--protracted struggle. Precedents indicate that insurgents can be defeated permanently, but the West must evolve new, sophisticated strategic doctrines.

489
Chubarov, IU. [THE MOST BARBARIC MEANS] Stredstva samye varvarskie. Voennye znaniia, v. 43, July 1967: 37.
U4.V874, v. 43

The roar of explosions and drifting clouds of poisonous agents characterize the escalation of the Vietnam War by the American aggressors; their attacks are directed primarily against the Vietnam population. The U.S. Government has ordered the Pentagon to provide the air pirates not only with conventional, demolition, and splinter bombs, but with improved bombs, ball bombs, and ground-to-air-missiles. The Bullpup A missile, whose explosive charge weighs 113 kilograms, was used during the first stage of the Vietnam War; but the Americans considered this charge inadequate, and the U.S. Air Force and the Navy are now using missiles with increased payloads of 340 to 454 kilograms. The Americans are also supplying these missiles to their aggressive NATO-bloc allies. They have used the splinter bombs Pineapple, Guava, and Lazy Dog since April 1966 to kill innocent Vietnamese. The lying American aggressors maintain that only military targets are bombed, even though the American press repeatedly reports the destruction of villages and living quarters in cities without military targets. It is known that the Americans are planning to annihilate the peaceful population of Vietnam; this is why they are making use of gas, poison, napalm, phosphorous, and improved splinter bombs. Vietnam has been transformed into a huge testing ground, where the death of 1,000 people does not count when new weapons are being experimented with in this crime against humanity.

490
Horvath, William J. A STATISTICAL MODEL FOR THE DURATION OF WARS AND STRIKES. Behavioral science, v. 13, Jan. 1968: 18-28.
BF1.B4, v. 13

This paper proposes an explanation for the observed regularity in the percentage of conflicts settled as a function of time. Each individual conflict is regarded as a probabilistic process in which the impediments to resolution fluctuate continually. Presumably the conflict ends when the barrier to settlement reaches its lowest value. In a sample of similar conflicts, the percentage ending by any particular time should therefore be represented by a distribution of lowest values. The theory of extremes as developed by Frechet, Fisher, Tippett, Gumbel, von Mises, and others is therefore applicable to this situation. This theory indicates that for large sample size, the distribution function will have one of three asymptotic forms depending on the nature of the underlying fluctuations. The particular form found to fit the conflict data analyzed here has been widely used in fatigue and failure studies in engineering, where it is called the Weibull distribution. Because of the generality of the explanation, it is suggested that this sort of model can be applied to other social and psychological processes where the statistics of large populations are involved. (Abstract supplied)

491
Kahn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC WARFARE. Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 5, Dec. 1967: 28-48. illus.
TL501.A688A25, v. 5

Studies the effect of changing world conditions and technology upon strategic warfare. By trying to anticipate future events, policy researchers are helping military planners formulate programs that will serve the needs of future decisionmakers. Before relating their conclusions, the authors explain the methodology they employed in the analysis of long-term trends. They "depended very heavily on straightforward extrapolations into the future of existing and past trends" but also "included extrapolation of the rate of innovation or other change." Since they had to formulate their estimates from a wide range of plausible alternatives, they found it useful to name several theoretical possiblities and categorize them as "surprise-free, most probable, or absolutely probable." They listed the 100 areas that would very likely see major technological innovations by the year 2000 and discussed some of the specific possibilities within several of the areas. Particular emphasis was given to explaining the expected revolution in the technology of strategic warfare and its impact upon a nation's military doctrine and activities.

492
Koburger, Charles W. THAILAND: A CONFRONTATION. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Nov. 1967: 51-55. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 47

The deployment of U.S. military troops to Thailand in 1962 was a successful application of the confrontation technique--the opposing of one element of military power with another element of military power, without combat, to prevent the first power from attaining its objectives. In May 1962 when large Pathet Lao forces began to move toward the Laos-Thai border, the Thai Government, under a security agreement with the United States, sent a formal request for troops to ensure the territorial integrity of Thailand. When the Communist advance toward Thailand stopped, U.S. troops began to leave. The presence of U.S. forces had helped protect the country from Communist attack, provided for temporary local military stability, and aided in restoring the status quo ante. The United States fulfilled its bilateral pledge, proved its determination to support the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and showed the world it was willing to withdraw its military forces after its limited political objective had been achieved.

493
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for International Studies. THE CONTROL OF LOCAL CONFLICT; A DESIGN STUDY ON ARMS CONTROL AND LIMITED WAR IN THE DEVELOPING AREAS. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1967. 4 v. (ACDA/WEC-98)
UA11.B55

Partial contents.--v. 1. Summary report.--v. 2. [Defining the problems. The design study. Preliminary findings.]--v. 3. Studies of conflict.--v. 4. The relevance of factor analysis to the study of arms control and limited war.

Analysis of low-level conflict aimed at assisting U.S. policymakers to cope with such conflict. In spite of future arms control arrangements between the major powers, regional skirmishes are likely to continue. Thus it would be wise to develop a strategy of conflict control directed at moderating or preventing wars outside of Europe that do not specifically involve direct military confrontation by the superpowers but that do threaten international peace. Information from detailed case studies and techniques of factor analysis were used to establish a model "in which the dynamic structure of the conflict process itself could be exposed for analysis." By attempting to identify the various phases of conflict and the crucial factors that promoted or inhibited each phase, the analysts hoped to develop insights into methods of conflict control.

494
Schelling, Thomas C. ARMS AND INFLUENCE. New Haven, Yale University Press [1966] 293 p.
U104.S33

Shows the principles underlying the "diplomacy of violence." Schelling's basic thesis is that the power to hurt can be, and is, used as "a kind of bargaining power." He distinguishes this use of force (to impress) from military strategy, and he asserts that the recognition of the object of victory as the imposition of one's will on the enemy, which until recently has typically received little attention, represents a revolution in the United States in "the relation of military to foreign policy." Schelling's examples are drawn from ancient and contemporary history, but "this is not a book about policy."

495
Schmid, R. [THE COMPUTER AS A WORK AND LEADERSHIP AID FOR HIGHER COMMAND STAFFS] Computer als Arbeits- und Führungshilfsmittel in höheren Kommandostäben. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 133, Dec. 1967: 737-738.
U3.A43, v. 133

The duties of a higher military staff are to give its chief timely data for reaching decisions, to quickly transmit his decisions in the form of orders and instructions to lower command posts, to supervise execution of orders by the latter, and "through adequate measures" to make its own troops' combat action easier. All this involves a great deal of communication and data processing, in which computers have proven revolutionary time savers. The U.S. Armed Forces with their command and control systems are the most advanced in that area. The armies of the Warsaw Pact Organization are now working intensively on development of their own system. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Switzerland are also each developing its own system. The system must be based on the concepts of integrated structure and standardized directions.

496
Sochaczewski, Joachim. [WAR BY PROXY--A THREAT TO EUROPE?] Stellvertreterkrieg--eine Gefahr für Europa? Wehrkunde, v. 16, Oct. 1967: 510-513.
U3.W396, v. 16

The latest Near East conflict has markedly weakened world resentment of war as a legitimate means of foreign policy. This change in the public attitude is apt

to affect international politics and may increase the chances of war by proxy. Such wars, however, depend on the interplay of a number of military and political factors. Since only nuclear war could threaten the Great Powers' "national substance," they shun direct confrontation with each other and try to prevent conflicts from escalating into global and nuclear war. In other areas, though, their interests still conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union have a legitimate or usurped responsibility for the security of their respective "client states." Each therefore influences the military and foreign policies of its clients. But the incipient disintegration of NATO or the Warsaw Pact Organization may eventually reach the point where commitments of "automatic aid" become practically meaningless. Through war by proxy a Great Power can change the status quo without risking nuclear war. As the most important suppliers of modern weapons to the combatants the Great Powers can control the intensity and the duration of a war. By reducing the threat of nuclear war still further the imminent nuclear nonproliferation treaty will undoubtedly increase the chances of war by proxy. Because America has commitments all over the globe, a possible Soviet war by proxy in Europe could help the Soviet Union undermine American interests elsewhere. If the Soviet nuclear umbrella protected Moscow's proxy, a massive military engagement of American troops or use of American nuclear weapons would hardly be in the U.S. interest. West European requests that the United States be permanently committed to active defense of Europe are therefore illusionary. Western Europe should be able to cope with wars by proxy itself. The very concept of deterrence should be redefined so that the Great Powers' military potential is not included in the deterrence equation for direct participants in such wars.

497

Tankins, Edwin S. WAR GAMING. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Dec. 1967: 88-96.
Z6723.U35, v. 47

Modern war games have evolved essentially as a scientific tool. They vary from map exercises to wholly mechanized games. All are useful as a means of teaching tactics and providing experience in decisionmaking. Their principal basis, operations research, involves the use of mathematical models, applied through the aid of electronic computers, to solve problems. War gaming simulates competitive warfare problems and provides a means of experimenting with alternative tactics and strategies. Models describing some types of military engagements were generated by F. W. Lanchester in 1916 and have been used as a starting point for much of the subsequent research in war gaming. Currently the Lanchester equations are being applied to guerrilla and antiguerrilla warfare, demonstrating that a numerically inferior guerrilla force can win "if they are careful to maintain local superiority in any encounter with the regulars." In man-machine war games data are presented to the player by a computer. The human considers the variables and makes his decision, which is then programmed into the machine. It integrates these inputs, compares them with a priori criteria, and "modifies the model according to the outcome of the comparison." Through this combination of man and machine, consequences of the human player's actions can be analyzed with great speed. None of these games, no matter how sophisticated, can be considered predictive. Their validity is contingent on the validity of game or model logic, the data and assumptions fed into the system, and the techniques used in evaluation. The most valid and complex games "can provide good qualitative validity concerning relative probabilities of alternative outcomes in the 'real' world." Although they may aid in exercising, extending, and improving human judgment, they are no substitute for it.

498

Thompson, Sir Robert. DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY: THE LESSONS OF MALAYA AND VIETNAM. New York, F. A. Praeger [1966] 171 p. (Studies in international security, 10)
U240.T56, 1966a

Contents.--The setting.--Communist subversion.--Communist insurgency.--Basic principles of counterinsurgency.--The Government cause.--The administrative structure.--Intelligence.--Information services.--Balance of forces.--Basic operational concept.--Strategic hamlets.--The isolation of the guerilla.--Jungle and frontiers.--The advisory role.--Feet on the ground.--Maps.

Outlines the theory of insurgency as applied in Malaya and South Vietnam by Communist insurgent movements. The author, who has lived in Malaya for the past two decades and served for 4 years as head of the British Advisory Mission in South Vietnam, offers what he considers the basic theory of counterinsurgency, describing the painstaking methods used to cope with the threat. Thompson admits that the bias of his book is "heavily weighted on the administrative" rather than the military aspect of insurgency. Its main purpose is to show how situations like the present one in Vietnam can be prevented elsewhere.

499

Walters, R. E. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE WEST. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 112, Aug. 1967: 249-252.
U1.R8, v. 112

Nuclear weaponry and research and development now dictate national policies and military doctrines. Deterrent strategy was formulated long after the development of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms do not represent a natural development in the history of weaponry. Their development, in fact, paralleled an increase in genocidal war strategies, as exemplified by the phenomenal 15-percent casualty rate among the Russian population during World War II. Previously the average casualty proportions during wars were quite low. It is also untrue that the superior manpower and conventional forces of the Soviet bloc have forced the West to rely on nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has never had a vast military manpower superiority. Nuclear weapons are far from our best weapons. As a result of nuclear power, the Western nations stand in an untenable position with the Atlantic Ocean and English Channel no longer serving as barriers against enemy attack. Research and development has modified military doctrine, accented nuclear weapons, and presented only two choices in the settlement of disputes: peace or total holocaust.

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

500
[AMD MIRAGE G. FRANCE'S SWING-WING AIRCRAFT] AMD Mirage G. Das Swing-Wing-Flugzeug Frankreichs. Flug Revue, Jan. 1968: 21-22. illus.
TL503. C524, 1968

The Dassault Mirage G variable-geometry fighter prototype made its maiden flight in Melun-Villaroche near Toulouse recently. The Mirage G--built by Avions Marcel Dassault with financial assistance by the French Government--was developed in an amazingly short period of only 20 months as the result of a government contract in October 1965 and is based on the concept of the Mirage F2. The two-seater Mirage G, last member of the large Mirage family, was conceived as a high-altitude interceptor but is also suitable for reconnaissance and strike missions at supersonic speeds just above ground level. (Abstract supplied)

501
ASW SPECIAL REPORT. Undersea technology, v. 8, Nov. 1967: 27-45. V210. AIU5, v. 8

Surveys the antisubmarine warfare [ASW] programs ot the U. S. Navy. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas H. Moorer is interviewed concerning the U. S. ASW posture, and other articles assess the Soviet submarine threat, the Atlantic and Pacific ASW forces of the United States, equipment for ASW, and the state of the ASW market. A technical study of one aspect of sonar propagation concludes the report.

502
Alexander, David. RUSSIA'S NEW WEAPONS AGAINST WHICH THERE IS NO DEFENCE. Socialist leader, v. 59, Nov. 11, 1967: 2.
HD4801. N35, v. 59

The fractional orbital bombardment system under development in the Soviet Union is the "most dangerous and real horror of the twentieth century." This space rocket, designed to orbit the earth at an altitude of some 100 miles, will carry atomic weapons which can be activated from the ground. There is no defense against such a threat. A madman at the control or a malfunctioning mechanism could cause the weapon to strike and destroy areas inhabited by five million people; an additional 15 million would fall victim to radiation. It is hard to see how this new Russian weapon--and for that matter China's "peaceful atomic bomb" philosophy--will serve Socialist purposes. "Russia's dialectical thinking may be able to demonstrate why the Russian and Chinese developments are weapons forged for Socialism, rather than instruments of imperialist torture."

503
AMBIGUOUS ANNIVERSARY. Newsweek, v. 70, Dec. 4, 1967: 94-96. AP2. N6772, v. 70

Comments on the 25th anniversary of the atomic age, which was launched at the University of Chicago--both for the good and bad of mankind. There are now five countries with nuclear weapons and seven others that could produce the bomb before 1970. Over 40 countries have nuclear reactors capable of turning out by 1980 enough plutonium for a yearly output of 5,000 bombs. So far these reactors have served peaceful purposes--electric powerplant development and the production of isotopes for industry and medical techniques--but these benign uses are far fewer than scientists had expected. It is hoped that economic necessity will soon bring an upsurge in the constructive use of nuclear energy, even while the military atom continues to serve as a means of nuclear blackmail. Thus the next quarter of a century will be marked by ambiguities about the atom: Will it serve humanity or will it culminate "in the red night of the last nuclear fireball"?

504
AND NOW, AIR CUSHIONS FOR AIRPLANES. Navy, v. 11, Jan. 1968: 24-25. illus.
VA49. N28, v. 11

Describes the Bell Aerosystems Company's air cushion landing gear, which will enable aircraft to utilize landing fields of much lower quality than is possible with present wheeled craft. The air cushion system, already in use in amphibious vehicles, has been modified by the application of a retractable nylon and rubber air cushion bag that will give the aircraft a number of important safety features as well as increased mobility.

505
Andrews, Walter. AIR FORCE TO DEVELOP NEW ICBM SILO. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Jan. 15, 1968: 14-15. UG630. M54, v. 21

In the next 4 to 5 years the U. S. Air Force will develop a prototype of a new hardened silo for ICBM's to increase the survivability and second-strike capability of U. S. ICBM forces. At the same time, the Navy will launch a 2-year conceptual design study of a new ballistic missile submarine system. The two programs are to be initiated despite the absence of a "clear Soviet threat."

506
Andrews, Walter. ARMY CONSIDERING MULTIPLE ROCKET SYSTEMS. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Dec. 4, 1967: 18. UG630. M54, v. 21

The U. S. Army is contemplating development of a multiple artillery rocket system [MARS] in the 1969 fiscal year. The system would "combine multiple launch of rockets with some degree of guidance," providing an area-bombardment capability at ranges similar to those of the Honest John rocket. Multiple rockets with bomblet-type warheads would be rail-launched, hence the alternate designation, multiple rail rocket system [MRRS]. According to the Army's research and development chief, the MARS would have an advantage over conventional artillery where enemy troops are concentrated for a short time, although artillery has greater accuracy. A trade-off between a MARS and an attack plane will also be studied. West Germany showed a lively interest in the development of a MARS-type system; multiple rockets have reportedly been utilized by the Russians since the Second World War. The size of a MARS rocket, to be determined in the course of preliminary studies, will fall into the Little John and Honest John missile category. The cost per round may decide the fate of the projects.

507
Appleton, D. O. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN V/STOL: IMAGINATION, INGENUITY, DARING INNOVATION. Data, v. 12, Oct. 1967: 38-41. illus.
P&GP RR

Some of the ideas, designs, and research efforts that private industry has carried out to find a workable and safe vertical/short takeoff and landing [V/STOL] aircraft for military and civilian applications. Appleton lists several types of V/STOL aircraft: Ling-Témco-Vaught's XC-142A, Bell's X-22A, Ryan-GE's XV-5A, and Sikorsky's stowed rotor design, which will enable its aircraft to hover and yet travel at speeds up to 575 mph. The author concludes that private industry is doing a lot to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of V/STOL and STOL aircraft alike.

508
ARMY CONSIDERING NEW HEAVY LIFT 'COPTER. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Jan. 15, 1968: 16-17.
UG630.M54, v. 21

The Department of the Army is evaluating a multi-million-dollar program to develop a heavy-lift helicopter with a net payload of 20 to 30 tons. The project would boost the U.S. ability to compete with the Soviet Union in helicopter technology and provide the Army, Air Force, and Marines with a heavy-lift carrier; commercial application is also anticipated. At the same time, development of interim heavy-lift helicopters is under study.

509
Baldwin, Hanson W. POSEIDON--NEW CHAPTER IN MISSILERY. Reader's digest, v. 92, Jan. 1968: 120-124. AP2.R255, v. 92

Although the United States will continue to maintain a mix of land- and sea-based missiles, the introduction of multiple independently-guided reentry vehicle [MIRV] technology will significantly alter the balance in favor of the sea-launched ballistic missile [SLBM]. Sea-based systems are less vulnerable to missile attack and are "nonescalating" in that the enemy cannot pinpoint missile sites in order to build up sufficient missiles for their destruction. America's sea-based system, the Polaris, has been a sparkling success in spite of many initial technological difficulties. By 1970 its fleet of 41 submarines will be equipped with Poseidon missiles carrying multiple warheads. Because of their tremendous operational costs, thus far the SLBM's have been far outnumbered by land-based long-range missiles. However, once the Soviet Union succeeds in adapting MIRV technology to their missiles, the land-based missiles will have to be modified to survive an attack. Missile sites will have to be "hardened," an ABM system installed, or the missiles made more mobile. All these measures are very expensive and will make the SLBM cost-competitive with the land-based missile in addition to its other strategic advantages.

510
BASIC INFORMATION ON THE FLEETS AND COMMAND ELEMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY. Navy, v. 11, Jan. 1968: 15-19.
VA49.N28, v. 11

From official Soviet reports, lists pertinent facts concerning the various Soviet Fleets--the Baltic Fleet, Northern Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, Pacific Fleet, and Caspian Flotilla--and their commanders. Photographs depict some Russian ships and important naval personnel.

511
Bertini, Marcello. [ITALIAN NAVY IN THE YEAR 1967] Die italienische Marine im Jahre 1967. Marine Rundschau, v. 64, Dec. 1967: 325-340. illus.
V3.M3, v. 64

Considers the reconstruction and development of the Italian Navy after World War II. Bertini sets forth the numerical strength and present status of the nation's naval forces.

512
Brenner, Hans. [THE HEINKEL FLORETT] Heinkel Florett. Flug Revue, Dec. 1967: 18, 33. 18, 33. illus. TL503.C524, 1967

In May 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany received its complete independence which, until then, had been considerably limited. In addition to the extensive license building programme for the flying units of the new Deutsche Luftwaffe it was possible to devote time and money to other greater propositions in Germany itself. To this end a competition was announced in November 1956 by the Federal Defence Ministry for the development of a German interceptor which could attain a maximum speed of 2.0 Mach. The winner of this competition was the Heinkel He 031 developed by the Ernst Heinkel Flugzeugbau GmbH. Although this machine, which was later named the "Florett," was an aerodynamic masterpiece, it never went into production--unfortunately. In spite of this, a closer look at this interesting project seemed to us to be worthwhile. (Abstract supplied)

513
Breyer, Siegfried. [SOVIET KRESTA MISSILE CRUISERS] Die sowjetischen Raketen-Kreuzer der "Kresta"-Klasse. Marine Rundschau, v. 64, Oct. 1967: 283-284. V3.M3, v. 64

A new type of Soviet missile cruiser was seen this year in the Baltic. The Kresta, which represents a further development of the "Kynda," has the same shape, electronics system, and remote-control weapons as the latter, though its weapons systems differ in their placement and interdependence. Kresta's boat-to-air missiles operate on remote-control starters, "doubly increased in comparison" to "Kynda," and its surface-to-surface missiles on starters "reduced by 50 percent." This alone would indicate that the ships are designed for action in areas defended by aircraft such as the Baltic and Mediterranean. The displacement weight of the ship is approximately 6,000 tons and its speed about 35 to 36 knots.

514
Burlage, John D. INTEREST HIGH IN THE FLEET BUT OPERATIONAL V/STOL STILL IN THE FUTURE. Data, v. 12, Oct. 1967: 25, 28, 37. illus.
P&GP RR

"Interview with Captain John A. Seargeant, USN," Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Development.

Despite the fact that the United States has several flyable fixed-wing aircraft with a vertical/short take-

off and landing [V/STOL] capability, it does not have an operational fixed-wing plane capable of both hovering and moving forward. The V/STOL requires more engine propulsion and complex airframe configurations and engine installations that are costly in terms of mission performance; its complex systems have led to costly development cycles. However, because of the V/STOL's potential, the Navy must develop an operational model. The aircraft is capable of close air support and attack, search and rescue missions, fleet air defense, and assault transport. At present there are two V/STOL aircraft, the Harrier and the XC-142, the latter the largest in the world. They have performed well in experimental flights ranging from landings on large aircraft carriers to "small deck" landings aboard the U.S.S. Raleigh, though neither is earmarked for operational use. Currently the Navy is evaluating the Bell X-22A. Although a valuable research tool, it indicates that the development of an operational V/STOL is still a matter of time, technology, and economics.

515
Burnham, Frank. NEW FPS-85 WILL NOT HELP AGAINST FOBS. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Dec. Dec. 18, 1967: 22-23.
UG630.M54, v. 21

Reports on the new FPS-85 "spacetrack" radar complex, which is to be turned over to the Air Defense Command in the spring of 1968. The FPS-85, a computer-directed phased-array radar, is possibly "the most sophisticated device of its kind in the free world." It may considerably upgrade the current U.S. antisatellite system, but it cannot detect or provide any warning of an attack by the fractional orbital bombardment system [FOBS] under development in the Soviet Union. Admittedly the FOBS was not taken into consideration when the FPS-85 was designed; yet its several-thousand-mile range, location, and orientation will enable it to detect and track at least 90 percent of all objects in earth orbit. The device is equally effective in detecting and supplying trajectory data on both land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles. Modularized and transported to Antarctica, the FPS-85 could be "effective against FOBS."

516
DOD SEES AWACS AND F-12 CUTTING ITS AIR DEFENSE BILL. Space/aeronautics, v. 48, Oct. 1967: 23-24, 26.
TL501.A786, v. 48

The administration has deferred the decision to build a full-scale ABM system to guard against Soviet ICBM's, yet it is thinking of spending $4 billion on an air defense system to protect the United States from Soviet bombers. The answer to this paradox lies in the system's improvements that will save $1/2 billion per annum in operation costs, enabling it to pay for itself in 8 years. The key elements in the air defense system will be the airborne warning and control system, which will track planes at low altitudes, and the F-12 interceptor fighter plane, a version of the A-11 spy plane. The F-12, unlike current defense aircraft, does not require ground control intercept guidance. Instead, it carries long-range search radar on board and a long-range missile system that requires the plane to maneuver into only the general vicinity of the intruder. The new air defense system is a vital step against possible Soviet development of an advanced bomber along the lines of its supersonic transport.

517
[DISTURBANCES IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER] Strategische Gleichgewichtsstörungen. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Dec. 10, 1967: 616-617.
U3.W38, v. 11

U.S. Congressman C. Hosmer reasons that in 5 years at the maximum the Soviet Union will be able to destroy the United States with its so-called "retaliatory strike," which in fact is designed to be its "nuclear first strike" according to Soviet strategists. In such a case Soviet losses incurred from an American counterstrike would essentially not exceed those suffered by the U.S.S.R. in World War II. This would be a small price for Moscow to pay for world domination. The American-Soviet nuclear balance of power has been seriously upset by Soviet acquisition of a fractional orbital bombardment system.

518
Duchein, Charles F. SPUTNIK NOW SPINS IN LIQUID SPACE. Navy, v. 11, Jan. 1968: 3.
VA49.N28, v. 11

Russia's blossoming Mediterranean seapower, as significant a development as the launching of the first Sputnik, emerged as a direct consequence of the recent Arab-Israeli War. Following on the heels of the Soviet incursion into the Mediterranean was their announcement of carrier construction and the sinking of an Israeli ship by Soviet-made missiles, the first missile sinking of a ship in history. The Navy League, continuing its tradition of maritime education, has recommended a program based on "seven strategic safeguards" to preserve U.S. maritime supremacy: to establish forthwith an Indian Ocean Fleet to replace the British presence, to develop a substantially nuclear Navy by 1976, to beef up the U.S. merchant marine and Navy with new ship construction, to streamline the defense organization, to establish a Secretary of Maritime Affairs at Cabinet level, to emphasize oceanic studies at American colleges and universities, and to "reorient the national strategy to a predominantly maritime mobile power structure."

519
Gasteyger, Curt. [ANTIMISSILES AND LOCAL WAR] Anti-Raketen und Lokalkrieg. Weltwoche, v. 35, Sept. 22, 1967: 17. tables.
AP32.W4, v. 35

The 1967-68 issue of the "world's political barometer," The Military Balance, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London and annotated as no. 627 in vol. 4, no. 2 of this bibliography indicates that the world is on the threshold of a new arms race. The European military and political situation is stable, despite the proposed withdrawal of the American and British troops from the Continent; the balance of strategic power between East and West is an effective deterrent against war. However, the rest of the world is tense and rearming, or actually fighting. The superpowers are expanding their ICBM programs and building ABM's; the Chinese are stepping up their nuclear program; the war in Vietnam has escalated; the Arabic countries are rearming; there is guerrilla warfare in Africa and Latin America. Since last year Khrushchev's successors have quietly increased their ICBM's from 300 to 450-475, while America's have risen only from 934 to 1,054. Thus the Soviet Union has begun to cut down America's lead in intercontinen-

tal deterrent weapons. The Soviet Union has also installed multistage ABM's with ranges of over 1000 kilometers around Moscow. Whether the Russians build up their ABM system depends upon Washington's reaction and developments in China. The cultural revolution in China has not affected the Chinese nuclear program, but the Chinese Army is too occupied with domestic turmoil to carry hostilities beyond the borders, even to South Vietnam. Other local wars--in Nigeria, in the Congo, in the Middle East, rebellions in Asia and Africa, and guerrilla wars in Latin America--are inspired primarily by the Communists.

520
Geisenheyner, Stefan. US/FRG V/STOL FIGHTER DESIGN--A NEW LOOK IN COMBAT AIRCRAFT. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Dec. 1967: 91-95. illus. UG633.A65, v. 50

Although military planners have not yet endorsed the inclusion of V/STOL technology in the tactical air forces, field commanders are highly interested in the combat flexibility offered by a V/STOL fighter-bomber. It would combine the takeoff, landing, and hover characteristics of a helicopter with the payload capacity and speed of a modern fighter-bomber and would be less vulnerable to damage from a surprise attack because it could operate from dispersed airfields. In 1965 the U.S. and West German Governments agreed to establish a joint commercial venture to manage a tactical fighter program utilizing American expertise in the design and production of modern fighter-bombers and West German knowledge of V/STOL technology. The firm, composed of Fairchild Hiller's Republic Aviation Division and Germany's Entwicklungsring Süd, recently submitted design proposals to the two Governments for a medium-weight fighter-bomber with both V/STOL and variable-sweep capabilities and built-in self-sufficiency for emergency turnaround operations. Whether or not the Governments decide to allocate the funds to continue the development phase of the fighter, the design at least gives a preview of the aircraft envisioned to fulfill the technical fighter requirements of the next decade.

521
Giese, Fritz E. [INTERNATIONAL FLEET SITUATION 1967] Internationale Flottenlage 1967. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Nov. 10, 1967: 590-591. U3.W38, v. 11

Describes the equipment, including weapons systems, of American, Soviet, French, British, Japanese, Turkish, and South African fleets, and the trend away from large battleships and cruisers to reliance mostly on smaller battleships, submarines, and other specialized ships. The trend is worldwide and radically affects the shipbuilding industry.

522
Gluskin, Vladimir M. [MISSILES, ROCKETS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: U.S. ARMY] Raketno-iadernoe oruzhie armii SShA. Moskva, Voen. izd-vo, 1966. 327 p. UF767.G58
"Text entirely in English."

Describes and gives performance data on U.S. missiles. Gluskin discusses the effects of nuclear explosions, the U.S. Army's methods of defense against them and views on the use of nuclear weapons in combat, and the impact of these weapons on the tactics of ground units.

523
Heiman, Leo. IN THE SOVIET ARSENAL. Ordnance, v. 52, Jan./Feb. 1968: 366-373. illus. UF1.067, v. 52

Reports on the post-World War II vintage Soviet ground-force weapons and equipment found on the battlefields and in Israeli ordnance depots after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The development of some of these weapons has brought about considerable changes in combat tactics and operational doctrines; other weapons were developed to fit the new tactical concepts of the Soviet General Staff. The author--an Israeli newsman educated in the Soviet Union and a World War II veteran of partisan warfare against the Germans--evaluates the equipment as neither "revolutionary nor superior" but rather "vastly inferior" in many respects to Western equipment.

524
Hoefling, John A. FOR RAPID REACTION: THE ARMY AND THE C-5A. Army, v. 18, Jan. 1968: 67-71. illus. U1.A893, v. 18

Discusses the importance of the new supercargo C-5A airplane and its future role in providing transportation for troops and equipment to troubled areas of the world. Rapid reaction, especially strategic lift, appears to be the only real military solution to political instability around the world. The C-5A is capable of traveling 3,050 nautical miles with a 220,000-pound payload and 5,500 nautical miles with a 112,600-pound payload. It normally carries 75 soldiers but can hold up to 270 troops if palletized seating is installed. The disadvantages of the C-5A are its vulnerability and the lack of fairly permanent terminal facilities for prolonged use. For the C-5A to be effective, logistical bases and aerial ports must be set up within range of intratheater aircraft. These bases must be far enough from the front lines to be relatively safe from enemy attack.

525
Kolcum, Edward H. LUFTWAFFE SEEKING TWO WINGS OF RF-4ES. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Jan. 29, 1968: 28. TL501.A8, v. 88

In its drive for procurement of McDonnell Douglas RF-4E reconnaissance strike fighters, the West German Air Force must overcome Government restrictions on offset arms purchases from the United States, budgetary limitations, and opposition by those segments in the Defense Ministry who prefer filling the reconnaissance mission with a modified version of the Lockheed F-104. The Air Force needs new reconnaissance aircraft for both the North and South Groups because of the increased Communist buildup along the East German border and feels that the RF-4E can best meet the requirements. However, with only $24 billion allocated for defense spending for the next 4 years, the $426 to $630 million that would be spent for 120 to 180 RF-4E's would take a sizable portion of the procurement dollar. At least six other aircraft programs would be affected, including the VFW-Fiat and Fairchild EWR-AVS V/STOL fighters, the Northrop F-5, the NKF STOL fighter, the General Dynamics F-111A fighter, and the Sikorsky and Boeing-Vertol medium helicopters.

526
Kostygov, B. D. [MINE AND TORPEDO WEAPONS DURING THE YEARS OF SOVIET RULE] Minno-torpednoe oruzhie za gody Sovetskoi vlasti. Morskoi sbornik, v. 50. Sept. 1967: 34-38. illus.
V5. M8, v. 50

Traces the development of Russian mines and torpedoes. The author discusses the destructive effect of today's torpedoes equipped with atomic warheads and automatic firing systems. Kostygov states that although homing torpedoes are considered the most effectual for combat at sea, in some cases mines might be successfully used.

527
Krylov, N. ROCKET MIGHT OF THE COUNTRY. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, Nov. 20, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 1, 1-4.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, Nov. 19, 1967.
Slav Rm

The Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc are trying to avert a new world war and curb aggressors. However, as long as imperialism exists, the danger of war remains, as the aggressive wars in Vietnam and the Near East, plots to attack the Soviet Union, and the bragging of the Pentagon leaders about their excellent nuclear missile forces prove. In reply to the imperialists, the Soviet people repeat--on this festive Missile Troops and Artillery Day--that any attack against the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries will be fatal to the aggressors. All branches of the Soviet Armed Forces have nuclear missiles capable of striking with "decisive results within the first minutes of fighting." The alert time for missiles and their size have been reduced, but the power of nuclear warheads, their range, and accuracy, are increasing. Soviet missiles can be launched from mobile pads, and new small solid-fuel intercontinental missiles, which can be launched from cross-country trucks, have been developed. U.S.S.R. strategic missiles can break through the enemy's antimissile defenses, and deliver their multimegaton warheads to targets anywhere on earth.

528
Leavitt, William. FOBS: IT SHOULDN'T BE ANY SURPRISE. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Dec. 1967: 71-74. illus. UG633. A65, v. 50

The Soviet development of a fractional orbital bombardment system [FOBS] has destroyed the Pentagon theory that a technological freeze leading to a stable strategic balance could be arranged with the Soviet Union. It is only logical that the Soviet Union would never agree to a technology freeze in view of its inferiority in offensive missile strength and expertise in space technology. While the FOBS is not as cost-effective as an ICBM, it lends flexibility to the Soviet military forces and reduces the warning time for the United States in a Soviet attack. Once the Soviets complete their FOB and ABM systems they would probably be in a position to initiate a devastating first strike and suffer little damage from retaliation. So far Department of Defense planners do not appear to appreciate the dangers from Soviet military space development and have responded only by building up U.S. offensive weapons instead of attempting to balance the American military posture. Possibly Pentagon officials will change this disturbing attitude and heed the warnings that have been appearing in literature as far back as 1958 of potential disaster from Soviet technological breakthroughs.

529
Lechat, Jacques. [DETERRENCE AND THE ORBITAL BOMB] La dissuasion et la bombe orbitale. Perspectives, v. 23, Nov. 18, 1967: [item 1] 2-4.
HC10. P4, v. 23

Although Russia's orbital bomb has not greatly modified the strategic nuclear equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union, it has certain strategic advantages. The orbital bomb not only carries a payload equal to that of an ICBM (30-50 megatons) but is difficult to intercept along its trajectory. On the other hand the bomb does not qualify as an effective weapon of counterforce strategy since it does not have sufficient precision in target selection. As a result it does not affect America's second-strike capacity. The reaction of the American public to the orbital bomb is influenced less by strategic considerations than by psychological ones.

530
LIFE WITH THE ATOM--AFTER 25 YEARS. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Dec. 11, 1967: 64-66. illus.
JK1. U65, v. 63

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the first controlled atomic chain reaction, reviews what man has done with atomic power since 1942. In an insert, nuclear applications in the military and civilian realms are cited: electricity, propulsion, space, and countless megatons worth of bombs. The future of nuclear power should be no less revolutionary, for "the world has only stepped across the threshold into the era of the peaceful atom, with its promise of better things for all mankind."

531
Lusar, Rudolf. [IMPORTANCE OF SOLID-FUEL ROCKETS FOR FIELD ARTILLERY, AIR, AND ANTITANK DEFENSES] Die Bedeutung der Feststoffrakete für die Feldartillerie, Panzerabwehr und Fliegerabwehr. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 134, Jan. 1968: 20-28. illus.
U3. A43, v. 134

Solid-fuel rockets will not completely replace conventional field artillery in modern warfare but will take over its most important tasks, such as bombardment with tactical nuclear warheads. And nuclear warfare will not make the tank obsolete as an attack weapon. Solid-fuel rockets offer much greater efficacy to antitank and antiaircraft operations than does conventional artillery. They are lighter and smaller than liquid-fuel rockets, their construction is simpler, and they are cheaper to produce.

532
Lynn, Norman. [THREAT FROM SPACE. U.S. "SENTINEL" ABM PROGRAM AIMED AT GROWING SOVIET AND RED CHINESE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS] Bedrohung aus dem Weltraum. US-Anti-Raketen-Projekt 'Sentinel' gegen wachsende Nuklearbewaffnung der USSR und von Rotchina. Flug Revue, Jan. 1968: 15-20, 46. illus.
TL503. C524, 1968

The decision by the U.S. to establish an anti-ballistic missile Nike-X system called "Sentinel" represents a historic shift in U.S. nuclear strategy. The move may be as fateful as any since the U.S. decision to build the atomic bomb and to develop a massive missile force. The Nike-X is a land-based missile system designed to provide the U.S. with defence against attack by ballistic missiles. With the aid of radar, the system would detect attacking missiles in flight and destroy them with ground-launched and ground-guided interceptor missiles. The Nike-X system is an outgrowth of development work started by the U.S. Army in 1957 on the Nike Zeus antimissile system. In 1963, certain changes were made to the system to give it increased capabilities--such as the replacement of conventional radars by phased-array devices and the addition of the short-range interceptor Sprint missile. At the present time, the Nike-X system is the only anti-ballistic missile system of its type in the free world. By using two interceptor missiles--the Spartan, capable of extended range intercepts outside the atmosphere and the other, Sprint, with a short range, but exceedingly high acceleration--the Nike-X system has a wide range of possible engagement. Our special report surveys in detail the technical and strategic aspects of the Nike-X system--and the problems involved. (Abstract supplied)

533

Macmillan, Norman. [LONDON: BRITISH SHIPBUILDING] London: Britischer Kriegsschiffbau. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Dec. 10, 1967: 612.
U3.W38, v. 11

Reports on procurement by the British Navy of British-made nuclear-powered submarines for their Polaris fleet of the seventies. The ships' weapons systems comprise primarily the latest generation remote-control missiles of American design. Costs of some individual ships and of the project are given.

534

McNamara, Robert S. MCNAMARA ON BMD. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization, Ottawa. EMO national digest, v. 7, Aug. 1967: 2-6, 16. illus.
P&GP RR

Secretary McNamara explains his position on the deployment of ballistic missile defense in view of the antiballistic missile [ABM] defenses developed by the Soviet Union and Red China. He reviews the U.S. capability and proposes measures to increase the overall effectiveness of the U.S. assured destruction forces and prepare the United States to cope with greater threats than those projected in intelligence estimates. The effectiveness and advisability of deployment of an ABM defense system are analyzed. McNamara recommends the development, testing, and evaluation of the Nike-X but no action to deploy the system now; instead the United States should begin negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit the deployment of ABM systems, while reserving the option to deploy them should these discussions fail.

535

Marc, Oliver C. [AVS-PROJECT--ITS PRESENT SITUATION AND FUTURE] AVS-Projekt--Stand und Zukunft. Flug Revue, no. 10, Oct. 1967: 18-20, 52. illus.
TL503.C524, 1967

In recent months the leading members of the German Air Force have been trying to decide upon plans for the next generation of combat aircraft and have been keeping an eye on the latest development projects. The main difficulty facing them is the uncertainty concerning the future role of the German Air Force within NATO. This, however, does not alter the fact that the Ministry of Defence still has to come to a decision concerning the continuation of the German-American AVS programme. This first joint defence system venture is, as ever, the focus of discussion even though the latest rumours in the USA suggest that the future of the programme may be hanging in the balance. In his article Oliver C. Marc rates the realization chances of this project and also describes its basic organization features and defence implications. (Abstract supplied)

536

Mason, John F. SHED LIGHT: TO HUNT AND KILL IN REAL TIME. Electronic design, v. 16, Jan. 18, 1968: 25-26, 28, 30-31. illus.
TK7800.E437, v. 16

Reports the progress made by the Air Force in its efforts to provide the capability to find and destroy the enemy under conditions of poor visibility. Under the top-priority, 2-year-old program called Operation Shedlight the Air Force is working on nearly 100 projects, "some of which are big multi-sensor aircraft systems while others are single sensors, components and even techniques." Shedlight systems will be installed in armed and unarmed aircraft. The latter will transmit target information to an armed plane or ground control center.

537

[THE MATRA PARACHUTE BOMB IS RELEASABLE AT 30 METERS] La bombe MATRA freinée par parachute est largable à 30 m. d'altitude. Air & cosmos, v. 5, Nov. 4, 1967: 20-21. P&GP RR

The hazards accompanying low altitude bombing have always been great, yet its advantages (it allows a plane to avoid enemy radar detection and to pinpoint its target) have induced scientists to develop a bomb that, dropped from as low as 30 meters, can be slowed down by a parachute just long enough to enable the plane to escape damage from the explosion. The MATRA bomb required a system that is simple to manufacture an adjustable mechanism, and a guidance system to maintain a stable trajectory. The heart of the MATRA is the "type 200" system, the function of which rests on two principles: deceleration and explosion of the bomb on impact. The MATRA system can be adapted to other bombs. Already it has been applied without modification to the STAe bomb and recently to the American MK-83 bomb.

538

[THE "MIRAGE G" HAS EXCEEDED MACH 2] Le "Mirage G" a dépassé Mach 2. Air & cosmos, v. 5, Dec. 23, 1967: 21. illus.
P&GP RR

Describes the test flights of the Mirage G and its presentation to the press. The Mirage G will become an integral part of France's force de frappe and will answer the needs of those countries that feel the F-111 is too costly. Early in 1968 the Mirage G will be tested at supersonic speeds and lower altitudes.

539
[THE MIRAGE G PURSUES ITS TEST PROGRAM AT ISTRES: 10 HOURS AND 30 MINUTES OF FLIGHT IN NINE SORTIES] Le Mirage G poursuit à Istres son programme d'essais: 10 h. 30 mn de vol en neuf sorties. Air & cosmos, v. 5, Dec. 9, 1967: 54.
P&GP RR

Examines the test flights of the Mirage G. Included are computations of landing and takeoff times as well as descriptions of the plane's performance in regard to its sweptback wings.

540
Molter, Günther. [NEW DIMENSIONS IN CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT: THE LOCKHEED C-5A GALAXY] Neue Dimensionen im Transportflugzeugbau: Lockheed C-5A Galaxy. Flug Revue, Dec. 1967: 14-17. illus.
TL503.C524, v. 1967

In June 1969 the Military Airlift Command (MAC) will receive delivery of an aircraft which might well revolutionize air transport--the Lockheed C-5A Galaxy. The C-5A will be the largest aircraft in the world and will exceed all previous aircraft in this category by its performance. The effiency of the C-5A is best described with an example: In 1948 Berlin was cut off from West Germany by the Russians and the allies used 300 transport aeroplanes in an airlift designed to support West Berlin with necessary supplies. Had the allies been able to employ the C-5A, only ten of these aircraft would have been necessary to execute the whole airlift. The typical standard operational concept of the C-5A is in missions over distances of 5,500 nm. with a payload of 100,000 lb. and a maximum cruising speed of 470 knots. The C-5A has a range of 2,480 nm. and a cruising speed of 460 knots with the maximum payload of 270,000 lb. Günther Molter examines and describes this impressive aircraft and its individual systems. (Abstract supplied, modified)

541
Molter, Günther. [WILL THE DO 31 DIE?] Stirbt die Do 31? [editorial] Flug Revue, Oct. 1967: 11.
TL.503.C524, 1967

Stresses the importance of development of the V/STOL jet transport aircraft, the Dornier Do 31, to the West German and Allied air forces. Now that the RAF is using the V/STOL fighter it will need an adequate transport aircraft. Molter discusses possible Bonn cuts in the financing of the project.

542
MOVING RIGHT ALONG. New republic, v. 158, Jan. 13, 1968: 7-8. AP2.N264, v. 158

Points to the shortcomings of the test ban treaty in limiting nuclear weapons development. The treaty curtails nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, and underwater but fails to curb underground testing--and the United States and the Soviet Union go on developing nuclear weapons. The French and the Chinese disregard the treaty completely, exploding their bombs in the atmosphere. So, 10 years after the birth of the treaty there are perhaps 10 times as many nuclear warheads as in 1963. The U.S. underground testing program has produced a warhead which explodes in space, destroying incoming warheads of offensive missiles by X-ray beams. A similar warhead is presumably in Soviet hands. In addition, the Soviet Union has a new weapon, the fractional orbital bombardment system [FOBS], a likely result of its underground testing program. The United States, in turn, has riposted with the multiple individually-targeted reentry vehicle [MIRV] system, also known as the "space bus," developed in the U.S. underground testing program. Neither the FOBS nor the MIRV are said to be in violation of the outer space treaty, which banned signatories "from putting nuclear weapons into orbit around the earth." There is no need to put these annihilation devices into orbit since there are better ways of dropping them.

543
Müller, Herbert. [STARFIGHTER FOR CONVENTIONAL MISSIONS] Starfighter für konventionellen Einsatz. Flug Revue, no. 10, Oct. 1967: 42, 44. illus.
TL503.C524, 1967

It now almost seems a certainty that the German Air Force will not be equipped with nuclear weapons. The problem thus arose of how the original objective of the F-104 G fleet could be suitably changed. The manufacturers, Lockheed-California, believe they have now improved on the conventional fighting power of the F-104 G by the installation of a new bombing calculator and significant alteration to the underwing pylons. Although no firm offer has been made to the Ministry of Defence in Bonn it appears that the intended modifications greatly enhance the conventional striking power of the Starfighter. (Abstract supplied)

544
NATO GROUP WORKING ON MEMORANDUM FOR SEA SPARROW. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Jan. 1, 1968: 15. UG630.M54, v. 21

Three NATO countries representing the NATO group on missile point defense of ships are working on an agreement on the development of the NATO Sea Sparrow system in preparation for the January 1968 NATO Naval Armament Group meeting in Brussels. The system would enable countries buying or planning to buy the air-to-air version of the Sparrow missile to use this missile also for point defense of ships. The NATO Sea Sparrow, one of the "first to be a complete cooperative R&D and production program," will be introduced into the fleets of participating countries in 1972-73. Each country will attach the NATO Sea Sparrow to the acquisition radar used aboard its vessels. The Sea Sparrow program is of particular significance in connection with the recent approval of a multinational destroyer fleet by NATO military leaders.

545
[THE NEW SOVIET MISSILES] Les nouvelles fusées soviétiques. Air & cosmos, v. 5, Nov. 18, 1967: 18-19. illus. P&GP RR

Describes and evaluates Russia's newest missiles. Among them are the SS-9, which measures 37 meters and is capable of carrying a 20-megaton payload; the "Skean," which can travel over 3,200 kilometers; the submarine-launched ICBM "Serb," which is comparable to America's Polaris A-3; and the "Scud." Also listed are older missiles: the "Scrag," "Savage," and "Sagger," an antitank missile mounted on an amphibious vehicle.

293-980 O - 68 - 3

546
[OUR ARMED FORCES ARE EQUIPPED WITH ALL TYPES OF MODERN WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING ROCKETS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Nashi Vooruzhennye Sily osnashcheny vsemi vidami sovremennoi voennoi tekhniki, v tom chisle i raketno-iadernym oruzhiem. Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, no. 8, Aug. 1967: 6-7. illus.
TL504.V45, 1967

Describes some of the aircraft on display at Domodedovo Airport on July 9, 1967, such as vertical take-off and landing aircraft, multipurpose fighters, and all-weather supersonic fighter interceptors.

547
Polmar, Norman. CORSAIRS FOR THE AIR FORCE. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Feb. 1968: 32-39. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 51

Evaluates the A-7 Corsair II program, which is expected to produce a total of at least 1,600 aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The first Corsair II model was designed for the Navy by Ling-Temco-Vought in 1964 to meet carrier strike requirements. Tests proved it unequaled as a single-engine weapons carrier. With modifications in its powerplant, gun armaments, avionics, and small arms protection, the A-7A was adapted to meet Air Force requirements. The Air Force version, A-7D, will provide the Tactical Air Command with exceptional load, range, and attack capabilities. Additional variants of the A-7 Corsair II are under consideration; it looks as though the sturdy new aircraft is destined to play a major defense role.

548
Powell, Craig. MAINTENANCE OF U.S. STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES DICTATES FUTURE R&D. Armed Forces management, v. 14, Nov. 1967: 38-43. illus.
UB153.A65, v. 14
Interview with Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dept. of Defense.

The primary task of U.S. Defense Research and Engineering [DR&E] is the maintenance of assured destruction and damage-limiting capabilities. The keys to meeting these objectives are survivability and penetration. Weapons systems must pass survivability tests and show that they are able "to penetrate any defense and cause damage at the assured destruction level . . . by deception, using advanced technology, and by brute force, through out-numbering the defenses." In this context DR&E will move into the field of multiple independent reentry vehicles, which are capable of carrying multiple warheads and releasing and detonating them after each warhead seeks out a target. There are two problems involving the survivability of the reentry vehicles: experiments must establish that the United States has a reentry vehicle capability, and reentry missiles must be protected against an attack by perfecting the hardening of land-based missile sites. The majority of defense research and development [R&D] programs are oriented toward the conflict in Southeast Asia. However, if the Vietnam War ends tomorrow, "more than a half billion dollars of R&D effort of an urgent nature that has been applied to Vietnam [would] still [be] applicable to the type of warfare . . . [the United States] may face in the 1970s." The research development, test and evaluation programs and decisions of today will make certain that U.S. fighting men will have better equipment and weapons systems than any other military forces in history.

549
Priewe, Gerd D. [MUST WE LIVE WITH STILL ANOTHER BOMB? THE FOBS IS UPON US--MOSCOW HAS PIERCED MCNAMARA'S NUCLEAR STALEMATE] Mit noch einer Bombe leben? Die FOBS kommen über uns--Moskau durchbrach McNamaras atomares Patt. Politische Welt, v. 10, Dec. 1967: 20-25.
D839.P65, v. 10

The Soviet Union has developed a new weapon, the fractional orbital bombardment system [FOBS], in its Kosmos-satellite program. Since September 1966 it has conducted at least 12 tests with its FOBS bombs under the disguise of a space research program. This demonstrates the problematic value for the West of the nuclear test ban treaty, outer space treaty, and the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty. American military leaders claim that the FOBS is not an economical weapon, that the best U.S. defense is still its second-strike capability, i.e., its ICBM's, and that years ago American scientists had invented weapons systems effective against the FOBS. Economical or not, the FOBS is already in Soviet hands, and U.S. defense systems are still nonexistent. Moreover, American ICBM's, approaching the enemy, will give him 15 to 20 minutes warning time, enough to deprive the American attack of its surprise value.

550
RX FOR WEAPONS PROBLEMS: FAST, FAST DESIGN. Electronic design, v. 16: Feb. 1, 1968: 33.
TK7800.E437, v. 16

The Air Force has recently established a Directorate of Technical Applications for Southeast Asia to provide quick solutions to weapons problems that arise in Vietnam. Using existing hardware and technology, the directorate designs and tests its short-term projects at the Air Proving Ground Center at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. American forces in Vietnam will soon use a new radar system developed at Eglin that has tremendous penetration capabilities and provides precise altitude information. Other Eglin projects include the development of an optical proximity fuse to improve the efficiency of firebombs, improved infrared decoys to detract heat-seeking enemy missiles from Air Force fighter planes, and devices to destroy enemy searchlight batteries and make Air Force night missions safer.

551
Ramsey, Edward L. FAST DEPLOYMENT LOGISTIC SHIPS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Jan. 1968: 56-63.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

Rapid deployment of land forces is and has always been essential to U.S. military strategy. To promote and increase mobility the Army has initiated the development of fast deployment logistics [FDL] ships with the following specifications: long-range endurance at a sustained high speed; the ability to store heavy wheeled and tracked vehicles and other material in a ready condition for up to 3 years; rapid loading and unloading capabilities; "unit integrity of embarked equipment at the brigade force level"; and a need for

minimum logistic support. The FDL ship, which will be capable of 25 knots, will be employed in various modes--some fully loaded and deployed overseas, some fully loaded and ready in continental U.S. ports, and others partially loaded in U.S. and overseas ports. They will be able to take advantage of "strategic warning by steaming to a forward position in the vicinity of the objective area." Tests utilizing older, slower ships have demonstrated that "afloat prepositioning" will work. Planned or existing merchant ships will not meet this need, but the FDL ship "will contribute significantly to providing a responsive and well-balanced worldwide deployment capability for US land forces during the 1970-80 timeframe."

552

Ransone, Robin K. LACK OF DEFINITION CLOUDS V/STOL'S FUTURE. Armed Forces management, v. 14, Feb. 1968: 88-89, 92. illus.
UB153. A65, v. 14

Discusses the role of experimental versus operational vertical short takeoff and landing [V/STOL] aircraft. The second generation experimental V/STOL has functioned to a limited degree "in the field" and has demonstrated unique capabilities and versatility. Consequently more stringent demands have been placed upon it; it showed in test flights that the V/STOL concepts are safe and that it offers sufficient promise for use as a military operational aircraft. Ransone notes that these aircraft are for research and are not intended for operational use or production. It follows that due to specific hardware deficiencies they are unacceptable for operational use, even though these deficiencies can be corrected. The author concludes that third generation V/STOL tests should be completed by 1972. These great-grandchildren of the tailsitters and bedsteads will be the first to have a chance for operational success.

553

Rockefeller, David. THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND THE "TECHNOLOGY GAP." European community, no. 107, Nov. 1967: 3-6. illus.
HD9525. A2. E52, 1967

Excerpts from remarks by David Rockefeller at the International Investment Forum, October 23, 1967.

Despite the fact that modern technology has fostered an increasingly interdependent world and has rendered the term "oceans apart" a purely geographical expression, it has driven apart the United States and Western Europe. The "technology gap" is a problem with serious political and military ramifications. The "brain drain" is one of these. However, the United States does not have an absolute technological superiority. European countries, among them France, Sweden, and England, have pioneered in the development of technological innovations from wrinkle-resistant fabrics to jet engines. Nevertheless the increasing technology gap will require that European nations refrain from abusive protectionism and allow others to help exploit their resources according to the fundamental premises of the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association. The United States can help by not "going home," since American business operations overseas engender a technology flow in both directions. America should help Europe become a more effective competitor, and both continents should cooperate in the exchange of information and ideas. On the other hand, Europe must enlarge the Common Market membership and increase the development of common policies among its original members. It must also invest more and show new interest in the science of management, for the "technology gap" is in part a management gap.

554

Sclater, Neil. 'FENCE' IN SKY KEEPS AN EYE ON SPACE OBJECTS: PHASED ARRAYS IN NEW AIR FORCE RADAR SET UP SCANNING PATTERN OVER EQUATOR TO COUNT TARGETS. Electronic design, v. 16, Jan. 4, 1968: 33, 35. illus.
TK7800. E437, v. 16

Describes the Air Force's newest defensive satellite-tracking network, a $62-million, electronically scanned phased-array system called the AN-FPS-85. The radar faces the equator and within a 12-hour period can scan "all the objects that man has hurled into an orbit in space." Computers process the radar sightings and classify them as known or unknown.

555

Sittsevoi, N., N. Vatago, and I. Gal'tsev. [MISSILES AND MEN] Rakety i liudi. Tekhnika i vooruzhenie, v. 26, Oct. 1967: 20-25. illus.
U4. T4, v. 26

An account of the training of rocketeers and work prior to and during missile launching at a strategic missile installation that stores its formidable weapons in forest caves. Accurate missile launches enable the warhead to hit and destroy enemy targets; the slightest error in correctness at the start could foil the flight. It has been established that poorly trained missile specialists are tense under strain and liable to make mistakes. Therefore Soviet rocketeers must be of high moral and psychological character, physically fit, and have solid scientific knowledge and skills.

556

[THE SOVIET ORBITAL BOMB] La bombe orbitale soviétique [by] J.G. Perspectives, v. 23, Nov. 11, 1967: [item 1] 2-3. HC10. P4, v. 23

Although the deployment of an orbiting bomb by the U.S.S.R. could give it a psychological edge over the United States, it has not altered the mutual deterrence between the superpowers. Such a bomb crossing over U.S. territory could terrify the population. However, even though there is no known method of detecting whether a satellite carries a bomb, advance warning systems such as over-the-horizon radar can be constructed. An orbiting bomb, located inside a satellite, carries a payload of from 30 to 50 megatons, which is equal to the payload of an ICBM. The United States will probably be forced under public pressure to deploy an orbiting bomb of its own, complete with an ABM system. This would put an enormous financial burden upon the U.S. Government--a situation which the Russians would take pleasure in abetting by construction of further sophisticated weapons.

557

Taylor, John W. DOMODEDOVO DISSECTED. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 7, winter 1967: 265-273. illus. UG635. G7A1252, v. 7

Describes the Russian aircraft displayed at the Domodedovo Airport on the 50th anniversary of the

Communist revolution. Among the planes on view were the supersonic Tupolev Tu-22 bomber, the MiG-21PF fighter, a variant of the four-jet Miasishchev Mia-4 strategic bomber, the 201-M, the Sukhoi Su-7 tactical fighter, and the vertical takeoff MiG. The author notes that, with the exception of the Tupolev bomber, the entire show emphasized tactical air power, which seems to confirm Khrushchev's promise of 7 years ago that the Soviet Union would build no more strategic bombers because missiles can provide an adequate deterrent and long-range strike force.

558
Ulsamer, Edgar E. NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS FOR AIRCRAFT. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Nov. 1967: 64-66. UG633.A65, v. 50

A prototype of a nuclear-propelled aircraft could be in the air within the next 10 years. Although the outlook for a nuclear plane is optimistic because of recent advances in nuclear propulsion and aerodynamic techniques, researchers have encountered difficulties in designing a suitable component to transmit the energy (heat) from the reactor to the conventional engines and ensuring adequate safety precautions. To overcome these problems the General Electric Company is currently investigating several methods to ease the heat exchanger problem, and experts are working on energy absorption techniques that would contain fission products in case of a crash and a "crash and collision warning system which would shut down the reactor and seal off the circuits at the shield before impact." With its enormous range and endurance levels the nuclear plane would have many uses ranging from cargo hauling to missile launching.

559
[THE UNITED STATES FUTURE ANTIMISSILE AND ANTIAIRCRAFT SYSTEMS] Zukünftige Raketen- und Flugabwehr-Systeme der USA. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Nov. 10, 1967: 578-579.
U3.W38, v. 11

Considers the U.S. decision to deploy an ABM system against Communist China's potential nuclear threat. Implications for NATO of the Soviet-American arms race in air defense systems are discussed.

560
Vozniuk, V., and V. Kiselevskii. [MOBILITY OF TANKS UNDER WATER] Dvizhenie tankov pod vodoi. Voennyi vestnik, v. 47, Sept. 1967: 39-41. illus.
U4.V87, v. 47

Reviews the improved under water performance of tanks, which has greatly expanded their tactical and operational possibilities. The authors point out that a tank can cross a river from three to five times faster under water than by pontoon bridge. A scientific explanation of the relationship between the decreasing engine power and the counterpressure on exhaust gases under water is given. The article discusses engine cooling under water and the tank's mobility and provides a detailed description of special equipment for driving under water.

561
Weinstein, Martin E. JAPANESE AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE--RESTRAINED, BUT POWERFUL. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Dec. 1967: 56-60, 63. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 50

Describes the development and structure of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force [JASDF]. Although its mission has been restricted to the protection of Japan against aggression because of the overwhelming anti-war attitudes in Japan when it was created in 1954, the JASDF has grown into the most powerful air arm in the Far East next to the United States and Soviet air units. In line with its limited mission, it is administered by the civilian Director General of the National Defense Agency and is divided operationally into an Air Defense Command, Special Units, and a Training Command. The JASDF acquired most of its aircraft under the first and second defense buildup plans through licensing agreements with American industry. However, in order to become less dependent upon American technology, the Japanese Government elected to begin research on its own advanced trainer aircraft under the third defense buildup plan begun in 1967. This 5-year plan also calls for the production of a new long-range fighter-bomber, the acquisition of five Nike-Hercules antiaircraft groups, and research and development for a new Japanese-designed transport and radar reconnaissance aircraft. The future of the JASDF beyond the third defense plan will be influenced by U.S. Far Eastern policy and Communist Chinese policy. Any changes in either of these two policies that would threaten Japanese security could weaken pacifist influence and cause Japan to harness its tremendous industrial strength to become the "military powerhouse of Asia."

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

562
Adias, Claude. [AIR FORCE MOBILIZED FOR TRAINING PROJECT "FATEX"] L'armée de l'Air mobilisée pour l'exercice "FATEX." Aviation magazine, no. 478, Nov. 1, 1967: 30-31. illus.
TL502.A854, 1967

Discusses "FATEX," the most important French Air Force maneuver since 1945. Directed by Generals Calmel and Bertin, it took place between October 10 and 20. "FATEX" had three main objectives: to study command equipment and the progress of information data during attack, to prepare a logistical plan which can quickly be carried out after a nuclear attack, and to develop a system of telegraph communication that will avoid unnecessary dispatches especially in peak periods.

563
Ailleret, Charles. ["DIRECTED" DEFENSE OR "ALL POINTS" DEFENSE] Défense "dirigée" ou défense "tous azimuts." Revue de défense nationale, v. 23, Dec. 1967: 1923-1932.
D410.R45, v. 23

After World War II, when Western Europe was powerless, devastated, and vulnerable to Communist expansionism, the United States in conjunction with its wartime allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was meant to fill the political and military vacuum left by Germany and restore the balance of power in Europe. The balance of power has been restored, and France now believes that the post-World War II Communist threat that gave impetus to the alliance is almost nonexistent. France must therefore

withdraw from NATO and develop nuclear weapons capable of striking any point in the world with megaton force. In effect it has lost its independence of command decisionmaking as a member of the alliance; now, in the face of political realities, it must embark upon a unilateral defense policy incompatible with the military objectives of the Atlantic alliance. The NATO alliance does not guarantee the security of France, for it is virtually impossible to predict, on the one hand, what will cause a serious conflict and, on the other, what side the various powers will take. In 20 years the rivalry between the Russian and American "empires" may change drastically, and whether the United States will succeed in alleviating the "internal racial tensions" that handicap its exercise of power remains to be seen. The alliance is further outmoded by the threats to peace and political stability in other parts of the world--Asia, China, the Middle East, Africa, and South America. The Soviet threat to Europe has diminished considerably. Today the Russians are more concerned with raising their standard of living and achieving cooperation with the West in various economic and technological fields. It is reasonable to assume that the fear of Soviet aggression that prevailed throughout Western Europe during the postwar period is no longer a justifiable emotion. A missile force capable of maintaining France's integrity against attack from possible future unknown areas of political instability will ensure the security and survival of France.

564
Amme, Carl H. NATO WITHOUT FRANCE: A STRATEGIC APPRAISAL. Foreword by Charles Burton Marshall. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967. 195 p.
UA646.3.A75

With an emphasis on such military concerns as strategic concepts, force posture, and the use of nuclear weapons for defense and deterrence, assesses the post-French-withdrawal NATO strategy. Amme argues that in central Europe "the NATO allies should be prepared to use battlefield nuclear weapons in a highly selective manner before a conflict can expand into a major conventional war" in order to signal the enemy that "a heightened risk of general war is shared by both sides." The nature of Soviet goals will not lead to a European war in the absence of accident, crisis, or miscalculation; moreover the choices available to the alliance do not include the repelling of a Soviet Army by conventional means. Any conflict in Europe "would be overshadowed by the danger of escalation to general war." Thus NATO must base its force posture on the best method of controlling these risks.

565
Anderson, Patrick. THE NEW DEFENSE SECRETARY THINKS LIKE THE PRESIDENT. New York times magazine, Jan. 28, 1968: 20-21, 70, 72-75. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1968

Profiles Clark Clifford, the new U.S. Secretary of Defense. Clifford's public service, his liberal record, his possible views on the Vietnam War, and his career as a highly influential Washington lawyer are traced and speculated upon.

566
Anderson, William R. WHY WE NEED A NUCLEAR SURFACE FLEET--SOONEST. Navy, v. 11, Feb. 1968: 28-31. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 11

At present the United States faces an ocean bordered by new sovereignties, and in the coming decades it will encounter new challenges to its hegemony of the seas. If the present balance of power is to be maintained, the United States must continue to rely on oceanic supremacy; a balance of seapower between East and West would mean an imbalance of world power. While the Soviet Union is mounting an aggressive campaign to build a modern navy, the U.S. Fleet has been permitted to lapse into near obsolescence. To combat the new Soviet buildup America must create a nuclear naval force that would incorporate a totally new generation of naval instruments, trained nuclear seamen, and a range of tactics and strategy made possible by nuclear propulsion.

567
Armfield, Hugh. AUSTRALIA: DEFENCE DEBATE. Far Eastern economic review, v. 58, Oct. 12, 1967: 68-70.
HC411.F18, v. 58

Australia is undertaking a comprehensive review of its defense strategy under the impact of Great Britain's decision to withdraw its forces East of Suez. Australian defense strategy, however, is expected to be based "on America remaining as the ultimate protector" in Asia. Some Australian planners advocate a Fortress Australia line, while others favor continuing at the forward position and boosting the Malaysian force. But the pattern of future policy is already emerging; it will include further commitment to the war in Vietnam, a move toward new regional defense cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the establishment of a multinational force in Malaysia or Singapore with greater defense assistance to both countries. Australia may succeed with some help from Washington--possibly in the form of economic pressures--in keeping the British Fleet in the Indian Ocean.

568
Atkinson, James D. THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. Ordnance, v. 52, Nov./Dec. 1967: 260-261.
UF1.O67, v. 52

Suggests that for the United States achieving and retaining technical superiority and recognizing trends in military-technological competition are the crux of strategy and the best safeguard of future security. Instead of aiming at nuclear equilibrium with the Soviet Union the United States should utilize "its technological resources to develop a variety of offensive and defensive systems to limit an enemy's capabilities."

569
Bennett, Ralph K. BEHIND THE KREMLIN'S NUCLEAR SHIELD. Data, v. 12, Dec. 1967: 9-11.
P&GP RR

The production of conventional offensive weapons is beginning to play an important role in the Soviet military apparatus--and could be of profound significance to the United States and the Free World in the last half of this century. A myriad of conventional weapons and techniques are being refined and developed in Russia; they include large, troop-carrying airplanes, helicopters, fighter bombers, ground-to-ground missiles, and the use of troops in airborne and marine operations. Among the reasons for the Soviet buildup of conventional forces are the threat of a major land war with China and Russia's desire to match the United States in "reach" and global mobility. This could also

mean that Russia realizes that it can no longer continue fighting its "little wars" by proxy. It certainly means that the Soviet Union is fast becoming an effective and mobile global military force; such a challenge demands "intensive use of every means possible to study every aspect of the Soviet conventional military machine in action."

570
Berry, John A. FORCE DE FRAPPE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Nov. 1967: 70-78. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 47

How effective is France's force de frappe in deterring the Soviet Union from attacking France? The elements required to render the theory of minimum deterrence credible are both material and psychological. Materially, France's force de frappe consists of three systems: the Mirage IV aircraft capable of carrying a 60-kiloton bomb; the intermediate range ballistic missile [IRBM], with a range of 1,900 miles; and the nuclear submarine "fleet," to be completed by 1973. The Mirage IV is highly vulnerable and could easily be destroyed by a surprise Soviet attack. The IRBM's in Haute-Provence are less vulnerable in flight but could be rendered useless by nuclear saturation bombing. Unlike the other systems the nuclear submarines are highly mobile and are capable of striking from any area. However, when France acquires its "fleet" of three submarines, at least one will be in port at all times for provisions and repairs, making it as vulnerable as the Mirage IV. Psychologically, the use of the force de frappe in a bilateral situation is illogical. The French deterrence credibility is effective only when coupled with that of the United States. France's independent nuclear force, built in lack of faith in the U.S. deterrent, erodes the belief of other NATO members in that deterrent and encourages aggressive adventurism by the Communists.

571
Borklund, C. W. CONSULTATION IS THE KEY TO U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. Armed Forces management, v. 14, Jan. 1968: 38-41.
UB153.A65, v. 14

The most important finding of a recent inquiry by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations is that the United States and its European allies need to improve the practice of alliance consultation. The combined industrial and agricultural power of the West is greater than that of the U.S.S.R. and its bloc countries and could therefore be used as a "trump card" in the effort to arrive at mutually advantageous agreements on arms control and questions of European security. Consultation is the only effective means of clearing up differences between NATO members and can play a part in assuring America's European allies that they are involved in its strategic planning. "Inter-NATO consultation" could have avoided the negative reaction that followed America's decision to deploy a "thin" ABM system. Other crises that caused irritation within the alliance but could have been smoothed over through consultation were the Arab-Israeli War, the Cyprus incident, and the perennial problem of Vietnam. The United States must establish a program that will provide for better Atlantic relationships and at the same time allow Europe to fulfill its needs for more modern, technologically complex, and expensive equipment and defense forces.

572
Borklund, C. W. STRATEGY BY SEMANTICS [editorial] Armed Forces management, v. 14, Dec. 1967: 19.
UB153.A65, v. 14

The belief that the Pentagon military leadership is a "bunch of intellectual doughheads" is outdated and wrong. The failure of the present administration to recognize this has led to many security "aches and pains." Military advice is not being listened to, and nowhere is this more evident than in an analysis of what has happened to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the Vietnam War. The military is in favor of heavy bombing in the North instead of the piecemeal target selection plan. It is also in favor of a strategy of overwhelming force as opposed to gradually increasing military pressure, and, according to the military, the electronic barrier going up south of the demilitarized zone is "silly" and based on "untenable tactics." Military experts are concerned also over the future effectiveness of NATO and attribute its present decline in strategic importance to the disinterest of the policymakers.

573
Buckhout, Robert. THAILAND: WHERE WE CAME IN. Nation, v. 205, Oct. 2, 1967: 305-308.
AP2.N2, v. 205

Summarizes the content of a conference of the Foreign Policy Roundtable at Washington University, St. Louis. Anthropologists, political scientists, and journalists, all expert in Thai affairs, discussed present conditions in Thailand and the effects of U.S. involvement on Thai culture and on the course of foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The extent of U.S. involvement in Thailand is becoming quite clear: 80 percent of the missions flown by the United States against targets in Vietnam and Laos originate in Thailand; 40,000 U.S. troops are stationed there, principally in support of these air bases; military advisers are training Thai troops to fight Communist insurgents; and U.S. helicopter pilots are flying Thai troops into the Communist-infested northeast section, while the United States Information Agency and other Government agencies are engaged in disseminating propaganda on the virtues of the Thai Government. Most of the conferees believed that the effect of insurgency in Thailand has been small but that because of the basic problems confronting Thailand it poses a potentially serious threat to the Government. The question uppermost in the minds of the participants was whether the United States has overcommitted itself in Thailand. The depth of this commitment has not been fully disclosed, and in the meantime U.S. soldiers are dying for the Thai dictatorship.

574
Butz, J. S. THE SEARCH FOR NUCLEAR FLEXIBILITY--'ILLOGICAL,' OR A RACE FOR SURVIVAL? Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Dec. 1967: 37-41.
UG633.A65, v. 50

According to the present official U.S. position a credible offensive force is the best deterrent to nuclear war. However, the stability of the mutual deterrence policy will be undermined in the future as China and other nations develop missile strike forces. In order to avoid the unpleasant situation of a multinational mutual deterrence circle, the United States should double its efforts to negotiate agreements on the reduction or eventual elimination of arms and strive for tech-

nological improvements that would give it unmatched defensive and offensive military capabilities. Unlike Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never considered it passé to adapt the flexibility doctrine to U.S. nuclear forces. They feel that even though no nation could win a nuclear war, the nation that will survive "best" is the one with the most military options and strong damage-limiting capability. From the scanty information available in open literature, one can conclude that nuclear weapon technology is entering its most innovative and productive period. The appearance of the FOBS and the ABM in Russia could indicate that the Soviet Union is challenging the United States to a contest for nuclear supremacy. The United States can only meet this challenge by making an all-out effort to maintain nuclear supremacy and by turning away from its present reliance on a single weapons system.

575

Cameron, Robert A. CREDIBILITY--FACING THE REALITIES OF THE ATOM. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Nov. 1967: 38-43. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 50

In order to contain local aggression, the United States must convince its potential enemies that it will use nuclear weapons at all levels of violence. The credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent has declined considerably since the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. The failure of the United States to apply its nuclear power in the Korean War and the subsequent growth in Russian nuclear capabilities have contributed to this decline. Although the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons briefly slowed the erosion of nuclear credibility, the development of the flexible response strategy soon rekindled skepticism about American nuclear guarantees. America's policy of using nuclear weapons to deter major war while attempting to resolve lesser conflicts with conventional arms does not make sense. When the threat of nuclear punishment is lacking, limited wars tend to break out and escalate as rapidly as they did before the advent of nuclear weapons. In terms of cost and manpower the West cannot afford to ignore much longer the strategic advantages of sophisticated nuclear weapons. The United States should reinforce its nuclear deterrent by revising its nuclear control and military strategy and by reducing the psychological aversion to atomic weapons. If the United States would delegate authority to the top U.S. allied commander in the field to use NATO's nuclear defensive weapons with the permission of the political authorities of the nations involved, it could fortify its deterrent credibility in Western Europe. People must be persuaded that modern nuclear weapons used at the right time and place would not trigger a nuclear holocaust but would probably stop a war before it got out of hand. Although the United States may never be forced to use nuclear weapons, it should let every aggressor know it is prepared to take such a step in the hopes that it would lead to a "nuclear peace."

576

Candlin, A. H. S. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE NEW ASSIZE OF ARMS. Army quarterly and defence journal, v. 94, July 1967: 166-177.
Ul.A85, v. 94

Nuclear weaponry has created changes not only in military technology but also in military doctrine. Because of these changes the fundamental and traditional principles of war must also change to the extent that the character of war, transformed by the "ultimate" weapon, is no longer based on these principles. This verdict has been widely accepted even though the general spectrum of armed conflict includes "limited war," which is waged by traditional means. The military doctrine underlying the use of advanced weapons must be in accord with the traditional principles of war in order to achieve success in limited conflict. The validity of modified nuclear doctrines based on survival, assured destruction, and damage limitation could also be in doubt because of the resurrection of more proven principles of war such as security, defense, and victory. Nuclear doctrine is exerting a "hyponostrategic" effect on the United States Government. Erroneous trust in nuclear superiority could lull Americans into an attitude of false security. Defense is essential to counter this attitude and to ensure that victory rather than survival will be the main objective of U.S. military posture. Despite Secretary of Defense McNamara's claims that the United States is strategically superior to the Soviet Union in offensive missiles, there is much anxiety among the better-informed U.S. service personnel. Over the past few years the supply and deployment of Soviet offensive missiles have increased more rapidly than expected. The Soviets appear to be closing the offensive missile gap with the development of multiple independently guided warheads, missiles capable of carrying multiple and individually guided warheads and "decoys." The reason for U.S. hesitation in accepting a ballistic missile defense [BMD] is cost and the belief that an effective antimissile system could be produced only at the risk of violating the nuclear test ban treaty. There are some grave doubts that an effective BMD system could be based on the findings of underground tests and simulation methods alone. The need for BMD on as wide a basis as possible--even on a shared basis with Atlantic allies--is imperative. Failure to move in this direction will widen the technology gap, and such movement is made difficult without intelligence on enemy programs. There is reason to doubt that the strategy of deterrence can endure. The dramatic advances in weaponry (the satellite-borne BMD and high-altitude "screening" nuclear explosion) by Russia could shatter the illusion of a nuclear stalemate and confront the world with a "nuclear checkmate."

577

Catley, R. AUSTRALIA'S WARM WAR. Eastern world, Nov./Dec. 1967: 7-8.
DS501.E45, 1967

Australia's recent "belligerence towards certain of her northern neighbors" is only partly accounted for by the nation's longstanding xenophobia. Canberra's immediate strategic concerns are with China, which is considered a "serious long-term threat to Australia," one that must be met by establishing a balance of power in Southeast Asia. Australian leaders fear that if the United States should abandon its efforts in Vietnam a Communist-dominated Southeast Asia would threaten the Australian north coast as the Japanese did during World War II. Yet China lacks air and sea power, and much of Australia's trade is with the Chinese, in sharp contrast with the situation vis-a-vis Japan. The Australian people have given these strategic conceptions little serious criticism, and their commitment to the war in Vietnam is wholehearted. They have echoed their leaders' assumptions that alliance with the United States will make Australia safer, when in actual fact that alliance may make Australia a prime target in any nuclear conflict.

578

Chopra, Maharaj K. INDIAN ARMED FORCES: OUR ARMED FORCES NEED MODERN WEAPONS. Forum, Aug. 1967: 25, 27. AP2. F8, 1967

India has the manpower for a good military organization but is not producing an adequate supply of modern weapons. Not only are India's 24 ordnance factories behind in their production schedules, but they are not equipped to manufacture some of the crucial weapons needed today. Little is being done to supply the Indian Armed Forces with updated warships and bomber aircraft. The Indian missile program is progressing very slowly and may not adequately meet future defense requirements. Because a number of countries are equipping their armed forces with nuclear weapons, India cannot give up the option to build them but does not consider them vital at the present time.

579

[CHUIKOV FAVORS THE EXPANSION OF CIVIL AIR DEFENSE IN THE SOVIET UNION: TASS AGAINST EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Tschujkow für Ausbau des zivilen Luftschutzes in der SU: TASS gegen Notstandsgesetzgebung in der BRD. Der aktuelle Osten, no. 25, Aug. 4, 1967: 1-2. P&GP RR

The Soviet Union has increased its efforts in the field of civil air defense. During World War II, local air defense in inhabited places within an air attack area was adequate. Today, when missiles are capable of carrying nuclear weapons anywhere on earth, the population, industry, etc., of the entire country have to be protected. A new civil defense system is needed. The population must be instructed in air defense, and workers, officials, and kolkhoz members should be mobilized and trained in civil defense. Communication media ought to be put at the disposal of the air defense program to ensure active participation of the population. These views expressed in a recent broadcast by Soviet Marshal Chuikov are not surprising because not only the Soviet Union, but other countries such as West Germany are also expanding and improving their air defense systems. Nevertheless the Communist press in West Germany attacked Bonn for this lately, stating that "air defense madness" increases the danger of war. The Communist method is to praise an action ascribed to the Communist but to consider it a crime if attributed to non-Communists. Another example of this method is the opposition of the Soviet news agency, TASS, to the German Federal Republic's recent emergency legislation.

580

CIVIL DEFENSE IN NORWAY: WHY IT IS WHAT IT IS. Norseman, no. 6, 1967: 149-151. DL401. N612, 1967

Although Norway is unlikely to be a priority target in the event of an all-out war, its strategic location and common border with the Soviet Union may invite attack. Thus the Norwegian Government is interested in building a strong civil defense organization. The old voluntary civil defense organization, established in 1936, proved effective during World War II but needed updating to meet the threat of the new mass destruction weapons. The present civil defense act, passed in 1953, made civil defense service compulsory for all citizens between the ages of 18 and 65 who were not otherwise engaged in the armed forces or civilian defense agencies. Because of its dispersed population, Norway was divided into 131 civil defense areas, each one administered by its own relief force. Besides providing a force of almost 150,000 to aid the population in the event of an attack, Norwegian civil defense planners are encouraging the construction of public and private blast-proof fallout shelters. Although the shelter program is lagging for lack of funds, by January 1967 Norway had room for 154,192 people in public shelters and 560,000 in private shelters. Plans have been made for the evacuation of 800,000 people from the cities to rural areas. While the civil defense organization has made substantial progress, it is endeavoring to improve the system through public information programs and closer cooperation with the church and the Salvation Army.

581

Clayton, B. A. DECISION-MAKING IN A THERMONUCLEAR AGE. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 112, Nov. 1967: 340-348. Ul. R8, v. 112

The advent of the thermonuclear bomb has caused substantial changes in the waging of war and is turning military strategy more and more into the art of bargaining, threatening, and coercing. A growing trend toward consideration of strategy as simply decisions based on empirical data has been observed, and old-fashioned military experience, judgment, and intuition have reputedly been supplanted by the new techniques. Some of these new aids to decisionmaking are systems analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, operational research, war games, and game theory. Modern systems analysis emphasizes explicitness, quantification, and the recognition of uncertainty and is applicable to many, but not all, military problems. Operations research today is projective analysis--its relationship to systems analysis is analogous to that of tactics to strategy. War games attempt to simulate conflict and are used to evaluate tactical doctrine and weapons. A kind of political-military game, which could be a valuable research tool in the study of international politics and crisis management, although costly in time and money, is now being widely developed. Game theory involves situations in which each player has to choose the most rational strategy when all relevant probabilities are known. It is essentially an analogy between the behavior of nations in conflict and firms in competition. These techniques are essential in decisionmaking in today's world. They have their limitations, however, and are not substitutes for sound and experienced military judgment.

582

Cleveland, Harlan. THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATO. NATO letter, v. 15, Nov. 1967: 2-7. illus. D845.2.A44, v. 15

The publicity given to the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military system has masked the positive progress of the alliance in the past 2 years. Once it reestablished its headquarters in Brussels, the alliance presented the first new NATO strategy in 11 years and began to streamline and modernize its defense system. The alliance has established a Nuclear Planning Group, which is endeavoring to define the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe and to devise means for the sharing of nuclear responsibilities among NATO members. Although the

stepped-up Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean following the Middle East crisis shows that the Russians have not abandoned force as the extension of diplomacy, there are indications that they may be willing to negotiate with the Western allies about Europe's future. NATO can play a major role in the politics of détente by providing the armed strength necessary for a good bargaining position and by providing the framework for coordinating negotiations.

583
COMEBACK OF NATO: A SETBACK FOR DE GAULLE. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Dec. 25, 1967: 57-58. JK1.U65, v. 63

NATO has not disintegrated, nor will it do so, despite French President de Gaulle's attempts to destroy it. The Atlantic alliance may, in fact, be more effective today than before the French pullout, as indicated by the latest meeting of NATO Defense and Foreign Ministers, at which a long-hoped-for change in strategy and a further integration of NATO military forces were adopted. With France no longer able to block essential defense decisions, the alliance has altered its strategy to one of flexible response, thereby eliminating the gap between an official policy of massive retaliation and the realities of military planning. Manpower goals have also been adjusted in a more realistic manner. To spotlight a growing trend toward NATO military integration, an Atlantic destroyer squadron will be formed with ships from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and other member nations. American officials feel that this Atlantic force will be a prototype for a similar force in the Mediterranean, which will constitute a forceful answer to growing Soviet strength in that sea. With an increase in the European share in its own defense will probably come a cutback of the American presence on the Continent, eventually leaving a token force to demonstrate to potential Soviet invaders of Europe that they risk nuclear war. A European defense community, grouped around a joint Anglo-French nuclear deterrent, would contribute still further toward transferring the burden of European defense, but since this would require the full cooperation of the French it will have to wait on a change in government in Paris. In any event it is clear that the rest of Europe has chosen to follow American leaders rather than Charles de Gaulle.

584
Conrad, Thomas M. DAMOCLES' NEW SWORD: BOMBS IN ORBIT. Commonweal, v. 87, Dec. 8, 1967: 332-334. AP2.C6897, v. 87

The deployment by the Russians of a fractional orbiting bombing system [FOBS] could have political as well as military implications. Although Secretary of Defense McNamara notes that the FOBS is not cost-effective (which is true), it can be parlayed into modest forms of political leverage without being actually used. The FOBS is not a reliable means for massive attack and is an "indifferent competitor with standard ICBM's for simple bombardment targets," but, in a hypothetical situation, if the Soviet Union launches a series of unarmed satellites the United States, sensitized to the threat of Soviet orbital bombs, could be pressured into a series of political defeats. On the one hand, if it shot down the satellites it would be accused of breaking the test ban treaty, while, on the other hand, if it inspects a satellite (and finds it unarmed) the Russians could demand payment for its dismantling; the United States would be left "looking like the paranoic fool." The cost-effectiveness technique is hard to justify when the behavior of individuals, groups, or nations is at issue. The behavioral sciences should be applied in conjunction with technology and weapons engineering; should we fail to do this we may encourage dogmatic political analyses which could be disastrously incorrect and which would invite our enemies to take advantage "of the rigid and predictable thinking patterns which result."

585
Cordier, Sherwood S. JAPAN: PRESENT AND POTENTIAL MILITARY POWER. In United States Naval Institute. Proceedings, v. 93, Nov. 1967: 68-78. illus. V1.U8, v. 93

Discusses Japan's ambitious military expansion program for the years 1967 to 1971. The Japanese economy and its foreign trade, which have made Japan the leading industrial nation in Asia, are the most significant factors in the growth of Japan's military posture. The author also notes that Japan's military development could be severely handicapped by overpopulation, strategic vulnerability, and lack of arable land. Because of its strategic vulnerability and the threat from Communist China, Japan will probably develop nuclear weapons. The tremendous economic growth of Japan makes it "a weighty, and perhaps decisive, counter in the balance of power, both in Asia and the world."

586
Csizmas, Michael. [MILITARY ALLIANCE SYSTEM IN EAST EUROPE] Das militärische Bündnissystem in Osteuropa. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 133, Oct-Nov. 1967: 604-614, 675-683. illus. U3.A43, v. 133

Considers the political and legal backgrounds, structure of command, command personnel changes, and military preparedness of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Csizmas outlines the Organization's history and comments on its military posture, especially the role of the satellite armies in the planned common defense. None of these armies has been given independent strategic tasks, but each is to be integrated under Soviet operational command in case of war. Their main role is to ensure safe movement of the Soviet forces on satellite territories.

587
Dahm, Helmut. [SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE VIEW OF THE 23d CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (1-3)] Die sowjetische Militärdoktrin in der Sicht des XXIII. Parteitags der KPdSU. 1-3. Wehrwissenschaftlishe Rundschau, v. 17 Oct./Dec. 1967: 566-577, 604-625, 661-679. U3.W485, v. 17

A documented review of Soviet strategic writings since 1945, with special emphasis on the most recent ones. Dahm discusses various types of wars (from local conventional to total nuclear) as envisaged by Soviet authors, as well as a switch in Soviet strategy from a defensive to a two-sided defensive-offensive one.

588
Delmas, Claude. [ANTIMISSILE MISSILES; A NEW ASPECT OF DETERRENCE] Missiles antimissiles; nouvel aspect de la dissuasion. Informations & documents, no. 252, Nov. 15, 1967: 18-23. illus.
P&GP RR

Among the problems NATO faces today is a brand new strategic factor, the U.S. ABM defense system. The present duty of NATO is to determine what effect this system will have on the strategy of the Atlantic alliance. Mutual deterrence has established a balance of terror under which McNamara's logical and rational doctrine of escalation, risk, the necessity of reinforcing nuclear forces, flexible response, and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been developed. The United States, which possesses the Nike-X system, Spartans, and Sprints, was not unprepared for the 1966 disclosure of a Soviet ABM system. Therefore McNamara was able to refuse to follow the Soviet example and avoid a new arms race, hoping that common Soviet and American interests would bring about Soviet cooperation. President Johnson, sharing this feeling, after announcing the U.S. ABM decision appealed to the Russians to slow the arms race and start negotiations for arms control and disarmament. Russia's acceptance of his offer indicates that both sides consider the necessity of facing the repercussions of the Chinese nuclear effort as their primary task. China will probably develop an ABM force, although crude and vulnerable, at the beginning of 1970. Since the United States feels that the ABM decision left the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear balance intact, the decision did not change the U.S. attitude toward its allies, nor did it modify NATO's basic strategy concepts. The United States, while unable to limit its interest exclusively to the Atlantic zone, remains interested in it, and considers NATO a masterpiece of American diplomacy and strategy that reinforces American defense potential and is in the long run profitable to all its allies.

589
Dmitriev, B. AMERICAN NATO STRATEGY. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, July 10, 1967: pt. 2, [item] 2: 1-4.
Slav Rm
Translated from Izvestiia, July 9, 1967.
Slav Rm

The announced change in NATO's strategic planning from "massive retaliation" to "flexible reaction" is somewhat belated, because the change in U.S. doctrine took place 6 years ago. The massive retaliation doctrine outlined by John Foster Dulles in January 1954 was based on lightning massive retaliation by means and at places of America's choosing. NATO members expressed concern over the possibility of the United States taking unilateral action, ignoring the principle of NATO unanimity, and using nuclear weapons. The answers of the U.S. Government did not calm the West European countries. With the alinement of forces in existence at the end of the 1950's, American territory would be exposed to nuclear attack in case of an American-Soviet confrontation. The Kennedy Administration embarked upon a more cautious military policy of "flexible reaction" adapted to the realities of the 1960's. According to Washington not every East-West crisis will require immediate use of thermonuclear weapons--response can be graduated from political pressure to a nuclear blow. Washington's aim is to protect American territory and transfer the danger to other areas, including Europe. However U.S. leaders did not alter NATO's policy of massive retaliation. The changes in strategic planning were imposed on NATO by the new European political climate. The "Soviet threat," which had kept the NATO allies in fear, lost its meaning, and instead of a military confrontation the Europeans now prefer to develop contacts and cooperation. The Americans have tried to present NATO's strategic change as a means to relax tension in Europe--they claim a "pause" during a conflict will enable them to settle the crisis without nuclear weapons. In reality deliberations on graded actions will not reduce the tension created by the presence of 76 divisions, about 4,000 rocket launchers, and American tactical nuclear weapons (about 80 percent of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are on West German soil). Slated to take 5 years, the new plan includes a structural reorganization that will enable the Americans to control key positions and remain masters of NATO's nuclear weapons. America will try to involve its NATO allies in restricted wars against the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, just as it now tries to achieve some participation of the Western allies in its aggression against Vietnam and interference in the Middle East.

590
Eckhart, William, and others. MILITARISM IN OUR CULTURE TODAY. Journal of human relations, v. 15, 4th quarter 1967: 532-537.
HI.J55, v. 15

"Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Chicago, September 7, 1965, by the Peace Research Group of Des Moines, Iowa."

Reports a study to ascertain whether variables describing ideological conflicts were "correlated with militarism in culture today." Correlations involving a militarism scale indicated that militarism is a defense of antidemocratic, antiwelfare, laissez-faire capitalism rather than opposition to communism. Materialism, nationalism, and religious orthodoxy also correlated positively with militarism at a statistically significant level, suggesting that militarism in American society is not mustered "in defense of either democracy or idealism."

591
Eliot, George F. SECONDARY DETERRENCE. Ordnance, v. 52, Jan./Feb. 1968: 363-365. illus.
UFl.067, v. 52

The threat of a nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Russia is "deprived of credibility"; the mutual fears of consequences provide the primary level of nuclear deterrence. But the Russians are now exploiting the secondary level of deterrence. They are helping to protract the conflict in Vietnam, expecting Americans to develop widespread opposition to the war, imbued with anxiety that it will turn into a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. Banking on the U.S. aversion to any future involvement in wars of national liberation, the Russians are trying to steer American policy toward the cautious use of military force in support of national objectives. They hope that domestic unrest and violence, undermining the U.S. ability to oppose aggression, and the expansion of Soviet naval power, undermining U.S. global sea-based mobility, will clear the way for Communist imperialism. However, the Kremlin could be wrong in its interpretation of "American reaction under pressure."

592
Enthoven, Alain C. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS--GROUND RULES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DEBATE. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Jan. 1968: 33-40. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 51

Argument for the systems analysis approach to defense planning presented by Assistant Secretary of Defense Enthoven before the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. He points out the vast improvements in force structure since the planning-programming-budgeting system [PPBS] replaced decentralized defense budgeting and planning activities in 1961. Systems analysis is certainly no substitute for judgment, but it aids judgment by clearly defining the issues and the potential consequences of alternative courses of action. Different assumptions may lead to different conclusions, but at least systems analysis provides decisionmakers with a uniform framework for evaluating assumptions and ground rules for effective debate. Through the application of modern methods of mathematical and economic techniques, systems analysis helps to identify the alternative that yields the greatest military effectiveness for any given cost in relation to long-range national objectives. While PPBS cannot automatically produce good decisions, it has vastly improved the quality of the defense planning process and has led to the acquisition of a ready, more balanced, and better supported combat force.

593
Erfurth, Siegfried. [FINLAND'S ARMED FORCES ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE] Finnlands Wehrmacht am 50 jährigen Unabhängigkeitstag. Wehrkunde, v. 16, Dec. 1967: 638-641. U3.W396, v. 16

Gives information on the strength, organization, weaponry, and training of the Finnish Armed Forces. Erfurth stresses the high morale of the Finnish people in regard to national defense despite the nation's heavy losses in World War II.

594
Erickson, John, Edward L. Crowley, and Nikolai Galay, eds. THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION; ITS IMPACT ON STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY. New York, Published for the Institute for the Study of the USSR [by] F. A. Praeger [1966]
UAll.E7

Selected, revised and updated papers from a symposium held at the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Oct. 1964.
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Nuclear strategy: world dilemma, by John Erickson.--The Soviet approach to the modern military revolution, by Nikolai Galay.--Is the atomic deterrent a bluff? by Ferdinand O. Miksche.--Trends in Soviet thinking on theater warfare and limited war, by Thomas W. Wolfe.--Towards the McNamara doctrine, by David Rees.--Neutralism and the West, by William Rodney.--The organizational crisis in NATO, by Hellmuth Roth.--The political cohesion of the Soviet bloc, by Richard V. Burks.--The impact on land warfare, by Michel Garder.--Soviet naval strategy, by Robert W. Herrick.--The future of manned aircraft, by Martin Edmonds.--The role of missile defense in Soviet strategy and foreign policy, by John R. Thomas.--Anti-missile systems and disarmament, by N. Talensky.--Psychostrategy: a new concept, by Robert D. Crane.--Military power in Soviet policy, by Raymond Garthoff.--Implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute, by Malcolm Mackintosh.--The United States and the Soviet Union: standoff or confrontation?, by Herbert S. Dinerstein.

Includes essays--by 17 internationally respected strategists and military writers--on subjects ranging from conventional warfare to the new concepts of psychostrategy, from the role of neutralism in the cold war to the meaning of the nuclear deterrent.

595
Ermakov, Vladimir. MISSILES--AGAINST WHOM? Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, Nov. 15, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 2, 2.
Slav Rm

Translated from Pravda, Nov. 15, 1967.
Slav Rm

Discusses the military reinforcement of the Alto Adige (Southern Tyrol), the network of rocket bases to be built from Ancona to Lake Garda, the U.S. depots for nuclear warheads in Friuli, the missile launchers located near Venice, and the new NATO base in Avigliano, where U.S. pilots are practicing napalm bombing before leaving for Vietnam. The author concludes that the additional army units in the tension area of the Southern Tyrol, a neo-Nazi target, are justified, but he questions the need for the new missile launching sites. This increase in modern weapons and foreign bases on its territory may involve Italy in future U.S. military ventures.

596
Ermarth, Fritz. SOVIET MILITARY POLITICS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Jan. 1968: 32-36. Z6723.U35, v. 48

The Soviet Communist Party leadership has successfully resisted all attempts by the military to encroach upon party control over military policy. Today, although the military establishment is much more unified than during the Khrushchev era and although political leaders have granted certain of the demands of the military, the marshals still do not "call the tune." Within the armed forces the political control apparatus has become strongly militarized; the question of the loyalty of the political officer, whether to the Army or the party, is now open. The party can thus control the Army only when the former is "united in its claim to leadership and on policy positions." Of all the interest groups in Soviet society, in fact, the military remains the most cohesive, but it can still be split by a determined party policy. If the party yields to internecine power struggles, the military may be able to intervene, probably in the direction of maintaining orthodoxy on all fronts. It now appears, however, that despite predictions to the contrary the current collective leadership will be able to maintain itself for some years to come. At some point resource allocations will have to be reexamined, and, unless international tension is high, the military budget will in all likelihood be trimmed, with decreasing stress placed on traditional forces. The traditionalists among the military will counter with "the contention that the Soviet Union is in increasing need of diversified limited war capabilities." By and large the party will be subject to a widening pluralism, to which it probably will refuse to adapt creatively. The ensuing aggravation of tensions poses an imminent challenge to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

597
EUROPE MINUS AMERICA. New republic, v. 157, Oct. 21, 1967: 7-8. AP2. N264, v. 157

American troops and nuclear weapons in Europe tend to irritate rather than comfort the Europeans. They fear being dragged into wars brought on by American trigger-crazy policies. Several months ago General de Gaulle stated that France refuses to risk becoming a "battlefield" or a target of American and Russian bombs. On a recent visit to Poland, De Gaulle reportedly proposed the disbanding of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization and establishment of a neutral area, to include both Germanies, Austria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. West Germany would retain its big army minus American nuclear weapons; militarily and politically France and Russia would dominate the European scene and America would be ousted. Everyone in the United States except the administration is aware of the deterioration of the American position in Europe. Representative Henry S. Reuss pointed out that "while Vietnam has hogged our attention, our European policy has crumbled to virtual nonexistence." Reuss called for new policies tailored to a Europe entirely different from the one NATO was devised to defend. Europe now has more self-confidence and is bored by U.S. obsessions with violence; only a change away from war and fear will dispel disenchantment with America. Time, patience, and an atmosphere of tranquility are needed for the entire continent of Europe rather than continual American admonishments to Europeans to stay firm and support U.S. policies of more arms and more "containment." NATO's military structure must be put in perspective as a useful but undramatic defense mechanism of a Europe not under siege. Otherwise, Europeans may become sold on De Gaulle's line and send the Americans packing.

598
Feld, Bernard T. THE DECISION TO DEPLOY: AN EDITORIAL OPINION. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 23, Dec. 1967: 18-19. TK9145. A84, v. 23

The administration's strategy of deploying an ABM system and at the same time attempting to arrive at an arms-lifting agreement with the Russians collapsed almost before the decision to construct a "thin" system was announced. Already certain congressional leaders are advocating a full-scale ABM system, and Senator Jackson has called for hearings to apply pressure to remove limitations on the ABM deployment. The cause of the "disease" that has perpetrated this new round of escalation is not essentially the "military-industrial complex" but rather rampant, indiscriminate anticommunism. The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy has consistently impeded arms control negotiations and is sponsoring projects such as the Plowshare testing program "to the detriment of prospects for a nonproliferation treaty." U.S. repudiation of a widely agreed-upon version of the nonproliferation treaty was brought about by the intervention of the Joint Committee. The committee also extracted Kennedy's commitment to pursue a vigorous underground test program, thus curbing the opportunities for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Although it appears that the battle to limit ABM deployment has been lost, those few who desire to avoid nuclear war must support efforts to limit deployment.

599
Fink, Donald E. NATO SEEKS IMPROVED NON-NUCLEAR FORCE. Aviation week & space technology, v. 87, Dec. 25, 1967: 47. TL501. A8, v. 87

At their meeting early in December NATO's Defense Committee and Ministerial Council decided to develop a flexible response capability for the Atlantic alliance, adopted a 5-year rolling-force planning concept for setting NATO force levels, approved a proposal to study the application of a thin ABM system to European security, and accepted the Harmel plan for determining how NATO nations can formulate unified policy toward reducing East-West tensions. In order to increase their conventional-strike capabilities the air forces of European NATO countries will have to build up their stockpiles of iron bombs and equip their bombers to fly conventional as well as low-level nuclear missions. NATO members will probably shift the major nuclear-strike mission to missile units in order to free more aircraft for conventional missions. They will also take a look at the future role of antisubmarine warfare and V/STOL aircraft in the defense of Europe.

600
Finney, John. TONKIN GULF ATTACK: A CASE STUDY IN HOW NOT TO GO TO WAR. New republic, v. 158, Jan. 27, 1968: 19-22. AP2. N264, v. 158

There is a parallel between the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine and the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which ignited the U.S. war against North Vietnam. There is also a striking similarity between Mark Twain's attack on the McKinley administration and Senator Fulbright's argument with the Johnson administration over justification for the initial bombing of North Vietnam in retaliation for "deliberate attack" on American destroyers in international waters. The Defense Department offers extensive evidence of an attack, but after being weighed, argued, and questioned this evidence still seems circumstantial and inconclusive. The Fulbright inquiry--too late to change the course of events--nevertheless raises questions about decisionmaking procedures in future military incidents. The Tonkin affair points to the need for a command-and-control system that could prevent "events from overtaking decisions." It cannot be concluded that the administration provoked the Tonkin affair to find an excuse for attacking North Vietnam, but the quality of judgment displayed by the administration in sizing up and reacting to the incident "in both a prospective and retroactive sense" can be challenged. Senator Fulbright is concerned mainly with the future: that the country not be thrown into foreign military hostilities "for lack of considered political decisions." His inquiry goes beyond the issue of the administration's command-and-control system; it strikes at the core of the problem--the constitutional power of Congress to declare war and congressional control over the executive branch.

601
Fischer, Karl. [IMPROVED DEFENSE FOR LESS MONEY] Bessere Verteidigung für weniger Geld. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Oct. 10, 1967: 516-517. U3. W38, v. 11

Any proposal for rationalizing West Germany's defense must answer the questions of what service

should be given top priority, whether the nation should possess delivery means for nuclear warheads, and what weapons systems should be procured or developed. The problem must be examined from the political as well as military, economic, and technological standpoints. The idea of the German Federal Republic acquiring nuclear weapons is resented by its friends and foes alike. The Federal Republic can only lose politically by engaging, even indirectly, in the nuclear military field, for the use of nuclear warheads would remain subject to foreign decision anyway. Thus the possession merely of a means of delivery would be politically useless. The situation may change when a "politically integrated Europe" arms itself with nuclear weapons. In the meantime the nation's alliance with nuclear powers should give it adequate nuclear protection. Provisions for the employment of German forces in nuclear combat even in field emergencies or only as a complement to their conventional role would discredit the West German renunciation of nuclear weapons. This would hamper the Government's freedom of action in foreign affairs. West Germany's own defenses and its military contribution to NATO should be entirely conventional. The nation's strategic environment requires that priority be given to West German land forces. Its Navy and Air Force cannot possibly have independent strategic tasks as they did in World War II but must limit themselves solely to support of land forces. Armored weapons--especially the "Leopard" tank--are of great importance because they represent the optimal combination of mobility and fire power.

602
FRIENDS IN ASIA HAIL CHINESE HYDROGEN BOMB SUCCESS. Survey of China mainland press, no. 3967, June 26, 1967: 31-33. DS777.55.U52, 1967
Hsin hua t'ung hsün shê [New China News Agency] release, English, Peking, June 21, 1967.
DS777.55.H656, 1967

Friends in Ceylon, Japan, Pakistan, and Cambodia acclaimed China's explosion of its first hydrogen bomb as a great victory for the invincible power of the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Communist Party leaders told New China New Agency representatives that all the peoples of the world who are struggling against imperialism and revisionism rejoice at China's success in mastering the world's most advanced science and technology. By breaking the U.S.-Soviet nuclear monopoly China has raised the morale of the revolutionary peoples of the world and contributed to world peace.

603
Gabelić, Andro. THE USSR: NEW ACCENT IN STRATEGY. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Nov. 20, 1967: 16-18. D839.R4, v. 18

The production of conventional weapons, the creation of new marine divisions, the development of naval power, and the refinement of "small war" tactics are part of Russia's effort to counter the "imperialist strategy of local and restricted wars." This strategy is the result of the failure of massive retaliation, which was based on atomic power and oriented toward preventive nuclear war for "liberating" the countries behind the Iron Curtain. This failure forced the West to seek a "solution" outside the domain of nuclear strategy; thus it developed a doctrine of restricted and local wars. The Russians in turn are countering this conventional strategy in the hope of deterring the West. This will not be easy, for such a strategy calls for foreign bases, materiel, financial resources, and a system of multilateral and bilateral alliances, all of which Russia either does not have or has too little of. Although Russia probably cannot bridle America's conventional strategy as it has its massive retaliation strategy, its new tactics are already getting some results: the presence of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean has reduced the effectiveness of the American 6th Fleet.

604
Gelber, Harry G. [AUSTRALIA AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES. SYNOPSIS OF A DEFENSE POLICY] Australien und das Bündnis mit den Vereinigten Staaten. Grundrisse einer Verteidigungspolitik. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Sept. 25, 1967: 675-682.
D839.E86, v. 22

Australia's defense policy rests primarily on its alliance with the United States. This in itself represents a major policy shift, because the nation traditionally has been bound to Great Britain. Australia has to cope with four groups of defense problems. The first is the security of the nation's communication lines with the rest of the world, especially those running through the Indian Ocean to the Near East and Europe, those that lead through the Pacific to the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia, and those around the Australian Continent. Another involves the security of far-off bases and territories, such as Singapore or New Guinea, from which an enemy might launch an attack, and the third group concerns defense against direct attack. The last group relates to maintenance of a general balance of power in an area stretching from China to the Indonesian Archipelago. The Australian Government subscribes to the American concept of "forward defense," which means that the nation's first line of defense should be as far from Australian territory as possible. This concept allows the Government to maintain national security at the relatively low cost of only 3.7 percent of the gross national product (for 1965-66) as compared to Great Britain's 6.8 percent and America's 8 percent. Scientific and technological gains are some of the byproducts of Australia's membership in the Western military alliance. Theoretically at least, a risk to Australia from this alliance is that the nation may be drawn into a war not of its own choice. Some fear the alliance may turn Australia into an American satellite, but the logical alternative, armed neutrality, would pose much more difficult problems. The alliance leaves ample room for Australia to exercise freedom of action when necessary.

605
Gellner, John. THE FUTURE OF NATO. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 7, Oct. 1967: 12-13.
P&GP RR

The French withdrawal from NATO's military organization is an accomplished fact. Indulging in recriminations is useless; all energy should rather be directed at keeping NATO together. This objective demands the solution of several fundamental problems: alliance strategy, nuclear sharing, and definition of NATO's mission. NATO's mission has been the defense of Europe, but, because the Soviet threat to

Europe has diminished, interest in the alliance is waning. NATO strategy is a part of U.S. strategy and the alliance's strength has been provided by the nuclear power of the United States. Not all NATO members are happy with America's "flexible response" strategy --especially Germany, which under this doctrine must bear the brunt of any delaying action by Allied forces. The question of nuclear sharing, for the most part a dead issue because of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, has been disconcerting to both Germany and Italy, which are not satisfied with their almost complete exclusion from nuclear weapons control. If these problems are "tackled in earnest" the French withdrawal may in the end prove salutary. What is needed above all is a new sense of unity in NATO.

606
[THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO CENTRAL EUROPE'S AIR DEFENSE] Der deutsche Beitrag zur Luftverteidigung Mitteleuropas. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Nov. 10, 1967: 580-582.
U3.W38, v. 11

Because of its location and the speed with which modern missiles and aircraft can cover vast distances, the Federal Republic of Germany is in the forefront of Western Europe's air defense. The country, stretching 1,000 kilometers from north to south parallel to the Iron Curtain and with an average width of only 300 kilometers, is extremely vulnerable to enemy air attack. To ensure optimal defense the German Federal Republic has coordinated its air defense with the NATO system for defending central Europe. The West German Air Force maintains NATO's West German radar observation and communication stations and has committed to it "groups" of fighters and antimissile and antiaircraft defense battalions.

607
Gorshkov, S. [AYE, AYE, SIR!] Est' tak derzhat'! Agitator, no. 12, June 1967: 21-23. illus.
DK266.A2A35, 1967

The Soviet Navy passed its maturity test during World War II, has shown examples of mass heroism fighting on land and sea, and is now using its wide experience in battle training. Despite the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, Lenin's warning should be kept in mind. As long as capitalism and the economic basis for starting aggressive wars exist, reactionary imperialist circles will try to solve problems by war. Facing the threat of nuclear war from Bonn's revanchists and the United States, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are mainly concerned with the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The Soviet Navy has nuclear submarines, modern surface ships, rocket-carrying aircraft, and formidable weapons. Submarines, seamen, aviators, and coast guardsmen carry out rocket launchings, torpedo and artillery practice, mine planting and mine sweeping operations, and submarine maneuvers. The ranks of specialists in combat and political training in the Navy are growing; many crews are 50 percent each. Soviet seamen strengthen their combat friendship with the fleets of the Warsaw Pact members, by conducting joint exercises with them. The Soviet fleet pays friendly visits to non-Communist countries as an envoy of peace and friendship among peoples.

608
[GREAT BRITAIN MAY CANCEL ITS ORDER FOR THE F-111K] La Grande-Bretagne pourrait annuler sa commande de F-111 K. Air & cosmos, v. 5, Dec. 30, 1967: 35.
P&GP RR

Discusses the factors that are forcing Great Britain to cancel its order for F-111K aircraft from the United States. Britain is in a financial depression. A reduction in British defense spending will coincide with a withdrawal of its troops East of Suez. The author notes as significant that despite economic pressures Britain has not had to give up its Polaris program; this is because the Polaris missiles are a relatively independent deterrent force.

609
Griffin, Charles D. NOW RUSSIA BUILDS UP POWER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Dec. 11, 1967: 46, 50-51. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 63

Excerpts from a speech at the Navy League Convention, Nov. 14, 1967.

The Soviet Navy's buildup in the Mediterranean is going to have repercussions in the international community. Soviet Navy ship-days have increased in the Mediterranean over 600 percent in the past 3 years and the average monthly ship-days of combatant ships has increased almost 1,000 percent. The progress the Russians have made in sustaining and deploying units far from home bases is a significant step in the development of their Navy. Indicative of this is the position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Ironically the Russians have emerged from the Arab-Israeli conflict with their position immeasurably enhanced; the Arabs are now more dependent on the Russians than ever before. With the powerful Communist influence in Africa, the British withdrawal from Aden, and the Suez Canal and oil rights at stake, the Russians present a serious challenge to human freedom in the Near East. And the Soviet presence "could directly affect the future of shipping in the Mediterranean, which accounts for 99 per cent of the imports of Italy, Greece and Turkey." Russo-Turkish relations have always been shaky, and the Soviet presence south of Turkey does little to contribute to a Turkish-Soviet detente. Greece is having too difficult a time with Bulgaria, its neighbor, to regard the naval situation as one of détente, and Italy finds it difficult to accept the Soviet Union's hostility to Western influence and its threat to oil supplies. Although the Arab world is a big prize, Russia's primary objective has been and will remain Europe.

610
Harrigan, Anthony. BRITAIN DISMANTLES HER DEFENSES. In American Security Council. Washington report, Dec. 25, 1967: 1-4.
P&GP RR

The devaluation of the British pound resulted in drastic cuts throughout the British defense establishment, and the United States lost an important military partner. Since a speedy British economic recovery is unlikely, America will have to look for a replacement: a strong ally able to hold the defense line against communism in Europe and ready to quell

"brushfire conflicts" around its rim. France under De Gaulle has strayed far from America, and the smaller NATO countries--although they still stand by the United States--are not in a position to take over Britain's special role. There remains but one candidate competent to restore the balance of power in Europe and along its strategic borders in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Atlantic--the Federal Republic of Germany. A hard look at its place in Europe seems in order not only in view of Britain's decline, France's alienation, and NATO's disintegration but, above all, because of the consolidation of the Warsaw Pact military system. The defense image in Europe would brighten if West Germany's capability were utilized to a greater degree--in the air, by the use of jet fighter-bombers, and in the North Sea, by helicopter carriers, against the threat of Soviet submarines. An agonizing reappraisal must lead the United States to shelve its sentimental attachment to Britain and take on West Germany as its number one ally. The Federal Republic of Germany is the sole power on the Continent strong enough to shoulder security commitments in and around Europe. And it is the only power willing to share the burden, thus freeing U.S. forces for struggle against Communist threats in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

611
Harrigan, Anthony. SOVIET BROADENS CHALLENGE TO U.S. SUPREMACY AT SEA. Navy, v. 10, Dec. 1967: 6-9. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 10

Now that the old guard of Red marshals has disappeared from Soviet military planning their concept of ground warfare as paramount has faded, and the Kremlin leaders are bidding for supremacy on the sea. The Russian decision to build aircraft carriers and the deployment of a Soviet Mediterranean task force provide dramatic evidence. The shift to seapower may even represent a change in Soviet strategic thinking from "heartland sufficiency and self-containment" to "offensive operations on a global scale." They recognize now that a failure to utilize seapower has led to the defeat of many world powers. The Russians have created a marine corps, launched tank-landing vessels, and developed a heavily armed frigate. Up to now the overwhelming predominance of American seapower has kept many vulnerable nations in the Western camp, including those of the oil-rich Persian Gulf area, which has been long acknowledged to be a prime Soviet goal. While the United States cannot prevent Soviet seapower from advancing, Washington can maintain superiority in this vital aspect of strategy. The replacement of the Navy's aging carriers with nuclear-powered vessels could save the day.

612
Hinterhoff, Eugène. THE PROBLEM OF THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 12, Oct./Nov. 1967: 39, 42-44.
UA646.F5, v. 12

The steady buildup of the Atlantic alliance has made a Soviet invasion of Western Europe improbable, but it would be dangerous for Europe to relax and reduce its defense potential unilaterally. Indeed, the military defense of Europe may not be adequate; NATO's defense warrants a reevaluation. NATO's "shield," consists of 26 divisions, which are equivalent to 39 Soviet divisions since the size of the Soviet divisions has been reduced. In fact the ratio of forces involved in Europe favors the West despite the withdrawal of two French divisions. However, present deployment of Western forces is not commensurate with strategic considerations. Alastair Buchan points out that the United States maintains the equivalent of six divisions in southern Germany, "while the historic avenues . . . into Western Europe, towards Cologne and the Ruhr, are guarded by weaker forces." And a Soviet attack in the Schleswig-Holstein area would be disastrous for the NATO forces. The defense of many of these vulnerable areas could be strengthened by a system of fortifications to slow down the Soviet attack. It is unfortunate that NATO must rely on nuclear weapons under its present defense strategy. Buchan believes that this "might lead to paralysis of will and to intense reluctance to resort to force in the face of the Soviet pressure." Should an attack occur, the danger of escalation could be eliminated by an agreement that would set up a denuclearized zone in Europe. Unfortunately such a plan has met with stubborn resistance from Germany, which is demanding greater access to nuclear weapons. Another obstacle--not only to a nuclear-free zone but to Allied efforts at maintaining a secure defense of Europe--is France. However, Brig K. Hunt feels that, since France's withdrawal "the only real difference will be that the French would fight alongside allied formations but not under their command."

613
Hoffmann, Heinz. [THE SOVIET UNION--A MILITARY POWER] Militärmacht Sowjetunion. Einheit, v. 22, no. 10/11, 1967: 1296-1306.
HX6.E4, v. 22

Outlines the development of Soviet military power from 1917 to the present. Hoffmann, East German Minister of National Defense, considers the effect of the central European strategic environment on the German Democratic Republic's defense policy.

614
Hubbell, John G. THE THREAT OF RUSSIA'S RISING STRATEGIC POWER. Reader's digest, v. 92, Feb. 1968: 54-61. AP2.R255, v. 92

According to many strategy experts, the Soviet Union is striving for military supremacy over the United States. In the past few years the Department of Defense has cut back many promising new weapons development projects on the grounds that the Soviet Union has abandoned its goal of world revolution and only wants to achieve strategic equality with the United States. However, the Soviet Union has shown itself not satisfied with achieving military parity with its adversary and is pursuing programs that could lead to dramatic technological breakthroughs and seriously threaten the United States. By building an extensive strategic bomber force, developing an ABM system, expanding their ICBM force, and establishing a space-weapons capability, the Russians are attempting to take the strategic lead. While it was inevitable that the Soviet Union would master sophisticated weapons technologies, Russian technology need not inevitably surpass that of the United States. By taking appropriate action as soon as possible, the United States could ensure the maintenance of its strategic supremacy, which not only guarantees victory in the advent of nuclear war but gives the United States a stronger position in the political crises of the cold war.

615
Hübner, Werner. [BONN'S MILITARY POLICY AND ARMAMENTS BUDGET] Die Bonner Militärkonzeption und der Rüstungshaushalt. Einheit, v. 22, no. 9, 1967: 1157-1160. HX6. E4, v. 22

Recent West German defense cutbacks were only nominal. The reduction of personnel by 60, 000 from "the already enormous number of 461, 000" has been heralded as a step toward détente. In fact, however, the new budget aims at substantial strengthening of West Germany's military posture by optimal allocation of funds. The common intent of the Government, the military, and industry is to make the West German Armed Forces capable of conducting a "dead-pledge war," as Israel did, but one adjusted to the European strategic environment. Bonn's desire to share decisions with the United States on the use of American nuclear arms and its hopes of participating in eventual West European nuclear power have remained unchanged. The West Germans want to be able to use nuclear blackmail on other countries. West Germany's advanced-line strategy, including the conduct of war on the territory of "Socialist states," is also unchanged. The new budget substantially increases research and development funds on the assumption that the stronger West Germany is in this field the better defense industry it will be able to create. Bonn argues that only through defense research and development can the nation advance its technological progress as the United States, for instance, has done. Actually in imperialist states private capital has failed to finance progress on such a grand scale. War-motivated and oriented progress, from which capitalist industry largely benefits, is the most inhuman aspect of the contemporary capitalist system.

616
IS RUSSIA WINNING THE ARMS RACE? U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Nov. 20, 1967: 36-38. illus. JK1. U65, v. 63

While the United States concentrates on Vietnam the Soviet Union is taking the initiative in the field of nuclear arms. Moscow is deploying more and more offensive missiles, as well as the controversial ABM system, and apparently has developed an orbital weapons system. Missiles capable of carrying as many as 10 bombs each and weapons of frighteningly high nuclear yield also seem to be entering the Russian arsenal, all this while total American strategic megatonnage has been going down. In the view of many congressmen and military experts, Defense Secretary McNamara's apparent unconcern is shocking. He is said to be allowing the Soviets to achieve numerical parity on the grounds that this state will bring heightened stability. Yet numerical parity, his critics charge, "is a strategy of slow suicide." Stated Defense Department policy is to maintain enough nuclear weapons to penetrate any Soviet defenses, since no missile defense would be adequate to save the "120 million Americans doomed in a nuclear exchange." To this end new offensive weapons, such as the Poseidon and the Minuteman III, will be added to the American arsenal, but even these, critics charge, are not enough. McNamara had hoped, they say, that the Russians would not embark on a new arms race if they were aware that the United States was practicing restraint. This hope has turned out to be misguided and "arms control by emulation" a failure, in the words of a retired Air Force research chief. Unless the United States acts soon, scientists say, it may be too late for the gap in space weapons to be closed.

617
Jackson, Henry M. NATIONAL SECURITY: BASIC TASKS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 34, Nov. 1, 1967: 34-37. PN6121. V52, v. 34

"Delivered before the Hoover Institution . . . Stanford University . . . October 11, 1967."

Weighs the Kremlin's foreign policy, which is evident in its efforts to extend Soviet influence where the risk appears acceptable, yet to avoid excessively hazardous ventures. The Senator feels that a reasonable response can be obtained from Moscow by maintaining sufficient strength to make negotiation more desirable to them than disagreement. The United States should work with Soviet leaders where their interests converge but should strive to discourage adventurism and aggression. Reviewing his voting record on matters of national security, he criticizes Defense Department officials who claim that "nuclear superiority has only limited relevance today." As he sees it, "international peace and security depend not on a parity of power but on a preponderance of power in the peace-keepers over the peace-upsetters."

618
JOINING ARMS. Economist, v. 225, Nov. 25, 1967: 849. HG11. E2, v. 225

A revitalized NATO will be based on the North Atlantic Defense Ground Environment [NADGE] system and will provide a new focus for technological cooperation in Europe. The procedures that have been evolved for NADGE over the long haul seem admirably adaptable to other such situations, including Franco-German cooperation in antitank missiles and the Anglo-French air-to-surface missile project. France, while able to "buy itself into any Nato project it thinks is worthwhile," does not sit at the Conference of National Armaments Directors, which may be destined to become NATO's procurement agency.

619
Jonas, Anne M. NEW DIMENSIONS IN SOVIET STRATEGY. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Jan. 1968: 22-27. illus. UG633. A65, v. 51

An analysis of the fundamental trends in Soviet military strategy indicates that future Soviet strategy is likely to pose a formidable challenge to U.S. security. Now that the Soviets have developed advanced technological and scientific capabilities, they can compete effectively with the United States in the development of new weapons systems. While the United States and other Western nations are reducing defense expenditures, the Soviet Union is investing increasingly greater sums in the race for strategic superiority. Not only has it engaged in modernization of its operational strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems, but it is also beginning to introduce completely new systems. The Soviets have included large sums in their 1968 budget for military aid to emerging countries and are building up their capability to fight in Third World trouble spots. In contrast to the Soviet moves to expand and modernize all elements of its military establishment, the United States has concentrated primarily upon refining existing strategic weapons systems. Nonstrategic American forces are so heavily committed to the Vietnam War that the United States could not intervene in another local conflict affecting its national interest. Yet such a conflict could develop from Soviet efforts to exploit unrest in the Mediterranean area and the Middle East. Thus it is imperative that the administration review its present defense policy in relation to the Soviet challenge.

620
Kroneck, Friedrich J. [POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE BUILDING OF AN AMERICAN ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM] Politische Aspekte des Aufbaus eines amerikanischen Raketenabwehrsystems. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Oct. 10, 1967: 697-702.
D839.E86, v. 22

Points out that even if the American decision to deploy an ABM system does not affect the American-Soviet balance of power, it certainly will prompt the Soviet Union to quickly improve its potential in offensive nuclear weapons. A Soviet-American ABM arms race will decrease the effectiveness of the French and British nuclear potential.

621
Laforest, Thomas J. STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Proceedings, v. 93, Dec. 1967: 56-65. illus.
V1.U8, v. 93

The northern sea route is strategic because Russian ships can pass between European and Far Eastern Russia without leaving Soviet territorial waters. Although the economic development of the route has been emphasized by the Russian Government, the strategic value of the waterway must not be underestimated. The communication afforded by the northern sea route is of paramount importance to Soviet naval operations and intelligence. In addition the Russians are maintaining a military establishment of considerable size inside the polar circle. The route will also play an important role in Communist plans to socialize the world through economic and political subversion. The Russians believe that the world is becoming an integrated economic unit and that the sea is the unifying medium binding the world "into a complementary entity, wholly dependent on a mutual exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods carried through this medium by seaborne trade and commerce."

622
Lauesen, M. L. [THE DEVELOPMENT OF DANISH STRATEGY] Die Entwicklung der dänischen Strategie. Wehrkunde, v. 16, Sept. 1967: 472-476.
U3.W396, v. 16

Traces the history of Danish strategy since 1864. Lauesen considers the reasons which caused Denmark to join NATO, the nation's role in NATO defense, its military cooperation with West Germany, and its interest in preserving a measure of independence from West German security interests.

623
Leavitt, William. A FRESH VIEW OF THE ABM DEBATE--FROM OAK RIDGE LAB'S ALVIN WEINBERG. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Jan. 1968: 72-74. UG633.A65, v. 51

While many scientists have attacked the ABM on the basis that it is too costly, is imperfect, and could provoke a new spiral in the arms race, other members of the scientific community disagree with this view. The former Presidential science adviser, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, has warned that the military and industrial establishment would pressure for enlargement of the thin ABM system proposed by the President and that the development of ABM systems could negate the limited test ban treaty. Dr. Wiesner concluded that joint U.S.-Soviet efforts to eliminate the arms race would be impossible if each side were forced to offset the arms buildup of the other. On the other hand, Dr. Alvin Weinberg, Director of the Atomic Energy Commission's Oak Ridge National Laboratory, stated that if a way could be found to limit offensive weapons, a strong defensive system could lessen the peril inherent in the balance of terror. Once a nation feels secure in a defensive system it would be more inclined to discuss disarmament measures. Dr. Weinberg acknowledges the difficulty of reaching an agreement that would limit offensive weapons but encourage defensive systems. However, he feels that many of the difficulties could be worked out if the arms control communities of the world were to devote their energy to "developing doctrines for limiting offense, and techniques for enforcing such limitations, rather than continuing to exert themselves primarily to limiting defensive systems."

624
Leddy, John M. NATO ON THE EVE OF ITS 20TH ANNIVERSARY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 57, Dec. 4, 1967: 759-762.
JX232.A33, v. 57

"Address made before the Georgetown University Conference on the Atlantic Community at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 13," 1967.

Assesses NATO's achievements and prospects as it approaches its 20th year. Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, denies that the Atlantic alliance will automatically expire in 1969 and expresses confidence that the member states will remain with the Organization. In his view the French crisis hampered but has not crippled NATO. As for the future, European problems are far from solved, and thus NATO is still a vital necessity. Yet all is not bleak--it is barely possible that "the underlying condition of tension between East and West can in time abate to the point where a true peace may come within sight."

625
Liddell Hart, Sir Basil H. STRATEGY. 2d rev. ed. New York, F. A. Praeger [1967] 430 p.
D25.L45, 1967

Partial contents.--Greek wars--Epaminondas, Philip, and Alexander.--Roman wars--Hannibal, Scipio, and Caesar.--The French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte.--The strategy of 1918.--Hitler's strategy.--Hitler's fall.--The theory of strategy.--The concentrated essence of strategy--and tactics.--National object and military aim.--Grand strategy.--Guerrilla war.--Index.

Discusses strategy throughout the ages, beginning with the Greek wars and ending with present-day guerrilla war strategy. The author notes that the H-bomb has done more than anything else to prove that "total war" as a method and "victory" as an objective of war are out-of-date concepts. Today there is a new strategy that is inspired by the dual idea of evading and hampering superior airpower. Indeed the further the United States has developed the "massive effect of the bombing weapon, the more [it has] helped the progress of this new guerrilla-type strategy." The author advocates that the United States base its strategy on the concept of guerrilla war and not on "massive retaliation."

293-980 O - 68 - 4

626
Lisov, I. [SOVIET AIRBORNE FORCES] Sovetskie vozdushnodesantnye voiska. Kryl'ia rodiny, v. 18, July 1967: 6-7. illus. TL504.V683, v. 18

History of the Soviet airborne forces. Modern warfare makes wide use of paratroop landings and material drops. No contemporary war operation is planned without the aid of airborne forces; they will play a role even in nuclear war. The airborne forces are known for their initiative, their maneuverability on the battlefield as well as behind the enemy lines, and their ability to find a solution in a complicated and quickly changing situation and attack swiftly. They can even operate after the battlefield has been devastated by fire or contaminated by radiation.

627
London. Institute for Strategic Studies. THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1967-1968. London, 1967. 53 p. tables. UA15.L65, 1967-1968

The ninth of the Institute's annual estimates of the military forces of the principal powers. Figures that indicate the size and nature of the regular forces of the Communist and Western powers as of July 1967 are given. Although the document does not project force levels or weapons strength beyond 1968 or "reflect the facts of geography, vulnerability, efficiency, etc., on either side," it may "be found useful in the context of discussions on strategy and disarmament." Part 1 gives figures for individual Communist powers exclusive of Yugoslavia, which has been omitted from this edition; part 2 for the Western alliances, those countries which have mutual defense treaties with the United States (excluding Latin America); and part 3 for the nonalined countries of the Middle East and Asia. South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland have been left out of this edition. The figures for an individual country are broken down by branches of service. Appended are tables showing comparative strategic strengths, major nuclear delivery systems, comparisons of defense expenditures throughout the world and their burden on national economies, a functional breakdown of defense expenditures for 11 powers, and tables disclosing military activity and arms deals between July 1966 and July 1967.

628
McBride, James H. "THE COMING MISSILE GAP." U.S. news & world report, v. 64, Feb. 26, 1968: 84-86. JK1.U65, v. 64
Reprinted from the Intercollegiate Review, Nov./Dec. 1967 AP2.I64, 1967

While the United States has been seeking arms control measures, the Soviet Union has relentlessly been pursuing strategic nuclear superiority. Policymakers have been confident that the United States would never lose its strategic lead because they believed that nuclear technology had reached a plateau. However, the "plateau theory" was undermined with the development of highly accurate guidance systems and missile defense techniques. There is every reason to believe that within a few years the Soviet missile force could drastically outnumber the U.S. force and would be able to destroy it in a first strike, thus virtually eliminating U.S. damage-limiting capabilities. If the Russians also deploy an ABM system, they could neutralize a substantial portion of the remaining second-strike force, the Polaris. The Soviet Union learned a good deal about missile defense from a series of high-yield nuclear tests just before the conclusion of the nuclear test ban treaty. Although it is not known just how effective the Soviet ABM is, it is probably superior to the American Nike-X, which remains untested. Unless the plans for the American force structure are drastically altered, "it seems inevitable that decisive nuclear superiority will pass into Soviet hands by the end of this decade."

629
Martin, Paul. CANADA AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. Canadian weekly bulletin, v. 22, Dec. 6, 1967: 1-2, 6. P&GP RR

"Excerpts from a recent address by Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian Club, Toronto."

Despite improved East-West relations the dismemberment of NATO would be dangerous. Russia is continuing to develop its already formidable military power, and a decrease in NATO's forces could whet the Soviet expansionist appetite once more. Should the allies reduce their forces in Europe the chances that Germany would sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty would be slim, and peace in Europe, which is largely a result of the stabilizing forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would be endangered. In order to strengthen its own security Canada must continue to support NATO's forces in Europe and the U.S. bomber-defense system, in lieu of allowing U.S. use of Canadian territory for its North American defense.

630
Maude, Angus. BRITAIN'S DEFENCE RUN-DOWN. Quadrant, v. 11, Sept./Oct. 1967: 11-16. AP7.Q8, v. 11

Great Britain's plan to withdraw most of its forces East of Suez has resulted in other countries doubting Britain's reliability as an ally. And British withdrawal from the Far East and southern Arabia, its cancellation of the TSR-2 long-range strike-reconnaissance aircraft, and other defense savings programs will not contribute to any financial savings of consequence. As long as a Labor government remains in power, Britain will remain not only "dependent upon the United States for military aircraft but determined not to spend the dollars required to secure enough of them." A Conservative government would halt the rundown of British forces, maybe even reverse it.

631
MILITARY BUCK PASSING [editorial] Christian century, v. 85, Jan. 10, 1968: 35. BR1.C45, v. 85

Buckpassing within the military establishment thrives on the system's hierarchical structure and is perpetuated by its virtual immunity to reform. The epitome of the buckpassing art is the recent effort of Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to shift the blame for Vietnam failures to the war protesters. Holding escalation opponents responsible for the Vietcong's tenacity, the U.S. inability to achieve victory, as well as U.S. casualties invites the paraphrasing of a Samuel Johnson saying: "Appeal to the bloody shirt is the last refuge of a scoundrel."

632
Miksche, Ferdinand O. A EUROPEAN VIEW: THE FUTURE OF NATO. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Feb. 1968: 9-13.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

If the United States does not want to see Europe fall under Soviet influence, it must act to revitalize NATO by helping Europe become an equal partner in the alliance. Western solidarity is currently threatened by Europe's resentment of its dependence upon the United States. Individually, European countries are not capable of guaranteeing their own security, so any trend to disintegration leaves them highly vulnerable. In spite of the current thesis that the Soviet Union no longer poses a threat to Europe, there is no evidence that the Russians are willing to make concessions on issues which cause East-West tensions. American troops based across the Atlantic would not provide as credible a deterrent to armed aggression by the Soviet Union or its satellites as a strongly integrated European military force. Once Europe creates its own protective force, it can join the United States in pursuit of a common Western policy as a partner, not as a dependent.

633
MONOPOLY OF NUCLEAR AGGRESSION. Minority of one, v. 10, Feb. 1968: 2-4. illus.
AP2.M55985, v. 10

The U.S. deployment of a "thin" Chinese-oriented ABM system is both an American propaganda scheme and a prelude to a vastly more expensive "thick" system. The Chinese are acquiring a limited nuclear arsenal to deprive a prospective attacker of impunity, but they fully realize that their nuclear capability does not allow them to launch a nuclear first strike against the United States. Administration attempts to give the impression that the ABM system is directed against a Chinese threat are intended "not to alert the Russians to an ambitious U.S. undertaking calculated to establish strategic world hegemony of the United States." However, the Russians have not been fooled by this propaganda and will accelerate their production of nuclear weapons and missiles so that they will be able to overtake the United States. America is building nuclear defenses not to protect its cities but to dissuade another nuclear power from retaliating against the cities "after it had been attacked with American missiles." This concept is in full accord with America's past and present nuclear policy--to keep its monopoly of nuclear aggression and retain a first-strike ability against any country.

634
Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW AT NATO?] A l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau? Revue militaire suisse, v. 112, Sept. 1967: 381-387.
U2.R5, v. 112

Comments on two subjects concerning NATO--German troop reductions and flexible response--and two areas of interest to Europe and France--the nonproliferation treaty and France's force de frappe. Montfort notes that further reductions in allied troops and the West German Bundeswehr will reduce NATO's conventional forces and frontline defense to a fiction. NATO's conventional posture is so weak that it would need atomic weapons to stop a conventional offensive attack. Montfort believes that neither France nor Communist China will ever sign the nonproliferation treaty. He concludes that the force de frappe, which has an atomic bomb four times stronger than that dropped on Hiroshima, costs less than maintaining a conventional-style French army.

635
Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW AT NATO?] A l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau? Revue militaire suisse, v. 112, Dec. 1967: 529-532.
U2.R5, v. 112

The Soviet announcement of a fractional orbital bombardment system and the U.S. decision to deploy a "thin" ABM system have brought atomic war closer to reality. Meanwhile the French are constructing their newest addition to the force de frappe--the Sault-de-Vaucluse missile base, whose missile silos can withstand a direct hit of a one-megaton bomb. The Atlantic alliance is having its troubles with Greece and Turkey and will probably be faced with the withdrawal of British troops from the Rhine as a result of the devaluation of the pound. Furthermore, it appears that NATO will begin to rely on U.S. atomic power. Switzerland is not a member of NATO, but it cannot avoid becoming involved in the alliance's decisions and policies. And although its situation is different from Israel's, it must continue to prepare for the worst in order to protect itself.

636
Moorer, Thomas H. THE U.S. NAVY: SEA POWER ON THE MOVE! Navy, v. 10, Nov. 1967: 10-16, 37. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 10

A survey of the Navy's recent progress and importance by the Chief of Naval Operations. Delivered to the National Security Industrial Association in Washington, D. C., on September 28, 1967, Admiral Moorer's address stresses the growing necessity of a mobile, powerful Navy in the face of expanding Soviet seapower.

637
[MUST FRANCE LEAVE THE ALLIANCE?] La France doit-elle sortir de l'Alliance? Nouvel observateur, no. 153, Oct. 18, 1967: 26-29.
AP20.O2, 1967

French opinion poll based on questions concerning the risk of nuclear war and the reliability of the Atlantic alliance. Of those polled, 4 percent believe that France may be attacked by another country, 42 percent believe that in 10 years Communist China will represent the greatest threat to world peace, and 19 percent feel that the United States is now the most dangerous threat to peace. The consensus is that the force de frappe will carry more weight in the future than it does now. Fifty-one percent of the group thinks that France needs its allies. The belief that France needs American protection is held by 40 percent, while 38 percent are convinced that the Atlantic alliance is needed because communism still threatens Western Europe. One out of every two Frenchmen believes that NATO plays an important role in maintaining the security of France and Europe, and a referendum to decide whether France should or should not withdraw from the alliance is favored by 54 percent, though only 12 percent are in favor of withdrawal.

638
Naymark, Sherman. POWER IN THE SEA. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 94, Jan. 1968: 18-27. illus.
V1.U8, v. 94

Discusses the importance of the ocean as a source of natural resources and as a possible service area for countries with high population densities. The ocean may one day prove to be a vital source of U.S. strategic deterrence, since over half of the planned U.S. nuclear missiles will be sea-based in nuclear submarines. And the probability is even greater that an enemy's launching capability against an insular subcontinent such as the United States will be primarily from the sea. Therefore long-range detection capabilities similar to that of the "Dew Line" will be needed underwater. The author concludes that these objectives will require nuclear power and that the ocean is suitable for nuclear powerplants owing to its large "service area," natural radiation shield, and the external pressurizing atmosphere it provides as a result of its depth.

639
Nazzaro, Joseph J. SAC: AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY. Air University review, v. 19, Jan./Feb. 1968: 2-9. illus.
TL501.A5574, v. 19

The primary role of the Strategic Air Command [SAC] is to deter general war. SAC is a second strike force, a flexible offensive force capable of surviving the worst possible situations and inflicting unacceptable damage upon an attacking enemy. It is also capable of long-range, all-weather conventional bombing support in limited warfare, as it has demonstrated in the Vietnam War. SAC is composed of 600 B-52 and B-58 bombers supported by a similar number of KC-135 jet tankers and has a missile force of 1,000 Titan II and Minuteman I and II ICBM's. If the United States is to ensure SAC's mixed force capability it must maintain SAC's flexibility in manned bomber systems and improve and expand its missile capabilities.

640
[1967 GREEN BOOK: A STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S. ARMY] Army, v. 17, Oct. 1967: 39-172.
U1.A893, v. 17

Partial contents.--Status reports.--Photo directory.--Vietnam reports.--Weapons guide.

Reviews the U.S. Army's achievements and plans "in an environment of transition and change." Top members of the Army staff describe the most significant aspects of the past year's activities and accomplishments--from withdrawal of the U.S. forces from French soil and the present status of Army Reserve components to new techniques for managing men and materials and the combat capability buildup throughout the Army.

641
Nishimura, Tomoharu. [THE DISSOLUTION OF JAPAN'S IMPERIAL NAVY AND RECONSTRUCTION OF ITS NAVAL SELF-DEFENSE FORCES AFTER THE WAR] Die Auflösung der Kaiserlich-Japanischen Marine und der Wiederaufbau der Seeselbstverteidigungskräfte nach dem Kriege. Marine Rundschau, v. 64, Oct. 1967: 285-299. illus.
V3.M3, v. 64

Traces the development of Japan's naval defense capability since the end of World War II and gives data on its present posture, command structure, tonnage, weapons, morale and training methods.

642
NO CARTE BLANCHE TO ATOM. Radical humanist, v. 31, Oct. 8, 1967: 456.
DS401.R27, v. 31

The greatest threats to world peace are the United States and the Soviet Union. Although their respective nuclear stockpiles create a balance of terror that results in deterrence, their production of sophisticated, destructive weapons has created "an unending circle of terror and counterterror," a situation that cannot remain stable indefinitely. Today both countries are deploying an ABM system, and this supersystem replaces the old strategies (so that there is no longer any need for NATO to have nuclear weapons, for instance). Now more than ever the survival of humanity depends upon Russia and the United States. Nations must turn against the very concept of war, and in their search for peace they cannot act as partisan of either the Communist or Western powers.

643
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETS AT LUXEMBOURG. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Jan. 8, 1968: 49-52.
JX232.A33, v. 58

Gives the text of the final communique and annex released by the Council at the close of its December 1967 ministerial meetings. Among the topics discussed by the ministers were disarmament and arms control, troop reductions, and nonproliferation.

644
Petrović, Ljubomir D. US MILITARY DOCTRINE. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Dec. 5, 1967: 13-16.
B839.R4, v. 18

The United States has traditionally considered the military profession a second-rate calling, but after World War II it developed the greatest military complex the world has ever known. This war left an indelible imprint not only on the nation's social fabric but also on its international military-political relationships. Since the war, U.S. military doctrines have undergone several alterations: from the doctrine of massive retaliation to one of restricted nuclear war under conditions of a balance of power, and from the doctrine of multilateral nuclear forces to the strategy of the indirect approach. Although U.S. strategic aims--the perpetuation of capitalism and the suppression of socialism--have remained essentially the same for two decades, its military doctrines have changed to keep up with changes in the world. The tremendous growth of the American military and the military-industrial complex is a powerful factor in anticyclical policy as a means for postponing crises and recessions; military production ameliorates disproportions in the capitalist expansion of productive forces and thus brings the American Government material-economic advantages. However, during the past 20 years contradictions within capitalism have

intensified. Although the conditions that surrounded American imperialism in the past have changed, the goals remain the same. The presence of American troops on foreign soil "is legitimized with the help of corrupt regimes," while surplus products are sold in return for political and economic influence.

645
POLARIS AFTERNOON. Economist, v. 225, Oct. 28, 1967: 368, 371. HG11.E2, v. 225

While Britain is getting into the Polaris business, the United States and the Soviet Union are busy putting themselves into another class of military power entirely, with antimissile defenses and second-generation underwater missiles. This is not to say that Britain has been forced out of the nuclear world; for a few years a Polaris force the size of England's "will carry enough retaliatory power to deter the Russians from threatening Britain with an obliterating first strike if it had to face Russia without American support." This force will not cost so terribly much. Certainly the French force de frappe, built without American help, cost much more, but on the other hand the French are learning how to make missiles in the bargain. By the mid-1970's Britain's 32 Polaris missiles will be inadequate. At that time, because Britain passed up the second-generation missiles, the Government will be in a good position to decide whether to quit the game altogether or replace the Polaris with the third generation. Issues involving Europe, America, Asia, and the future of NATO will be clearer, but the decision must be made by 1975.

646
Powell, Craig. ARMS SALES IS MORE THAN JUST A MILITARY QUESTION. Armed Forces management, v. 14, Jan. 1968: 72, 77, 81. illus. UB153.A65, v. 14

The foreign aid bill passed by Congress in December is the smallest in American history. This legislation will not only provide insufficient funding but will contain provisions that could hamper the executive branch in the area of military arms sales. Among the reasons Congress reduced foreign aid appropriations was the fear by many legislators that the United States had overextended its obligations and that the supplying of arms might foment conflict and lead to further American involvement overseas. However, according to Paul Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense, arms sales enable U.S. allies "to make provision for their own defense and for the security of their own region . . . and decrease the risk of direct American involvement in times of tension." Arms sales to foreign countries are a serious matter. Before the United States can sell arms to a foreign country, it determines whether a real military threat exists and whether the country has the financial resources to pay for the arms. Warnke points out that the Department of Defense must achieve a better understanding with Congress and make it clear that arms sales are not made "on a hit or miss basis" but that each transaction is carefully reviewed and considered.

647
Ratcliffe, A. L. [THE MILITARY POLICY SITUATION AT THE END OF THE YEAR. A RETROSPECT AND A PROSPECT] Die militär-politische Lage am Jahresende. Ein Rückblick und Ausblick. Wehrkunde, v. 16, Dec. 1967: 617-626. U3.W396, v. 16

Review of American, Soviet, Red Chinese, French, British, and West German defense policies in 1967. Also discussed are the military situations in the Near East, Australia, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Ratcliffe thinks that the relevance of ideologies and East-West polarity for the world's future is diminishing; what is important is to bridge the chasm between the white and colored peoples and between rich and poor nations.

648
Ratsimbazafy, Aristide. THE INDIAN OCEAN: NEW STRATEGIC ROLE. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Oct. 20, 1967: 18-19. D839.R4, v. 18

Since April 1967 Great Britain has owned four islands in the Indian Ocean and plans to build on them--with the help of the United States--telecommunication centers and supply bases for its East of Suez forces. The British and the Americans will use the islands to control the sea routes linking the Atlantic Ocean with the Near East and Southeast Asia. The failure of the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] and Central Treaty Organization pacts and the political events marking the development of anti-imperialistic attitudes in many countries has radically changed Anglo-American strategy in the area and has led to aggressive actions in Indonesia, India, and Israel. The main objective of this policy is to provide security and freedom of action for the 7th Fleet in the Southeast Asia area jeopardized by the technological advance of Chinese national defense. They also want to secure rear areas, in which units for offesive action against Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa could be stationed. The Indian Ocean will be the strategic heart of the new Anglo-American empire, and its brain will be in Wall Street rather than in London. France, which wants to demilitarize SEATO, might frustrate the plan by its opposition.

649
Raven, Wolfram von. [SECURITY WITH QUESTION MARKS. WHITHER MARCHES THE BUNDESWEHR?] Sicherheit mit Fragezeichen. Wohin marschiert die Bundeswehr? Zeitschrift für Politik, v. 14, Dec. 1967: 459-477. JA14.Z4, v. 14

West German defense policy must constantly take into account that the idea of conquering Western Europe is seductive for the Soviet bloc. At the moment the danger seems remote, but the Soviet bloc still has in combat readiness considerable forces in Europe, including 700 to 800 medium-range missiles in western Russia. Another important consideration is the impact of modern technology on West Germany's strategic environment, which has become highly variable. Any serious East-West confrontation in Europe, given its present state, will be on German soil, with the resultant total destruction of Germany even if only conventional forces are used. Thus the nation's safety must rely on a deterrence tantamount to preventing any confrontation at all. Such deterrence to be credible must comprise nuclear forces of all types plus conventional forces. It must rest on a strategy that projects a war image able to impress on the potential enemy the prohibitive costs to him of possible aggression against Western Europe. Obviously this kind of projected war cannot be planned militarily to the end, yet its image must be utilized to the full politically. Originally the Bundeswehr's role in

NATO was based on such a deterrence concept. It included a forward defense strategy, designed to cause the aggressor incalculable damages. The situation changed after the United States became vulnerable to Soviet missiles, which lowered the credibility of America's automatic defense of Western Europe and caused the United States to adopt for itself and to impose on its NATO allies a flexible response strategy. This deprives Western deterrence in Europe of its all-important element of unpredictability (for the enemy) of effect and provides for limited war that, given the disproportion between Eastern and Western forces in Europe, would turn Germany into scorched earth. And yet the continued efficacy of Western deterrence in Europe is best visible in the growing East-West détente. In Moscow's view Western deterrence in Europe can still cause incalculable damage to the Soviet Union. For the Germans have delivery means that can carry American nuclear munitions. The Federal Republic of Germany must by all means retain these delivery vehicles. NATO, in a time of détente, can only loosely combine the defense interests of its member states. Its land forces, including the Bundeswehr, can play an effective role in crisis management situations on its peripheries (e.g., in Norway or Turkey). But the German Federal Republic should concentrate now on increased R&D efforts to make its defense posture of the seventies highly effective.

650
RUSSIA'S STRATEGY IN TODAY'S WORLD--THE VIEW FROM EUROPE. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Nov. 27, 1967: 101-102.
JK1.U65, v. 63

European experts harbor suspicions of the current U.S. interpretation of Soviet motives--that "the Soviet Union does indeed want a deal with the U.S." Russian-American trade, they say, can never be of much importance as an incentive toward bettering relations. Nonproliferation is an important area of agreement, but the Russians are doing little to persuade the treaty's real opponents, the American allies. The international arms race, according to the Europeans, is much to the advantage of the Russians, who have consistently ignored U.S. pleas to cool it off. Russia is striving for superiority in the realm of space exploration, shunning any moneysaving cooperation with the United States. The experts also contend that Soviet aid to North Vietnam goes far beyond obligation or face saving and that the Kremlin feels confident that the war will not escalate to all-out nuclear war, since Russian leaders have no intention of intervening directly. They could, the European observers assert, exert enough pressure on Hanoi to end the war if they wanted to. Anything adversely affecting the United States is still seen as an advantage by the Russians, and they will make every effort short of nuclear war to hamper American aims.

651
Savchenko, F. [ARMS OF ENORMOUS POWER] Oruzhie kolossal'noi moshchi. Voennye znaniia, v. 43, Sept. 1967: 37-38. illus. U4.V874, v. 43

Discusses the utilization of atomic energy for military purposes and claims that the Soviet Union, which has bombs with 100-megaton yields, surpasses the United States in the development of nuclear weapons.

652
Selton, Robert W. RATIONAL VICTORY. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 94, Feb. 1968: 26-32. illus.
V1.U8, v. 94

Wars are no longer won or lost. Instead each combatant must be prepared to negotiate for something less than his political and military objectives. A nation that formulates specific objectives either secretly or for internal or world consumption may face a defeat at the negotiating table if these objectives are not realized. However if victory can be measured in terms of achieving an objective, there may be some question as to which objectives are to be achieved--the secret military ones, those held to the public, or those expressed to the world. Whether a war will be limited or not will depend on whether the politico-military objectives are constrained. If both sides establish rational objectives then a limited contest can be prevented from growing into total war. Yet future wars cannot be completely free from the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used. Tactical nuclear weapons could be used in geographically confined wars. In a conflict situation the United States can achieve a limited victory by adopting limited objectives and using a selective application of power to attain these objectives. There are prerequisites to such a "rational victory": the American public must realize that an easy solution does not exist for all of the world's problems, realistic objectives must be formulated by the U.S. Government that will neither arouse the public nor intimidate the enemy, and the art of diplomacy must become "as finely developed an art as the application of military power."

653
Spaak, Paul Henri. THE INDISPENSABLE ALLIANCE. NATO letter, v. 15, Nov. 1967: 10-14. illus.
D845.2.A44, v. 15

On examining the changes that have occurred in the world since 1949 one may well conclude that NATO is as indispensable as ever, contrary to the claims of some of its adversaries. Although the Soviet Union has renounced war as a means of achieving its goals, it has never given up its determination to extend its worldwide influence in the social, economic, and political fields. For the Communists, the policy of peaceful coexistence is only a temporary measure; they are as hostile as ever to the Western ways of life and Western governments and pose a serious threat to the countries of the Third World. Just because Europe has achieved a certain degree of economic stability and feels safe from forceful Communist domination, it should not turn its back on the rest of the world. A strongly united Western Europe in partnership with the United States could assume an influential role in world affairs. Although Europe cannot attain a position of equal partnership in the Atlantic alliance until Great Britain is included in the Common Market, this does not mean that the alliance must go. In addition to ensuring the defense of its members, NATO offers the best framework for Western discussion on the development of common foreign and economic policies.

654
Spore, John B. FLOATING ASSAULT FORCE: SCOURGE OF THE MEKONG DELTA. Army, v. 18, Feb. 1968: 28-32. illus.
U1.A893, v. 18

The American River Assault Group [RAG] is providing valuable firepower against the firmly entrenched Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta area. This assault group is composed of converted landing craft armed with automatic weapons and under the control of the South Vietnamese Navy. (U.S. Navy advisers are on each craft.) This group pointed the way to the U.S. 9th Infantry Division's Mobile Riverine Force, which operates almost exclusively in the Mekong Delta and has proved valuable in combat. The Navy complement, the River Flotilla Fleet, is made up of assault troop carriers and a "battleship," whose weapons include a 20-mm. cannon, two .50-caliber machine guns, and four .30-caliber machine guns.

655

Tarasov, V. COLONIALISTS' SHAGREEN SKIN. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, Dec. 8, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 5, 1.
Slav Rm
Translated from Izvestiia, Dec. 7, 1967.
Slav Rm

In Mauritius Island's first elections, in August, its people demanded independence. Negotiations between London and the Island's government ended in a date being fixed for a proclamation of independence in 1968. According to the press, Mauritius Island will remain as a dominion within the Commonwealth, possibly acquiring a new strategic role and having its defensive needs met with Britain's help. Its financial crisis has forced Britain to pull back East of Suez, but the British War Department is unwilling to get out of Mauritius, since the transformation of the island into a naval or air fortress will not require much money. A communications center for naval forces and a landing strip for jet planes ("used, incidentally, by American long-range bombers") are already in existence. In the meantime Washington is planning to move into the "vacuum" of the Indian Ocean area and is trying to bargain with Britain on establishing "allied security forces" there. The Americans want to grab the British airbase on Gan Island and build a military base in the Seychelles Islands and a naval base on Diego Garcia Atoll.

656

Taube, Gerhard. [THE MILITARY AND THE SEA. THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPERIORITY IN THE DEEP SEA] Militär und Meer. Das Ringen um die Vorherrschaft in der Tiefsee. Wehrkunde, v. 16, Sept. 1967: 492-494. U3.W396, v. 16

Discusses the importance of the deep sea for naval operations and the Soviet-American race to conquer it by ever-deeper submerging vessels and submarines.

657

Teller, Edward. NEEDED NOW: TRANSATLANTIC ABM DEFENSE--AND UNION. Freedom & union, v. 22, Nov. 1967: 3-7.
JX1901.F6, v. 22

Transcript of Dr. Edward Teller's comments on ballistic missile defense during a question and answer session at a reception marking the opening of the new headquarters of the International Movement for Atlantic Union. The noted nuclear physicist felt that a light missile defense system would provide insurance against Chinese nuclear blackmail, protect the United States against Chinese nuclear attack, aid in determining the feasibility of a more extensive missile defense system, and strengthen the deterrent against Soviet attack by increasing the U.S. damage limiting capability. The United States should unite with its allies to form an Atlantic nuclear umbrella. By joining together for nuclear defense the allies would draw closer to one another and would save the expense of individual technological development. While all countries would share in the development of the defense system, each would have control over the nuclear weapons needed to defend its own air space. The weapons would be restricted by treaties and electronic controlling devices to defensive purposes only. Since China and Russia consider force the greatest argument, the Atlantic democracies would increase their chances for obtaining concessions from the former by united action. Consideration of the resolution pending in Congress that calls for a convention to explore the possibility of converting NATO into an Atlantic federal union is becoming increasingly urgent in view of world tensions.

658

Thurmond, Strom. ABM: LESSENING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. Data, v. 12, Oct. 1967: 10-11. P&GP RR

Although the United States has enjoyed a nuclear advantage for over two decades, the Soviet Union has made alarming progress in closing the gap in deliverable megatons, and it is far ahead of the United States in the construction of an ABM system. The vital difference in the prevention of a nuclear showdown could well be the advances that both countries make in ABM defense capability. Because Soviet intentions may not be as rational as those of the United States it is best that America guarantee its security by an overabundance of defense rather than by "cost-effective" military parity. There are several objections to the ABM. Many fear that it will cost too much and that it will accelerate the arms race, and some experts do not know how far the Russians have progressed with their ABM. An ABM system would cost each person in the United States only $10 per month for 10 years ($40 billion). The Soviet Union has already opted for acceleration by deploying ABM's around Moscow and other principal cities and it is "establishing a line of these missile sites across the northwest border of their country." The fact that the United States has already announced that it will construct a "thin" ABM system signifies that it will perhaps gain a "production time advantage" if there should be a confrontation with the real enemy--Russia.

659

Van Osten, Richard. NATO ADOPTS STRATEGY OF PEACEMAKING. Armed Forces management, v. 14, Jan. 1968: 64-66, 70. illus.
UB153.A65, v. 14

Ennumerates the NATO councils, committees, and commands and describes their respective functions, and some of the changes in NATO that are contributing to its movement from peacekeeping to peacemaking. Considerable space is devoted to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, which "prepares and finalizes" defense plans for the NATO European Command. The author notes that contrary to popular belief NATO has several military accomplishments to its credit: increased Allied participation in nuclear activities,

progress in infrastructure, standardization, and cooperative production. He concludes that "NATO is heading toward a far closer political liaison among its members" but military factors are not being pushed aside and "there is no time in the foreseeable future when they might be."

660
Vandevanter, E. STUDIES ON NATO: AN ANALYSIS OF INTEGRATION. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1966. 102 p. (Rand Corporation. [Research] memorandum RM-5006-PR)
Q180.A1R36, no. 5006

Delves into the problems surrounding "the task of coordinating the efforts of the NATO allies." Numerous areas provide grounds for dissension concerning the definition and amount of integration proper for the alliance, but the major issue "arises from the question of SACEUR's authority in war and other time of emergency." The author proposes as a solution at this time "a loose-knit general alliance, cohesive enough to keep the machinery of collaboration intact, yet so flexible that nations would be expected to submit to its absolute control only under certain, explicity defined, circumstances."

661
Vase, I. THE DANISH HOME GUARD. National guardsman, v. 22, Feb. 1968: 8-12.
UA42.N24, v. 22

The Danish Home Guard grew out of the Home Guard Associations, which were organized following World War II by former members of the resistance movement. Its primary mission is to share in territorial defense by delaying the enemy until the regular forces can make a coordinated attack, gathering intelligence, and supporting operations of the field force units. The three branches of the Home Guard are placed at the disposal of the regular Army, Navy, and Air Force and are manned by both veterans and individuals with no prior service. The Army Home Guard matches the organizational structure of the regular Army; the Naval Home Guard is broken down into divisions which deploy cutters between 60 seaports; the Air Home Guard takes part in airfield defense and supervises the Visual Observer Corps. While the Danish Home Guard does not regularly schedule drills comparable to those of the U.S. National Guard, the members must undergo a certain amount of training each year and store weapons and equipment at their homes or places of employment. During test alerts Home Guardsmen were able to mobilize for combat action very quickly and demonstrated the effectiveness of their harassment techniques against the "aggressor." Since Denmark can only support a relatively small peacetime regular force, the Home Guard plays a major role in defense planning.

662
Viefhaus, Erwin. [THE NEW NATO STRATEGY: THE FUTURE OF THE BUNDESWEHR] Neue NATO-Strategie: die Zukunft der Bundeswehr. Weltwoche, v. 35, May 26, 1967: 17.
AP32.W4, v. 35

The NATO Conference of Ministers of Defense at Paris announced its official change of strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response. This declaration and the impending reduction of allied troops in Germany have created some kind of insecurity there and pose the question of the future of the Bundeswehr and its concept. NATO's new strategic doctrine shocked some German political leaders, and some regard it as a great defeat for Defense Minister Schröder, who shortly before the NATO Conference spoke of a "forward strategy" against the military threat from the East, which remains unchanged. Critics and supporters of the new NATO doctrine are primarily concerned about the effects of the anticipated changes on the strength, structure, and equipment of the Bundeswehr. There are speculations that the Bundeswehr will be augmented after the first reduction of American and British troops in Germany, but the cheerless financial situation of the country prevents this. Some think the number of West German divisions will be reduced when more allied troops are thinned out; the length of military service will be lowered from 18 to 12 months; the Armed Forces will be decreased from 460,000 to 400,000 men or combined into a small, active 250,000 Bundeswehr with a territorial defense force, which would be mobilized for special duties and assignments. Minister Schröder has tried to convince the military experts that no immediate and spectacular measures should be expected; that the strategic balance between East and West is not endangered; that a unilateral denuclearization of the NATO area is out of question despite the withdrawal of some American nuclear units next year; and that neither a reduction of the Bundeswehr nor any radical changes in armaments are being considered. The debate on defense has been postponed. Some politicians have remarked sarcastically that the flexible NATO strategy is evidently so flexible that every NATO member can deduce from it what he wants.

663
WEST EUROPE'S CHANGING FUTURE: U.S. REVIEWS ITS POLICY AS A DREAM FADES. U.S. news & world report, v. 64, Feb. 26, 1968: 43-44.
JK1.U65, v. 64

"The U.S., in the light of changing Europe, is adjusting policies and military postures to enable it to cope with new commitments and responsibilities that European allies refuse to share." By turning their attention inward to their own problems, European countries have shattered U.S. hopes for a united Europe that would be able to defend itself against the Soviet Union and assume global responsibilities in partnership with the United States. De Gaulle's insistence upon special privileges for France and Wilson's decision to diminish Britain's world role reflect the resurgence of nationalism and isolationism in Europe. Because of Europe's self-centered attitudes, the views of the European allies will carry less and less weight with U.S. policymakers. This year the United States plans to pull 35,000 troops out of Germany. Further reductions of American forces in Europe will depend upon Russia's response to the first cutbacks, West German contributions to the cost of maintaining the troops, congressional pressures, the availability of the new extra-large transport aircraft, and the size of Europe's military commitment for its own defense.

664
WHAT WENT WRONG IN THE PENTAGON: A 73-BILLION-DOLLAR OPERATION. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Dec. 11, 1967: 41-43.
JK1.U65, v. 63

U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara's resignation demonstrates that placing civilian authorities between generals and their commander-in-chief in time of war is a mistake. McNamara's ability to call the shots and supersede the Joint Chiefs had no recent precedent. Franklin Roosevelt met regularly with his military leaders during World War II, as did Harry Truman during the Korean War. Recently none of the service heads has seen the President except at ceremonial occasions, and only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, consults regularly with the Defense Secretary. Now that the war in Vietnam is being turned back to the pros, speculation concerning changes is rife. Many of McNamara's Defense Department reforms will probably live on after him, including his budgeting procedures and strategy flexibility, but more authority is likely to devolve upon the Joint Chiefs, a development that the Congress is sure to applaud. In the future only the administrative and business ends of U.S. defense may be left to the control of the civilian Secretary.

665

Wiesner, Jerome B. THE CASE AGAINST AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM. Look, v. 31, November 28, 1967: 25-27.
AP2.L79, v. 31

The Chinese hydrogen bomb explosion produced anxieties throughout the world, and in the United States it resulted in renewed calls for an ABM defense against China. Under pressure from industry, Congress, and the military, President Johnson has now decided to "buy" an anti-Chinese ABM system. However, this decision "could be as wrong and have as serious domestic and international consequences as the disastrous conclusion six years ago that a few military advisers and some weapons would lead to an early victory for South Vietnam's forces." An ABM system should be built only if it provides greater security. But the basic technical fact is that a sophisticated opponent can overcome any defense currently possible. Although China evidently does not have long-range ballistic missiles, it does have the resources to develop them. Within less than a decade China could produce a moderate number (100-200) of missiles to break through the anti-Chinese ABM. At any rate, America cannot build an anti-Chinese ABM system without stimulating the Russians to respond with an offensive buildup of their own. The ABM the President proposes could hardly stay small, and, once the United States deploys it, an arms race is inevitable. And even if Russia could develop an effective ABM system plus a defense against Strategic Air Command bombers, an American ABM system could not boost the U.S. deterrent. Instead, the United States must rely on its "offensive deterrent," its known ability to retaliate devastatingly in case of a nuclear attack. The United States will have to accept a "deterrent balance" with the Chinese as well as the Russians and greatly reduce the offensive missile force and thus the risk, effort, and cost involved in the present deterrent position. Substantial balanced disarmament is technically feasible, but it has no effective backers; the world can only hope for peace ensured by a balance of terror.

666

Wolk, Herman S. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY AND VIETNAM. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Jan. 1968: 51-52, 55-56. UG633.A65, v. 51

In spite of the current focus on the limited-war tactics employed in Vietnam, it would be a mistake to discount the significance of strategic nuclear power. Far from becoming obsolete, nuclear weapons "have made for a stabilization of world affairs by directing conflict to lower levels of the spectrum." While the actual military utility of nuclear weapons may have receded, their tremendous destructive power has prevented the outbreak of general war. In fact, the policy of mutual nuclear deterrence underlies the U.S. position in Vietnam today; the superiority of the American nuclear strategic forces has deterred an all-out nuclear attack and their threat value has increased the credibility of American involvement in Southeast Asia. In order to continue its ability to thwart Communist objectives by limited measures, the United States dare not lose its strategic lead. It would be unwise to engage in any arrangements with the Soviet Union for a mutual reduction in strategic forces as long as the primary conflicts of interest continue to exist between the two countries.

667

Young, Elizabeth. EXCERPTS FROM BBC ON ABM. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Jan. 1967: 59.
TK9145.A84, v. 24

The Red Chinese have built a nuclear arsenal in response to America's nuclear weaponry for they believe that an American nuclear attack is imminent. Although they once thought it was impermissible--in the light of national liberation war or civil war--for Socialist countries to use nuclear weapons, their fear of an American attack has brought about a mass paranoia. The Red Guard and the cultural revolution are indicative of a massive effort to hold the country together against Russian-American collaboration. To the Chinese the nonproliferation treaty, ABM's, the test ban treaty, and meetings at Glassboro signify a conspiracy, which they feel they must stop by force.

668

Zabelok, B. [GUARDING SOVIET SKIES] Na strazhe sovetskogo neba. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, v. 9, Oct. 1967: 65-68. DK50.A32, v. 9

Explains the importance of the Soviet Union's antiaircraft defense against nuclear attack and violation of Soviet airspace by foreign aircraft. Zabelok describes in detail how Soviet antiaircraft missiles destroyed the American high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance plane in May 1960 and the American RB-47 observation bomber that violated Russian air space in July 1960. The power and effectiveness of the Soviet antiaircraft defense has improved since 1960; according to American and other foreign publications, the type of Soviet ground-to-air missile located near Hanoi is "a very deadly weapon," and the MIG-21 fighter is considered "an excellent, high-speed, maneuverable" aircraft.

669

Zitzewitz, Horst von. [THE NEW NATO STRATEGY AND THE BUNDESWEHR] Die neue NATO-Strategie und die Bundeswehr. Aussenpolitik, v. 18, Aug. 1967: 476-486. D839.A885, v. 18

Describes the formal change in NATO strategy from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" and its effect on the West German Armed Forces. The "stra-

tegic paper" adopted in May 1967 by both the Chiefs of Staff of NATO member states and the NATO Council of Defense Ministers laid down compromise guidelines for development of the allied forces. Zitzewitz contends that West German military leadership consented hesitatingly. The guidelines differ sharply from the West German position on two points: West Germany feels its own defense measures should be tailored to cope with the Soviet bloc military potential rather than the Kremlin's political intentions at any given time; and the warning time of an imminent attack will certainly be much shorter than the guidelines anticipate.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. Biological

670
Andrews, Gould A. RADIATION ACCIDENTS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT. Radiation research, suppl. 7, 1967: 390-397. QC770.R3, 1967

Points out cogent features of radiation effects in man following radiation accidents. Such accidents provide a valuable source of information since, "as contrasted with studies of therapeutic radiation, the accidents usually involve normal people."

671
Bakács-Polgár, E., and I. Kurcz-Csiky. ON THE DETERMINATION OF FISSION PRODUCTS DEPOSITED ON THE GROUND. Atompraxis, v. 13, July 1967: 301-302. illus. TK9001.A9, v. 13

The authors determined the monthly average of total beta-activity and radioactive strontium deposited on the ground and on plants, partly by determining the air pollution, partly by investigating the total fallout. The total beta-activity due mainly to short-lived isotopes decreased considerably after the atomic truce agreement; the decrease in Sr^{90} content in 1964 was less pronounced. The Chinese atomic bombs, exploded in October 1964 and in May 1965, caused fallout, although only to a slight extent. (Abstract supplied, modified)

672
Broerse, J. J. PENETRATION PARAMETERS FOR 15-MeV NEUTRON BEAMS. Kerntechnik, Isotopentechnik und -Chemie, v. 9, Oct. 1967: 446-451. illus. TK9001.K4, v. 9

In connection with investigations of the biological effects of fast neutrons, a number of physical problems was studied, notably shielding, penetration and collimation of 15-MeV neutrons. The shielding characteristics of various materials were measured with a neutron rem detector. Attenuation curves are reported for concrete, paraffin, laminated wood, water and steel. The penetration of 15-MeV neutrons into paraffin phantoms has been investigated in view of the possible use of these neutrons for radiotherapy. For these radiotherapeutic applications appropriate collimation of the 15-MeV neutron beams should be obtained. Steel proved to be the material most suitable for collimation purposes. Some characteristics of a steel collimator are discussed. (Abstract supplied)

673
DEFENSE ISSUES SUMMARY OF DEFOLIATION STUDY. Science, v. 159, Feb. 9, 1968: 613. Q1.S35, v. 159

Reports the release of a Department of Defense digest summarizing the findings of a survey by the Midwest Research Institute [MRI] on the "ecological impact of herbicides used for defoliation and crop destruction in Vietnam." Complaints by various scientific groups on the possible harmful effects of the herbicides led the Department of Defense to commission the MRI study and submit it for evaluation to an ad hoc committee of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. The 369-page study was completed in December 1967 and based principally on information obtained from interviews and scientific literature. The summary minimizes the adverse effects of the defoliants and lists the following conclusions: the vegetation they destroy is quickly replaced; they could favorably modify the habitat of wildlife, although their full impact on fauna is difficult to assess; the level of poison that endangers plant life wears off after a short time; they do not directly endanger animals or humans; they do little harm to fish or aquatic organisms but could change their eating patterns by destroying floating aquatic vegetation.

674
EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION: ASSEMBLY ADOPTS REPORT. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Nov. 1967: 11-12. JX1977.A1U564, v. 4

Text of a resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly commending the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation for its comprehensive report on radiation risks. In sponsoring the resolution, delegates from both Communist and non-Communist countries praised the Committee for its valuable research in areas of great importance to the future welfare of the human race. Some representatives stated that the amount of radioactivity in the atmosphere would continue to decrease only if all nations agreed to a comprehensive test ban. The resolution requests the Scientific Committee to continue its program and notes that the Committee plans to hold its next session in April 1968.

675
Fischer, H.-F., D. Paffrath, and W. Peters. [MEASUREMENTS OF RADIOACTIVITY AT DIFFERENT ALTITUDES IN THE ATMOSPHERE DURING PASSAGE OF FRESH FISSION PRODUCT CLOUDS] Messungen der Radioaktivität in verschiedenen Höhen der Atmosphäre beim Durchzug von Schwaden frischer Spaltprodukte. Atompraxis, v. 13, Oct. 1967: 444-447. illus. TK9001.A9, v. 13

After the third Chinese nuclear weapons test, measuring flights in the atmosphere at altitudes up to 12,500 m. were performed for collecting aerosol on fiber filters. The method of sampling is described. The fraction of fresh debris to total amount of debris is determined by the β-disintegration curves of the samples. Vertical profiles of the specific β-activity of the air for old and fresh fission products are represented by graphs. These results are compared with our measurements after the first and second Chinese nuclear tests. In addition to fission products of the nuclear explosion we identified the neutron-induced nuclides U^{237} and Np^{239} by means of gamma-ray spectrometry. (Abstract supplied, modified)

676

Galston, Arthur W. HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM. New republic, v. 157, Nov. 25, 1967: 19-21.
AP2.N624, v. 157

The United States has claimed that the herbicides it is using to clear jungle growth in Vietnam are innocuous, but they could lead to a dangerous ecological upset in the sprayed area. Since the mechanism of change induced by the defoliants is not fully understood and has not even been investigated in environments similar to Vietnam, the spraying program is experimental and could cause irreversible harm to wildlife and agriculture. The toxic content of some of the chemicals themselves could endanger the civilian population of Vietnam and contaminate grazing land and destroy neighboring plots of useful plants. Although the herbicides in their original form eventually disappear from the soil, they could be transformed into new compounds that would "poison" it.

677

Haussermann, W., and H. Schreiber. [DETERMINATIONS OF Sr^{90} IN SOILS] Untersuchungen über die Verteilung von Strontium-90 im Erdboden. Atompraxis, v. 13, July 1967: 303-306. illus.
TK9001.A9, v. 13

The results of more than 200 determinations of the Sr^{90}-contents in soils during 1960 to 1964 down to 20 cm. are given. The annual amount of precititation on the different collection places across the Black Forest ranges from 780 to 2,200 mm. The variations in time of the Sr^{90}-activity and the distribution in depth are discussed. (Abstract supplied, modified)

678

Hoek, J. van den, and W. T. Binnerts. THE INFLUENCE OF LIMING OF GRASS ON THE SECRETION OF ^{90}Sr IN COW'S MILK. Atompraxis, v. 13, July 1967: 307-310. illus.
TK9001.A9, v. 13

The effect of supplementary calcium, applied to pasture, on Sr^{90} secretion in milk was studied under normal management conditions. Two compounds, 140 and 200 kg. Ca/ha. were used and administered as $CaCO_3$. The average reduction on Sr^{90} in milk was 33%; the effect became noticeable within 24 hours, maximal reduction was attained in 4 days. No effects were observed from different climatic conditions or from two compounds with different Ca content. Simplicity of application and effects observed make this method interesting in case of a contamination event. (Abstract supplied, modified)

679

Hunter, Jeffrey J. AN ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE FOR URBAN CASUALTY ESTIMATION FROM MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Operations research, v. 15, Nov./Dec. 1967: 1096-1108.
Q175.O63, v. 15

A model has been developed that estimates the total number of direct effects casualties due to a multiple weapon attack on a city whose population has a circular normal distribution. The only specifications required are the coordinates of the ground zeros in relation to the center of population, the population parameters, the weapon parameters, and the aiming error for each weapon. Further generalizations involving extension of the model to consider elliptical normal population distributions, elliptical normal aiming error distributions, and modified casualty functions are also discussed. (Abstract supplied)

680

Marquardt, W. [LOCAL INFLUENCES ON ARTIFICIAL RADIOACTIVITY IN THE BIOSPHERE] Lokale Einflüsse auf die künstliche Radioaktivität in der Biosphäre. Kernenergie, v. 10, Sept. 1967: 276-281. illus.
QC770.K4, v. 10

Local parameters influence the contamination of the biosphere. Inversions stop the supply of fission products from the altitude. Many aerosols are bound by fog. Fog particles precipitate when meeting with obstacles; the ground-near air is partially decontaminated. Radioactive fallout depends on duration and kind of atmospheric precipitations. Wind pick-up effects may locally intensify the radioactivity of air. Therefore, the results of measurements made in one place cannot be directly transferred to neighbouring places. (Abstract supplied)

681

Mil'gram, N. [THE PLAGUE--AN ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES] Chuma--soiuznik SShA. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 8, Aug. 1967: 34.
DS1.S7, 1967

The world has been informed about the results of the chemical warfare conducted by the United States in South Vietnam; but the results of the bacteriological warfare that is gradually being introduced by the United States in Vietnam will be even more dreadful. Outbreaks of such diseases as the plague are not publicized. However, it is evident that they are caused by the activities of American "bacteriological service" specialists. In Saigon the Pentagon has established a scientific-methodological center on bacteriological warfare manned by American and West German specialists. World Health Organization data for 1966 supply evidence of bacteriological warfare in South Vietnam; of the 1,326 fatal bubonic plague cases all over the world, 377 are ascribed to South Vietnam. In the spring of 1967 the plague broke out in Camranh; 30 natives became infected and only one American. In March 1967 the plague was prevalent in 26 Vietnam provinces. In its warfare preparations, the United States pays special attention to bacteria causing severe infections in the human organism and in plants such as rice. The U.S. Armed Forces pay Japanese bacteriologists and microbiologists 3.6 million yen for each project they work on. They concentrate on acute contagious diseases such as anthrax. Under Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance stated that this year the United States has spent $230 million for development of bacteriological weapons.

682

Mitschrich, H. [RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT. 3. MILITARY-MEDICAL ASPECT OF EXTERNAL IRRADIATION FROM LOCAL RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT] Der radioaktive Niederschlag. 3. Externe Bestrahlung aus lokalem radioaktivem Niederschlag in wehrmedizinischer Sicht. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 11, Nov. 1967: 384-391. diagrs.
P&GP RR

Local radioactive fallout after atomic detonations originates from ground-(water-) detonations. The intensity and total dose of the radiation emitted can be measured and calculated. People having to stay in such a radioactive contaminated area will be effected by the radiation, especially by penetrating gamma radiation. Procedures are shown for how these can be measured and calculated and what doses are considered to be tolerable under field conditions, how they can be calculated and what measures have to be taken by large and stationary medical installations to protect themselves as far as possible. [Solid material] protective factors . . . are discussed as well as the characteristics of gamma radiation emitted by radioactive areas. (Abstract supplied, modified)

683
Peńsko, J. VARIATIONS OF THE GAMMA-RAY BACKGROUND DOSE RATES AND ATMOSPHERIC RADON CONCENTRATION IN WARSAW. Atompraxis, v. 13, July 1967: 310-312. illus.
TK9001.A9, v. 13

Systematic observations of the gamma-ray background have been carried out in Warsaw. It was found that the terrestrial dose rate is greater in summer than in winter. Rain-showers bring a temporary increase in gamma background radiation. The contribution to this radiation from derivations of radon contained in the atmosphere and from fission products was established. (Abstract supplied, modified)

684
Reynolds, M. A., and others. FALLOUT FROM THE CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OF 17 JUNE 1967. Science, v. 158, Dec. 29, 1967: 1692-1693.
Q1.S35, v. 158

Low-level activities of iodine-131, barium-140, and strontium-89 were found in a series of rain samples collected at Fayeteville, Arkansas, during the period from late June through August 1967. The ratios of these short-lived isotopes to strontium-90 were determined as accurately as possible. The data indicate that the debris from the Chinese nuclear explosion was injected primarily into the stratosphere. (Abstract supplied)

2. Economic

685
Agarwala, Amar Narain. ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE. New York, Asia Pub. House [1966] 126 p. illus. (Allahabad University magazine students' publication aid series, 1)
HC440.D4A35

Analyzes India's potential military strength in terms of the capacity of its economy "to sustain long-range and short-range defense efforts of given dimensions." While the study emphasizes the translation of economic resources into fighting power, it also includes proposals for utilizing public enthusiasm for war efforts. Agarwala does not advocate that India step up its military operations but concludes that it has the capacity to substantially increase its military power.

686
Alexandros, L. [THE NEAR EAST: A BALANCE SHEET] Nahost: eine Bilanz. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Dec. 10, 1967: 613.
U3.W38, v. 11

The loss of the 1967 war with Israel cost Egypt over $1 1/2 billion. The war also brought indirect economic losses to India, Pakistan, Red China, the Soviet Union, and Poland. It turned out to be economically profitable not only to Israel, Greece, and the United States but to some Arab nations as well (Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria).

687
Atkinson, James D. RED FLAG ON THE HIGH SEAS. In American Security Council. Washington report, Dec. 18, 1967: 1-4. P&GP RR

The once insignificant Russian merchant fleet now sails on all seas. Soviet merchant shipping rose from 1.6 million deadweight tons in 1939 to the present 10,617,000. In the past 5 years the Soviet merchant marine has moved from 12th to sixth place in the world. Yet even more striking than these statistics is the Soviet maritime thrust into the Western Hemisphere. In April 1966, maritime logs recorded the first docking of a Russian ocean liner at Quebec--only 8 months after the Soviet Minister of the Merchant Marine denied any Soviet intention to operate passenger services across the oceans. Soviet shipping has even penetrated the St. Lawrence Seaway; the number of Russian voyages through this key waterway equals that of the United States. Stepped-up shipping in Southeast Asia is also indicative of the future pursuits of Soviet maritime power. Since June 1967 Soviet ships arriving in North Vietnamese ports have averaged 18 per month, with the addition of two to five ships flying flags of Soviet satellites. While U.S. shipping is a "declining asset of National security," Soviet shipping is forging ahead. In May 1967 the Soviet Union had 526 ships under construction or on order compared with a total of 45 for the United States. In November 1967 the U.S. Maritime Administration published a short study of the Soviet merchant marine indicating that this fleet could be used "as a political instrument for economic purposes and an economic instrument for political purposes." The possibility of using the merchant marine "as a psycho-political and subversive warfare weapon" was implied by Radio Havana on November 1, 1967: Cuban maritime training schools will teach students "the language, geography, and history of the countries they will visit." Considering the Soviet role in unconventional-warfare training in Cuba, it appears that "the Cold War will be intensified at sea during the coming decade."

688
Baldwin, William L. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEFENSE MARKET, 1955-1964. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1967. 249 p. illus.
HC110.D4B3
Bibliography: p. 230-237.

Partial contents.--The structure of the military market as depicted by annual contract awards.--Market structure: subcontracting and multi-year measures.--Market structure: primary product groupings and specialization in military products.--Characteristics of demand in the defense market.--

Influences of advanced technology on the defense market. --Entry into and exit from the defense market. --Financial performance and structure of the major defense contractors. --Projected structural trends and procurement policies.

Examines the important structural characteristics of the national defense market and discusses their implications for military procurement policy. First Baldwin presents the measurable aspects of the market structure such as the concentration, stability, and diversification of the prime contractors for military products and services. This study is followed by a treatment of certain subsurface structural features, "namely the nature of the government's demand for military products, the technological base of the market, and conditions of entry." Structural considerations alone should not determine military procurement policy. However, defense policymakers should use their influence over the structure of the defense market to make any changes that could improve its performance.

689

Black, Ronald P., and Charles W. Foreman. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN CIVILIAN PUBLIC AREAS. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Falls Church, Va., Analytic Services, 1967. 1 v. (various pagings)
T21.B55

Examines the process of technological innovation in civilian public programs. While the defense industry is noted for its technological progress, the domestic side of public programs resists change. The report attempts to determine reasons for this resistance in the event that arms control agreements would free technological resources of the defense industry to help solve civilian public problems. The principal questions considered "deal with how the process of technological innovation works in civilian public areas; whether there are identifiable factors which characteristically affect the process; and how public policies are employed to alter the rate at which technological innovation occurs." These questions are used as a framework for analyzing three examples of innovation in civilian public areas--the civilian light-water nuclear power reactor, the San Francisco Bay area rapid transit system, and the high-speed ground transportation program. Although it will be difficult to adapt defense-based resources to counter inertia in the civilian sector, it is hoped that an identification of the problems will help the Federal Government solve them.

690

Bolton, Roger E. DEFENSE PURCHASES AND REGIONAL GROWTH. Washington, Brookings Institution [1966] 189 p. maps. (Brookings Institution. Studies of government finance)
HC110.D4B62
Bibliography: p. 175-180.

Partial contents. --Analytical framework. --A simple model of regional growth. --Testing the model. --Estimation of defense purchases by State. --The impact of defense purchases on regional growth. --The regional distribution of procurement. --The regional distribution of payrolls. --Defense purchases policy.

Studies the impact of defense spending upon regional economic growth in the United States between 1951 and 1962. The relative dependence of a State or region upon defense income was expressed quantitatively by estimating the ratio of defense income to total outside income. While the reliability of the estimates is somewhat questionable due to the lack of accurate data and weaknesses in the analytical methods, the figures do give a valuable insight into the economic hardships that would be created by shifts in defense expenditures due to disarmament measures or changes in defense technology.

691

Buchs, Herbert. [ARMAMENTS COOPERATION WITHIN NATO AS A MEANS OF NARROWING THE TECHNOLOGY GAP] Rüstungszusammenarbeit in der NATO als Mittel zur Einengung der technologischen Lücke. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Oct. 10, 1967: 703-710.
D839.E86, v. 22

Considers present and future cooperation between NATO states in development, production, and procurement of weapons. Buchs points out that national economic interests often hamper broad cooperation in that area. Political decisions then are needed to overcome this obstacle.

692

Coleman, Herbert J. MASSIVE BUDGET ROLLBACK SLICES BRITISH POWER; F-111K CANCELED. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Jan. 22, 1968: 17-19. TL501.A8, v. 88

In its campaign to curtail public spending, the British Labor Government has enacted a series of drastic defense cutbacks. Aiming for a 1972-73 defense budget of no more than $3.8 billion, Prime Minister Wilson ordered a reduction of defense personnel and the withdrawal of British forces from the Far East and the Persian Gulf. He has initiated a number of military hardware cuts, including the cancellation of the British order for the General Dynamics F-111 variable-sweep-wing aircraft. Although the cancellation of the F-111 will save the Government $960 million over the next 10 years, Defense Minister Denis Healey bitterly opposed the move as it will leave a large gap in the long-range strike and reconnaissance capabilities of the Royal Air Force. Now that Great Britain will have to confine its military strength to Europe and the Atlantic area, Healey is charged with the responsibility of designing a "quick reaction" strike force which will come to the aid of Commonwealth countries in areas where the British forces have been withdrawn. Wilson's cutback program will also include reductions in research and development spending, totaling $31.2 million in 1968-69 and $36 million in 1969-70. Conservative Party members have angrily denounced Wilson's budget cuts and they claim that he has made their country "a laughing stock among the nations."

693

Divine, David. BRITAIN'S CHANGING ROLE IN DEFENCE: EAST OF SUEZ REDUCTIONS. United Asia, v. 19, July/Aug. 1967: 225-226.
DS1.U55, v. 19

Clearly Britain's military expenditures outside of Europe, especially East of Suez, are not commensu-

rate with its domestic economic picture. The British Government realizes that "there has been no real attempt to match political commitments to military resources" and still less to relate defense resources to England's economic posture. The British plan to make up for lost military bases East of Suez with improvements in mobility, which should play an important part in the "rationalization" of future defense expenditures. Reductions in the Army, Navy, and Air Force will serve to stabilize the domestic economy and at the same time maintain a viable military system. The decision to reduce British forces East of Suez began in 1947 with the signing of the Indian Independence Act and became irreversible with the end of the "confrontation threat."

694
Dresden. Kriegsakademie "Friedrich Engels." [PROBLEMS OF THE MILITARY ECONOMY] Probleme der Militärökonomie. Berlin, Deutscher Militärverlag, 1967. 248 p. maps. UA17. D7
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--The scope of the Marxist-Leninist military economy, by Hans Einhorn.--The relationship between the economy and the military system. The military system's new demands on the contemporary economy, by Hans Einhorn, Siegfried Schönherr, and Werner Hiepe.--Model of a modern war economy, by Hans Einhorn.--Internationalization of imperialist defense research and arms production, by Horst Fiedler and Joachim Weissleder.--The role and place of logistics in the West German imperialist system of economic preparation for war, by Siegfried Schönherr.--Preparing the West German economy for its role in nuclear warfare, by Werner Hiepe.

Considers, among other things, the functional differences between peace and war economies, the growing importance of "political-moral factors in a war economy," and measures for assuring proper functioning of the national economy in wartime. Included is a comparison between the NATO economic potential and that of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

695
Duckwitz, Georg F. [STATIONING OF TROOPS AND THE CURRENCY SETTLEMENT] Truppenstationierung und Devisenausgleich. Aussenpolitik, v. 18, Aug. 1967: 471-475. D839. A885, v. 18

Recounts the Bonn-Washington and Bonn-London negotiations leading to bilateral settlements to offset the costs of stationing British and American troops in Germany and reducing the number of troops assigned to NATO. Duckwitz points out that any such reduction should be negotiable with Moscow for possible reciprocation. A decision by NATO members prior to negotiations with the Soviet Union would deprive the West of a chance to induce parallel arms control measures in the Warsaw Pact Organization.

696
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM WAR. [New York] Renaissance Editions, 1967. 86 p. tables. (Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University. Special report series, no. 5)
HC106. 6. E25

A background paper by M. L. Weidenbaum prepared at the request of the Center for Strategic Studies and conclusions of a discussion panel.
Bibliography: p. 85-86.

Partial contents.--How a military buildup affects the economy over time.--The U. S. military buildup for Vietnam.--A cross-sectional analysis of the current military budget.--Implications for the future: problems of transition.

Considers the Vietnam War's impact on the American economy. Suggests that the United States develop a flexible fiscal policy in time to offset the inflationary impact of any major escalation of the war and the deflationary effects of a defense cutback in case the war ends.

697
Hersh, Seymour M. THE GREAT ABM PORK BARREL. War/peace report, v. 8, Jan. 1968: 3-9, 19.
P&GP RR

Beyond its profit value to the electronics industry, the Nike-X ABM system appears to have very little to offer. About 15,000 companies, many of them staffed by Pentagon retirees, are expected to profit from the deployment of the Nike-X. Perhaps the projected benefits to their constituents explain why many Congressmen could not be dissuaded by the administration from demanding a U. S. ABM system. Although it will very likely cost as much as $14 billion over the next 5 years, the Nike-X will not add substantially to the U. S. deterrent. It is designed to protect Minuteman sites from Soviet attack but will not hinder Soviet second-strike capability. It may not even defend the continental United States from a Chinese nuclear attack if China decides to forgo ICBM's. Many experts believe that the complex system of missiles and radars will not work without massive testing, which would violate the test ban treaty. The deployment of the Nike-X could also encourage nuclear proliferation and accelerate the arms race. Neither the Soviet Union nor most of America's allies believe that the United States will stop at the deployment of the thin system. Thus other countries may feel they have to proceed with their own nuclear defenses, and the Russians will certainly build up their strategic penetration forces.

698
ISSUES IN DEFENSE ECONOMICS, edited by Roland N. McKean. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, distributed by Columbia University Press, 1967. 286 p. (Universities National Bureau conference series, 20) HC110. D4I8
"A conference of the Universities National Bureau Committee for Economic Research."

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Applying economic concepts to defense problems: Increasing returns in military production functions, by Malcolm W. Hoag. Collective goods, comparative advantage, and alliance efficiency, by Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser.--pt. 2. Strategy and resource allocation: Strategy, arms control, and the deployment of defensive weapons systems, by Jerome Rothenberg. The strategy of inflicting costs, by Thomas C. Schelling. The structure of choice between deterrence and defense, by Martin C. McGuire.--pt. 3. Institutional structures and defense spending: The market mechanism in the defense department, by Martin J. Bailey. Organizational structures and planning, by James R. Schlesinger. The economics of defense contracting: incentives and performance, by Oliver E. Williamson.

Papers delivered at the conference.

699
Janeway, Eliot. [ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR] Listener, v. 78, Nov. 23, 1967: 656-657.
AP4. L4165, v. 78

Considers the Vietnam War's impact on the American economic situation, including labor markets. Janeway also discusses the indirect effects of the war on the international monetary system, which is dependent on the stability of the U.S. economy.

700
Klass, Philip J. LITTLE CHANGE SEEN IN POST-VIET SPENDING. Aviation week & space technology, v. 88, Jan. 22, 1968: 68-69, 71, 75, 77-78. illus.
TL501. A8, v. 88

Reports on a forecast of aerospace and avionics spending levels anticipated to follow the termination of the Vietnam War. The forecast was prepared by a committee of 20 planning and market research experts from aerospace and avionics companies and will be published by the Electronic Industries Association. Although the committee expects to see a 20 percent drop from peak spending during the 3 years following the Vietnam War if it terminated in 1969 and a 40 percent drop from higher peaks if it ends in 1971, the group predicts that the spending levels for the early 1970's will still be 15 to 20 percent above the pre-Vietnam levels. Aircraft and missile manufacturers would be the hardest hit by a termination of the Vietnam hostilities: Aircraft expenditures are expected to drop from $13.5 billion annually to $11.2 billion if the war ends in 1969, and from $17 billion to $10.6 billion if it continues to 1971. However, the experts think that spending in the area of defense electronics will level off at slightly below $10 billion after 1971 regardless of the course of the war and that the war will not curtail a 60 percent increase by 1974 in military space expenditures.

701
MILITARY ELECTRONICS: STRETCHING THE SINEWS OF WAR. Electronics, v. 41, Jan. 1968: 106-108. illus.
TK7800. E4384, v. 41

Forecasts an upsurge in the production of military electronic equipment in spite of the budgetary pressures imposed by the Vietnam War. Almost 75 percent of the $5 billion earmarked for the U.S. ABM system will go for electronics. In addition, avionics will take up a sizable portion of the $10 billion the Defense Department has allocated for aircraft in 1968 and the $2.5 billion to be spent on operational missiles of all kinds. The Pentagon is also scheduling research, development, and production of radar and communications system and a variety of military electronic support equipment for all three services.

702
Petrios'iants, A. M. ATOMIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE USSR. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, Nov. 5, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 5, 1-4. Slav Rm
Translated from Trud, Oct. 24, 1967.
Slav Rm

Russia's progress in nuclear physics was interrupted during World War II, but even under adverse conditions scientists managed to achieve the goals set by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. The first atomic reactor in the Soviet Union, or in Europe, began production of plutonium on December 25, 1946. Today the Soviet Union has not only caught up in the development of nuclear weaponry but has surpassed the United States. The U.S.S.R. was the first to use atomic energy and established an extensive nuclear reactor program for peaceful purposes. Nuclear energy has replaced petroleum and coal as a source of power. Atomic energy has been utilized successfully in shipbuilding. The byproducts of the operation of nuclear reactors, "fission radioactive elements," can be extracted from the spent fuel elements and used in the national economy. Prominent in the plans for future progress in nuclear power engineering are plutonium fast-neutron reactors: the Bor-60 research fast-neutron reactor and the BN-350, a power reactor for nuclear fuel breeding with an electric capacity of 350 megawatts, are under construction. The Dubna proton synchrotron, with the proton energy of 10 billion electron volts, and the Serpukhov, with 76 billion electron volts, have demonstrated the Soviet Union's development in the field of accelerators. Mankind has in its possession a terrifying force, the liberated energy of the atom; it is important that it be used for man's benefit and not for his destruction.

703
Taylor, Hal. BUDGET OUTLOOK: LBJ ORDERS HOLD ON FISCAL '69 EXPENDITURES. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Nov. 1967: 26-28.
UG630. M54, v. 21

Discusses the National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] fiscal restrictions and their effect on the interplanetary program, research, development, and new construction and points out NASA's bleak budgetary outlook in the face of the Vietnam War and Congress' failure to approve a tax increase. Taylor warns that further cuts in the NASA budget would "kill the Apollo Application Program and any unmanned exploration of Mars until 1975" and reviews NASA options at various funding levels.

704
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Federal Procurement and Regulation. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT, 1966: REPORT. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 17 p. tables. JK1673. A517 1966a
At head of title: 89th Congress, 2d session. Joint committee print.
Bibliographical footnotes.

Appraises the military and civilian aspects of the Federal supply system. The subcommittee recommends the development of a national supply system, adequate contractor inventory control, the utilization of personal property inventories, and various other improvements and tightening-up measures.

705
Weidenbaum, Murray L. THE CHANGING TREND IN GOVERNMENT SPENDING. Financial analysts journal, v. 24, Jan./Feb. 1968: 77-80. tables.
HG4501. A7, v. 24

Selected Department of Defense economic indicators show that increases in Government spending caused by the Vietnam buildup will be much smaller in 1968 than in previous years but will still provide an important

area of strength in the economy. Military prime contract awards have shown little growth, and there has been a decline in armed forces increases, draft calls, defense materials requirements, and the rise of obligations over expenditures, all of which indicates a leveling-off of the Vietnam War's demands on U.S. economic resources. However, with a major military escalation this would change, even if a cutback in military spending were to come because of peace in Vietnam, other military programs that have had to be compressed would compete strongly for additional funds. These programs include an ABM system, a new generation of strategic weapons, and military research and development programs. A large and active military market is likely to continue to be available to American industry, and a renewed upward trend in U.S. defense spending in the middle 1970's is probable. Nondefense Government purchases will also increase during 1968, but at a slower rate. The amount of the budget deficit in 1968 is difficult to assess because of changing Government views on the type of accounting system to be used. The deficit will probably be reported on three bases--administrative, cash, and national income accounts.

706
Wetmore, Warren C. WEST GERMANY TO STRESS R&D SPENDING: GOVERNMENT HOPES TO CUT BACK OPERATIONAL EXPENSES THROUGH REORGANIZATION AND STREAMLINING OF ENTIRE DEFENSE SYSTEM. Aviation week & space technology, v. 87, Dec. 25, 1967: 44-45. TL501.A8, v. 87

Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Schroeder presented to the Bundestag, on December 6, the Government's plans to cut operational expenses of the Armed Forces while increasing the funds devoted to procurement of modern weapons and military research and development. The current plan will trim the $25-billion budget of the 5-year defense plan drawn up in 1965. It calls for the reorganization of training programs, the fusion of the German Army with the German territorial defense forces, the creation of three different types of Army units based on graduated levels of combat strength, and the streamlining of the command structures of the air, land, and naval forces. Although no large manpower cuts are envisioned, the 1968 force levels will not reach the levels planned in 1965 for the 1966-70 period. Schroeder hopes to economize by reducing the number of major weapons systems, making the maintenance of materiel as cost-effective as possible, giving simple technical solutions preference over too-sophisticated and expensive weapons systems, instituting long-term objectives for a more cost-effective force planning, and retaining existing weapons systems until they reach the limits of their technical operational capability. However, he expects no budget cuts in the all-important modernization program for the research development, testing, and production of new military equipment.

3. Ethical and Social

707
JUST WAR. Commonweal, v. 87, Dec. 22, 1967: 371-372. AP2.C6897, v. 87

The Christian just war theory dates back to St. Augustine, and over the centuries it has had a variety of forms. In all of them appears a need for a just cause, a "civilized" means of warfare, and commensurability between the goal and the cost. These terms can be applied to the war in Vietnam today. Two entirely different Catholic views on its conduct were published recently. Editor William F. Buckley, Jr., in the National Review applauds the departure of Secretary of Defense McNamara and argues that the military alone should decide the means of warfare. This may entail an all-out escalation, use of at least tactical nuclear weapons, possibly even a "pre-emptive strike" against China; it would also mean a surrender of control "over the moral character of the day-by-day conduct of the war." The U.S. Catholic editors, on the other hand, have come right out and called the war in Vietnam immoral, finding it impossible to justify the means used: napalm, which cripples soldiers and noncombatants alike in this "no-front" war, destruction of the country, and uprooting of its people. Furthermore, the futility of the war has a "brutalizing effect" on the people in Vietnam as well as in America. In their arguments, the U.S. Catholic editors act in the faith's best tradition. Although they do not compare U.S. Government policies to those of Hitler's Germany, they draw a parallel between the responsibility of Americans to speak up against the war today and the responsibility the Germans had to speak up against the immoral Nazi policies. By raising their voices against the war in Vietnam, the U.S. Catholic editors are demonstrating that a properly used just war theory need not be a "corrupt tool of the just warriors" but a useful tool for moral judgments about the nation's conduct of military matters.

708
Loomis, Charles P. IN PRAISE OF CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION. American sociological review, v. 32, Dec. 1967: 875-890. illus.
HM1.A75, v. 32

"Presidential address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in San Francisco, 30 August 1967."

The extent to which opposing actors think of themselves as being dependent on and/or collaborative with one another is a crucial concern for the study of conflict and its resolution. Analysis of systemic linkages among collaborating and non-collaborating actors in conflict, and the relations of these to group boundaries in a given situation, furnish a means of relating conflict to change. Variables such as behavioral linkage, or interaction, and desired linkage, or liking of the citizens of Mexico and the United States for one another, across a mutual boundary are studied in this context with an effort to find out how to increase liking and decrease hostility. Also, the linkages of villagers, along with other factors including boundary maintenance, in rural India are examined to find out how to speed up change and modernization. A model or strategy for rapid modernization is presented, relating the results of the use of force to the "halo effect," or "fund of good will," common among victims of disaster after rescue and salvage work is carried out in communities. (Abstract supplied)

709
McMorris, Samuel C. WORLD PEACE AND THE BOMBS OF CHINA. Midwest quarterly, v. 9, 1967: 53-62. AS30.M5, v. 9

The balance of power--considered for more than one hundred years the basic war deterrent--has come within reach only since the invention of the nuclear bomb, not because the causes of war have been eliminated but because mankind, stared down by the bomb's might, shys away from large-scale conflict. For this reason some proliferation of atomic weapons is welcome. No country should have a monopoly over ultimate weapons, be it the United States or another power. A military stalemate may yet propel opposing systems into industrial and economic competition, and the victory of either nation in such competition would be to the ultimate benefit of all mankind. It is in this context that one should view China's detonation of a hydrogen bomb barely 3 years after its first atom bomb. This feat demonstrates that brains and ability are not the exclusive possession of the white race. The first nonwhite nation in this century to achieve military equality with the leading white nations was Japan. Having lost World War II it was almost totally stripped of its war potential. In a decade this humiliation may boomerang and produce a Japanese Hitler, not necessarily a racist, but one who will do everything to restore his country to greatness, power, and equality with other nations. Two nonwhite nations would then nearly equal the major white nations in military and industrial power, thus creating a balance between the white and the nonwhite world. This does not mean that a world division along racial lines is predictable or desirable. But hard military realities will help to avert the elimination of one race by another under any such pretext as doing away with communism.

710

Nagy, Gyula. THE JUST REVOLUTION III. Frontier, v. 10, winter 1967/68: 266-268.
BRl. F7, v. 10

"An abridged version of an article...originally published in the Hungarian Church Press digest for 1 April last."

Theology denies its sanction to participation by Christians in "just revolutions," when the armed participation of Christians in "just wars" has been accepted for a millennium and a half. Christianity, which is basically "revolutionary humanism," aims at radical changes, hence it should be openminded to the revolutionary changes taking place in the world. Yet revolution is a "worldly process," and placing it on the same level with the "revolution of the Gospel" means considering only the element of radical change in both. Faith is a forceful factor in social ethics. In the struggle against social injustice the Christian believer must first exhaust all lawful means of word and action, even to the point of accepting "undeserved suffering." However when others, in fighting for their lives, take to weapons as the last resort, a Christian cannot attempt to remain neutral because of worry over possible guilt. Traditional church teaching provides neither direct answers nor guidelines for all possible situations. In their consciences and in the sight of God, Christians may reach decisions that involve them in fighting an obsolete, unjust, and unlivable political, economic, and social system.

711

Pearson, Roy. THE DILEMMA OF FORCE. Saturday review, v. 51, Feb. 10, 1968: 24, 55.
Z1219.S25, v. 51

One of the major points of disagreement between the proponents of total war and advocates of immediate negotiations is the seemingly obvious effectiveness of military force. The popular notion that an enemy hit hard will eventually give up is, however, wrong. "Reliance on force is always unreliable," not because the opponent may be superior but because force embraces elements of its own annihilation. It destroys itself directly, in the sense that power corrupts, and limitless power generates limitless corruption and kills itself indirectly by begetting its own killers. The use of force treats the symptoms and only rarely the causes. A foe crushed by force is only prevented, not persuaded; frustrated, he will return to his old ways as soon as he can, even more determined and eager to avenge his humiliation. Thus force breeds its own destruction. The inability of force to hit at the guilty without involving the innocent is multiplied in nuclear warfare. Considering its ghastly certainties the "impossibility of associating righteousness with the instrumentality of armed force" becomes unavoidable.

712

Preece, R. J. C. THE BERLIN WALL--A PROBLEM IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION. Contemporary review, v. 212, Jan. 1968: 20-24.
AP4. C7, v. 212

Conflicts viewed as ideological defy solution; if on the other hand they are seen as practical differences, resolution may be achieved. The Americans have apparently learned and applied this lesson, but in the matter of the Berlin Wall no amount of dispassion seems feasible for them. Yet certainly East Germany has a position that could be understood by Westerners, thus perhaps leading to an easing of the Berlin situation. Why was the wall built? The answer is relatively simple--to halt the damaging and disastrous flow of refugees to the West. To the East Germans these refugees seemed not heroic but ungrateful. They had been raised and trained, in many instances under government subsidy, by one state, and they immediately fled to another in order to reap the benefits of higher wages and a higher standard of living. How different is this situation from the much-deplored British "brain drain"? The economic disparities between East and West Germany were exacerbated by other factors, such as black-marketeering and currency smuggling, as well. Probably even now some arrangement could be made between East and West in order to do away with the wall, but if the West's "real interest is in the propaganda benefits of the wall . . . ." In any case the wall has served its purpose, and the East Germans may soon pull it down. Among the world's industrial nations East Germany now ranks 10th. Its existence is unquestionable, and despite Western disapproval of its form of government, this is its choice and should be recognized. The German Democratic Republic naturally must bear much of the blame for the killings and atrocities at the wall, but the West must shoulder its share, for it could have "acted politically prior to 1961, and not scored childish debating points."

713

Vilmar, Fritz. [FUNCTIONS OF MILITARISM IN THE LATE STAGES OF CAPITALISM] Funktionen des Militarismus im Spätkapitalismus. Atomzeitalter, Oct./Nov. 1967: 565-574, 638-651.
P&GP RR

293-980 O - 68 - 5

Title varies: Atomzeitalter; Information und Meinung.
Abbreviated version of a new chapter for the third edition of Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus (Armament and Disarmament in the Late Stages of Capitalism), which will be published soon.

Socioeconomic analysis of the "militarization" of Western society, which was effected by the East-West arms race. Vilmar stresses the adverse results of militarization and armaments on democratic processes and on the further development of democratic institutions in modern capitalist society.

4. Other

714
Bertram, Hellmut. [DO ANTIMISSILES MAKE SENSE?] Haben Antiraketen einen Sinn? Flugwelt, v. 19, Dec. 1967: 807-809. illus.
TL503. F626, v. 19

The accuracy of long-range and intercontinental missiles [ICM] has an important bearing on their possessor's nuclear retaliation capability. The more accurate they are, the less payload they require to destroy targets and the smaller and lighter they can be, thus making for easier launching from ships, aircraft, and satellites. Such mobile bases have an incomparably greater chance for survival of an enemy first strike than permanent bases. Present technology theoretically allows extremely high ICM accuracy, but unsatisfactory intelligence about the location of targets makes attainment of such high efficacy difficult. Despite their drawbacks, ICM's constitute a formidable threat to modern defense; their rapidly growing technological sophistication dramatically improves their efficacy. High manufacturing costs may temporarily check the availability of the improved ICM in quantity, but, after the inevitable trend toward decreasing production costs sets in, the number of highly sophisticated ICM's to be had "will be practically illimitable." A party threatened by these ICM's has two alternatives: one political, the other military. Politically, it can either seek relaxation of tensions or yield to pressure. Militarily, it can try to acquire an equally strong deterrent or build adequate defenses against hostile ICM's. The military path is easier because it depends on a unilateral "initiative" rather than a bilateral one. Traditionally "defense minded," the Soviet Union rejected an American proposal that the two powers eschew building up antimissile defense systems in order to check a costly arms race that would add nothing to their security. The system the Russians were building to protect Moscow and Leningrad was obsolete in view of the sophisticated, American offensive ICM's. But at that time the Russians were also developing a new, effective one. They had found that nuclear detonations at altitudes of over 100 kilometers produce X-rays that can put out of commission delicate conduits in missiles flying at those altitudes and that this damaging radiation can stretch over hundreds of kilometers. The full significance of this fact was quickly grasped by the Americans, who decided on the basis of the Soviet revelation to build their own (Nike-X) antimissile defense system. Europeans can hardly draw any lesson for themselves from the American experience, since Soviet missiles attacking Western Europe will not fly at such high altitudes. Yet the more security America will draw from its Nike-X system after it is built, the more secure will Europe be too.

715
Brennan, D. G., and Johan J. Holst. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE: TWO VIEWS. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. 36 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 43) U162. A3, no. 43

Discussion of the postdeployment policy issues in ballistic missile defense [BMD]. Brennan asserts that in certain circumstances an American BMD would make sense and attempts to present a balanced view of a topic that has received a good deal of one-sided criticism. Current estimates indicate the ratio of the cost of offsetting offensive forces to the cost of the defenses that are offset is roughly one to one. Thus, given a choice, a country may prefer to spend money on reducing its own casualties rather than on increasing its kill power. The superpowers can reach an agreement to freeze offensive forces in order to head off an offensive-defensive arms race. After a consideration of the impact of the BMD on deterrence of general nuclear war, public opinion, the China threat, and national bargaining power he concludes that eventually BMD will no longer be seen as the "invention of the devil" but may be recognized by both East and West as an important contribution to their strategic posture. Holst examines the possible West European reaction to the deployment of BMD by the United States and the Soviet Union. He feels that, although Europeans would naturally be apprehensive at the uncertainties introduced by the superpower deployment of BMD, it would not necessarily destabilize the political or strategic situation in Europe. BMD would not reestablish a world system of strict bipolarity based on superpower dominance, and it could discourage new members from entering the nuclear weapons club. Holst expresses the European concern that BMD would adversely affect arms control measures and damage the Atlantic alliance. He concludes that the current strategic doctrine, based on fixed levels of assured destruction, could be revised to avoid an uncontrollable arms race in a BMD world.

716
Butz, J. S. THE CASE FOR THE DEFENSE. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Nov. 1967: 44-48. illus.
UG633. A65, v. 50

The U.S. decision to deploy a thin version of the Nike-X ABM system is not part of a vast military-industrial plot as its critics would lead the public to believe but is a necessary step in developing a balanced offensive-defensive force aimed at deterring enemy action. Until approval was given for the Nike-X, U.S. nuclear strategy had been based upon maintaining a strong offensive force with overwhelming counterattack capabilities. Proponents of the all-offensive nuclear policy contended that the ABM was unnecessary as it could not provide a foolproof guarantee against an unacceptable degree of devastation from an attack and it would generate a new arms race by forcing the enemy to install more attack missiles. However, a second nuclear strategy concept has developed which considers missile defense beneficial because it would protect U.S. cities from an attack by an unsophisticated missile force belonging to a new nuclear power such as China, reduce damage to U.S. cities in the event of nuclear

war, and reinforce the deterrent against an aggressor by introducing a damage limitation factor. With or without U.S. deployment of the ABM the 20-year Soviet-American arms race would continue to be spurred on by revolutionary scientific advances in both offensive and defensive weaponry. The solution to the nuclear dilemma lies not in maintaining the status quo but in working toward a settlement of U.S.-Soviet differences or achieving a technical breakthrough comparable to the first nuclear weapon.

717
Chen, Shao-hsien. THE PRESENT SITUATION OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS. West & East, v. 12, Aug. 1967: 1-4. Orien Chi Kor

Several events of the past few months have renewed tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. When the American destroyer U.S.S. Walker bumped against a Russian warship during naval operations in the Japan Sea last April, both sides claimed provocation by the other. Shortly thereafter the U.S. Government rejected a Soviet request to purchase a midget submarine, and the limited U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space matters was curtailed. The writings of Svetlana Alliueva aroused Russian accusations of an American campaign to defame the Soviet Union. In spite of the importance both sides originally placed on the American-Soviet consular treaty, the Supreme Soviet has so far not approved it. Even though neither country became directly involved in the Arab-Israeli War, their conflicting policies regarding the Middle East crisis enhanced the cold war tension. The United States advocated respect for national political independence and territorial integrity and a restriction of the arms race in the Arab region. The Soviets demanded restitution for the Arabs and withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territory and encouraged continued belligerency on the part of the Arabs by giving them military aid. Although President Johnson realized that the Soviets had to take an uncompromising stand in dealing with the United States on the Middle East question in order to retain Arab friendship, he felt it would be worthwhile to approach Kosygin for a person-to-person discussion on the Vietnam problem. However, the Glassboro conference yielded no progress toward a Vietnam peace settlement; afterwards Kosygin told reporters that until the United States halted its aggression against the Vietnamese people there would be no end to the war, and Johnson stated that North Vietnam still was not willing to join the United States at the conference table. In the absence of North Vietnamese reaction to U.S. peace moves, the United States has begun stepping up its military activities in Vietnam.

718
EAST-WEST VISITS: AEC DECLINES TO RELAX RULES FOR 200-BEV LAB. Science, v. 159, Jan. 19, 1968: 289-290. Q1.S35, v. 159

American scientists have made little progress in persuading the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] to liberalize its policies on the visits of scientists from Communist countries to AEC's national accelerator laboratories. With the exception of a few installations where the laboratory director may admit "surprise" visitors from the Eastern-bloc countries, the AEC retains the right to pass on any visits by Soviet or East European scientists. The AEC's refusal to admit Communist visitors has often been a source of embarrassment to American scientists, who hoped to set a new precedent by obtaining approval to open the new AEC 200-Bev National Accelerator Laboratory to all visitors. However, the AEC does not agree with the majority of particle physicists, who "seem to feel that the best route to East-West cooperation is through openness on this side of the relationship," and remains steadfast in retaining its authority to regulate visits.

719
FALLOUT SHELTER SURVEY: CIVIL DEFENSE SAYS THERE IS NO PLACE LIKE HOME. Science, v. 158, Nov. 17, 1967: 894-895. Q1.S35, v. 158

During FY 1968 the Office of Civil Defense [OCD] plans to spend about one-third of its $86.1 million budget for the fallout shelter program; the remaining funds will go toward the operation of the civil defense warning and communications system, research, training, dissemination of information, and local civil defense operations. By the end of last year the OCD had located shelter space in large existing structures for 155 million people and is now concentrating on its State surveys of protection space in private homes. The surveys are being conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census at the request of the Governors of the States and are designed to advise homeowners how they can modify their basements to obtain maximum protection from radiation. Since most of the homes in the South lack basements, OCD is conducting a community shelter program in that area. Civil defense officials are also attempting to persuade owners of new construction projects to voluntarily include shelter space.

720
Ferguson, James. PROVIDING THE MEANS TO MEET AGGRESSION--AT ANY LEVEL. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Nov. 1967: 90-93. UG633.A65, v. 50

The Air Force Systems Command [AFSC] must work closely with the aerospace industry to adapt modern technology to meet immediate and future defense requirements. In order to respond to a constantly changing environment, the AFSC maintains an organizational flexibility. Recently it established the post of Director of Laboratories by combining the Research and Technology Division with the former Deputy Chief of Staff-Technology, created a Deputy Chief of Staff-Operations, and combined the Space Systems Division with the Ballistic Systems Division to form the Space and Missile Systems Organization. It works closely with other Government agencies in support of long-range national space objectives and cooperates with operational commands to apply the fruits of research to short-term problems. It has particularly endeavored to identify and solve any problems in Southeast Asia that lend themselves to "quick-fix" solutions. Since the AFSC recognizes that its research and development program must meet the challenges of future limited wars, it is supporting aircraft research, electronic innovations, and space communications systems that could be adapted to limited-war situations. In partnership with industry the AFSC hopes to maintain a feasible and effective program for keeping the Air Force technologically up to date.

721
Gomer, Robert. THE ABM DECISION. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 23, Nov. 1967: 29.
TK9145.A84, v. 23

The decision to deploy a "thin" ABM system was a victory for the military-industrial complex and was justified in terms of political rather than military expediency. It is difficult to believe that the Chinese, supposedly the reason behind it all, will attack the United States with the knowledge that they will be annihilated in return. Although this system can (and most likely will) be enlarged in the hope of making it damage-denying, such a move would elicit a Russian response and start a new arms race. Already a serious attempt is being made by the superpowers to achieve a deterrent advantage. While the capability to wipe out a country seven times over has been deemed enough by "rational" strategists, "there may never again be 'enough'" for the superpowers. Once this psychosis catches on (it may have already) and the arms race continues to spiral, the voices of peace and reason in our nation will succumb in an atmosphere of fear and political and emotional siege. The "thin" ABM system will lead to a heavy system, in reaction to not very acute threats, while the real threats in our world--hunger and poverty--remain unanswered.

722
Hennig, Eike. [CRITICISM OF MILITARISM AND THE ARMAMENT SOCIETY] Militarismuskritik und Rüstungsgesellschaft. Atomzeitalter, no. 11, Nov. 1967: 623-637. P&GP RR

Considers changes in the relations between the military establishment and civil industry leadership in modern capitalist society. In his extensively documented treatise the author discusses socioeconomic effects of the interdependence of the civil and defense industries and some problems and findings of disarmament research carried out by the United Nations. Also given is a historical review of the concept of militarism.

723
Matsumoto, Teruo. I WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ATOMIC BLAST IN HIROSHIMA. Military medicine, v. 132, Sept. 1967: 741-746.
RD1.A7, v. 132

A first-person account of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima by a captain in the U.S. Army Medical Corps, then a Hiroshima schoolboy.

724
Mordvinova, R., and A. Nazarenko. [THE NEED FOR SPECIAL SKILLS] Nuzhny spetsial'nye znaniia. Voennye znaniia, v. 43, Nov. 1967: 30-31.
U4.V874, v. 43

The Soviet Union's medical civil defense workers are responsible for organizing protection from irradiation among patients and service personnel. In the past, inadequate training in radiation protection, including the effects of terrain, has caused errors. Very often in civil defense training only measures such as construction of shelters and covering of doorways and windows are considered. But organization of dosimetric control means, distribution of food in shelters and at reception points for the injured, and maintenance of sanitation in the contaminated area should also be included. A handbook on radiation is a necessity for medical workers.

725
Nielsen, Walter. [THE ABM DILEMMA--ALTERNATIVES AND CONSEQUENCES] Das ABM-Dilemma--Alternativen und Konsequenzen. Aussenpolitik, v. 18, Sept.-Oct. 1967: 547-556, 612-620.
D839.A885, v. 18

Motivated by its cost effectiveness philosophy in regard to armaments the United States had hesitated to build an ABM defense system in the belief that it would prevent an all-out Soviet-American arms race and retain its 3 to 1 nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. "A component of the American détente strategy," the cost effectiveness theory has a serious drawback: Its practical application depends each time on the adversary's behavior. Thus after Moscow's rejection of the American suggestion of a bilateral moratorium on ABM systems, the United States can ill afford not to follow suit and build its own. The Soviet decision may have stemmed partly from Moscow's conviction that the Soviet Union had developed an ABM system effective enough to give it strategic superiority over the United States, or it may have been motivated by the need to neutralize the threat from secondary nuclear powers. The deployment and eventual perfection of ABM systems may strongly affect the existing Soviet-American parallelism of interests in regard to their respective military blocs, their respective territories' status as sanctuaries, and the "nuclear interzones"--the nonnuclear members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, who are concerned that they will be victims of a conflict between the superpowers.

726
Schumann, Hartmut. [CIVIL GAIN FROM TECHNOLOGICAL DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT] Der zivile Nutzen wehrtechnischer Forschung und Entwicklung. Wehrkunde, v. 16, Nov. 1967: 565-570.
U3.W396, v. 16

Article based on the author's research at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

In the opinion of its critics, the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty would strongly impair a nonnuclear signatory's freedom to carry out peaceful nuclear programs. For the existing technological difference between the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy is merely an insignificant mechanical process of a supplemental nature. Some experts believe a nation that eschews military nuclear programs would be forgoing their spinoff effect on its civil industry and thus reducing its potential for economic growth. Doubtless, U.S. defense spending, which includes enormous investment by the Government in research and development [R&D] and other activities not specifically connected with defense but nonetheless motivated by national security, has brought to civil industry considerable progress free or for a fraction of what it would otherwise have cost. A single byproduct of defense R&D, the computer, has revolutionized all of industry. But the ratio of important innovations originated in defense R&D and utilized by civil industry to costs of defense R&D is extremely small. Apparently the best means of technological economic prog-

ress is directly through civil industry. Exploiting new technology from defense R&D takes time, which decreases the value of defense R&D for the national economy still further. But Amitai Etzioni's view that defense R&D is a burden on a country rather than a stimulus for economic growth "does not rest on precise economic considerations." His advice to cut defense R&D as much as possible in the interest of the optimal GNP "cannot be accepted as an abstract rule," because its value depends on given economic situations. For Leonard S. Silk, on the other hand, defense R&D itself is technological progress, which stimulates economic growth in a number of ways. The truth lies somewhere between these views. Will civil industry be able to perform so well "without a military stimulus"? The answer to that question must be negative. Civil industry is not in a position to define technological objectives beyond normal business efficiency. From the economic standpoint, technological innovation is not innovation until it yields profits. Private industry alone probably would not be able to raise the necessary means for projects as large as the Oak Ridge one, for instance.

727

US TO ESTABLISH ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM AGAINST CHINA. Survey of China mainland press, no. 4027, Sept. 25, 1967: 30-31.
DS777.55.U52, 1967

Hsin hua t'ung hsün shê [New China News Agency] release, English, Peking, Sept. 20, 1967.
DS777.55.H656, 1967

The decision by the U.S. imperialists to establish a Chinese-oriented ABM system is a further step in their nuclear blackmail of the revolutionary peoples of the world. While trying to make a deal to limit the deployment of nuclear weapons against each other, the U.S. and Soviet Governments are collaborating in an anti-Chinese military alliance. However, the Chinese people are proud of their brilliant nuclear achievements which broke the atomic monopoly and incurred the wrath of the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists. They have faced up to the U.S.-Soviet nuclear big stick before and will not be intimidated now.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

728
Deutsch, Eberhard P. A JUDICIAL PATH TO WORLD PEACE. American Bar Association journal, v. 53, Dec. 1967: 1115-1120. LL

Traces the rule of law concept from natural law governing people to international law governing nations--from the Athenian philosophers of 2,500 years ago to the International Court of Justice today. So far, however, this forum's contribution to world peace by judicial settlement of international disputes has been thwarted by an almost universal unwillingness of countries to surrender their sovereignty. Under the U.N. Charter every member has actually given up part of its sovereignty, and under article 93, "all members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice." Yet misgivings about the impartiality of the judges and fears of invasion of domestic frontiers by international organs result in a negligible use of the Court. Nations would be less reluctant to entrust their controversies to the Court for adjudication if they had reasonable assurance of the tribunal's nonpolitical character. Two years ago the American Bar Association suggested amending the Statute of the International Court of Justice to give the Court jurisdiction over all members of the United Nations; it also called for internationalized judges with life tenure as well as for the prohibition of invasion of the domestic jurisdiction of states appearing before the Court. Adoption of these revisions would bring about "an ultimately acceptable tribunal for the impartial juridical adjudication of justiciable international controversies for which solution could not be found in the diplomatic forum" and would be a meaningful step toward international peace and security.

729
Doehring, Karl. [PEOPLES' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION ACCORDING TO THE DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PREVAILING IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker aus der Sicht der herrschenden Völkerrechtslehre der DDR. Staat. Zeitschrift für Staatslehre, öffentliches Recht und Verfassungsgeschichte, v. 6, no. 3, 1967: 355-366. LL

A review of Rudolf Arzinger's Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht im allgemeinen Völkerrecht der Gegenwart [The right to self-determination in contemporary general international law], (Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1966.) 465 p. JX4054.A7

For Arzinger, an exponent of the East German official doctrine on international law, the raison d'être of people's right to self-determination is "socialism." This right therefore is nothing but the right to realization of working-class rule. In Germany the bearers of that right are not all the German people together but the two German peoples separately, one in the German Democratic Republic and the other in West Germany. This position deviates, however, from classical Communist teachings on what makes a people a "nation"; i.e., the bearer of the right to self-determination and consequently to national independence. Arzinger contends that the very existence of two contradictory social systems in Germany makes the right of self-determination for the entire German people an illusion. The execution of such an all-German right would mean outvoting of the people of one German state by the people of the other. This would be a clear violation of the former's right to self-determination under contemporary international law, the East Germans insist. In their view the right to self-determination of the entire German people will be a delusion until all Germany becomes "Socialist." In the meantime, they point out, the closest possible thing to German reunification would be a confederation of the two German states.

730
Firmage, Edwin B. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO "INTERNAL WAR." Utah law review, v. 1967, Dec. 1967: 517-546. LL

Reviews the tensions, provocations, and violence of the past two decades and points out the radical change in warfare since 1945. While large-scale international wars seem improbable due to the restraining effect of nuclear weapons, aggression within national borders continues. It is essential to the future of international order as well as in the interest of the United States that a civil war between disputing nationalist forces be distinguished from "an attempt by a Communist state to depose the non-Communist government of another state by some form of exported violence." It is equally vital that a suitable means to combat other forms of aggression be found and that the "nature of the violence and the identity of the participants" be properly understood before the course of action is chosen. The author analyzes these problems in the case of Vietnam, explains the U.S. Department of State position and that of its critics, and outlines the classic formula for a protracted war of attrition, giving a chronological account of escalation and assessing the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam.

731
Gerlach, Axel. [INTERVENTION; AN ATTEMPT AT DEFINITION] Die Intervention; Versuch einer Definition. Hamburg [Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg] In Kommission beim Alfred Metzner Verlag, Franfurt am Main und Berlin, 1967. 257 p. (Varia iuris publici, Bd. 47) JX4481.G53
Bibliography: p. 215-255.

Partial contents.--Pt. 1. History of intervention and of the definition of intervention. Machiavelli. Bodin. Grotius. Development from the 18th century

to World War II. Vattel's work. The "Holy Alliance." The Monroe Doctrine. Comparison of definitions and their appraisal.--Pt. 2. The meaning of intervention in modern international law. The concept of intervention in the law of international organizations: the United Nations Charter; the League of Nations in retrospect. The OAS. Other organizations. The intervention concept in jurisprudence. Need for a new definition.--Pt. 3. The upper limit of intervention: distinction from aggression and war.--Pt. 4. The lower limit of intervention: distinction from permissible political influence. Interference in freedom of decision. Use of absolute force. Use of compulsive force.

Suggests that the international public law adopt some municipal law concepts to be able to deal more adequately with the problem of intervention in relations between states.

732
Holton, Thomas. PEACE IN VIETNAM THROUGH DUE PROCESS: AN UNEXPLORED PATH. American Bar Association journal, v. 54, Jan. 1968: 45-47.
LL

Various efforts to resolve the Vietnam conflict before the U.N. Security Council or through direct U.S.-North Vietnam negotiations have failed. But one road to peace is still unexplored--that of "adjudication by a duly constituted world tribunal." This would permit the United States to withdraw honorably by complying with an order of a recognized world authority and thus demonstrate U.S. respect for the rule of law. The tribunal that could settle the Vietnam dispute is the International Court of Justice in the Hague. The authority of this "truly global bench" of prominent lawyers from 15 countries is based on the U.N. Charter and, in the event of a dispute, the matter of jurisdiction can be settled by decision of the Court itself. The "considerable area of congruence" in the U.S. and North Vietnamese objectives inspires some hope of settlement, but the procedures must be equitable for North Vietnam as well as honorable for the United States. The United States should invite North Vietnam to join it in referring the conflict to the International Court of Justice and then petition the Court for a pos immediate cease-fire order and a decree of settlement. Adjudication is a possible way to peace in Vietnam and to the "settlement of future conflicts through law" as well.

733
Kearney, Richard D. U.S. DISCUSSES DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE LAW OF TREATIES. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 57, Nov. 27, 1967: 719-722. JX232.A33, v. 57
Statement "made in Committee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 20," 1967.

Reiterates U.S. support for efforts toward codifying and developing international law, particularly that relating to treaty law, and comments on the International Law Commission's draft articles relating to treaties. Ambassador Kearney, the U.S. member of the International Law Commission, considers the adoption of a Convention on the Law of Treaties highly important to the development of international law.

734
Kirsten, Johannes. [THE SOVIET UNION--PROMOTER OF CODIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TREATIES] Die Sowjetunion--Förderer der Kodifikation des völkerrechtlichen Vertragsrechts. Staat und Recht, v. 16, Nov. 1967: 1821-1831.
LL

In 1968 the United Nations is to convoke an international conference of states to consider the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties worked out by the International Law Commission [I.L.C.]. The present analysis confines itself to those aspects of the Soviet contribution to the drafting of the proposed law of treaties which are of special import for the German Democratic Republic's foreign policy. In 1962, an I.L.C. Rapporteur, [Sir Humphrey] Waldock, proposed that a distinction be made between dependent and independent states, with denial of a full treaty-making capacity to some states. The Soviet delegate, Prof. G. I. Tunkin, pointed out the incompatibility of such a system with the principle of national self-determination. At the 17th session of the I.L.C. in 1966 the Soviet delegate, refuting the British position, called for adoption of a universal rule based on equality of rights. This was done. A related problem is the question of the treatymaking powers of a federal union's component states. The Soviet delegate pointed out that only the provisions of a federal constitution determine such a capacity and that such practice is consistent with the principle of the equality of states. The Soviet view prevailed in the final draft articles. In regard to a general multilateral treaty, --one which concerns general norms of international law or deals with matters of general interest to states as a whole--the controversy concerned the relation of the principle of freedom to make treaties to the principle of universality--the right and duty of all states to engage in peaceful international cooperation. Overstating the first principle, the imperialist delegates proposed rules that in effect would make it difficult for the German Democratic Republic to join general multilateral treaties and broad international organizations. The Soviet delegate stressed that harmony between the two principles requires these treaties to be open to all states. Because of the West's unyielding position the I.L.C. refrained from drafting the article on general multilateral treaties and referred the matter to the U.N. General Assembly for decision. In regard to the functions of a treaty's depositary the Soviet delegate maintained that these are international in character and should be performed with total impartiality. This view was accepted by the I.L.C. and embodied in the final draft articles.

735
Kröger, Herbert. [THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND BONN'S DELUSION OF A ROLLBACK. BONN'S "EASTERN POLICY" CONTRAVENES THE LESSONS OF HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW] 50 Jahre Oktoberrevolution und der Bonner Roll-back-Wahn. Bonner "Ostpolitik" im Widerstreit zu den Lehren der Geschichte und zum internationalen Recht. Staat und Recht, v. 16, Oct. 1967: 1642-1658. LL

Contends that the West German Eastern policy violates the principles of international relations and international law, especially those principles that evolved from, or developed under, the influence of "the Great October Revolution" and socialism. Kroger ascribes to West Germany plans to roll back "socialism" and change the status quo in Europe. Friendship pacts and mutual assistance between the Socialist states "use international law and its development as an effective means in the struggle" against West German imperialism.

736
Lissitzyn, Oliver J. TREATIES AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES (REBUS SIC STANTIBUS). American journal of international law, v. 61, Oct. 1967: 895-922.
LL

Analyzes the treatment of the rebus sic stantibus clause by a draft convention on the law of treaties (Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties) formulated in 1966 by the International Law Commission. The Commission faced the problem of reconciling that clause, a fundamental principle of international law, with another fundamental principle, Pacta sunt servanda (treaties are to be kept). The draft articles suggest two distinct policy norms for delineating the scope of the two principles. Lissitzyn doubts that in the continued absence of an effective international judicature a policy of the community of nations that is in favor of rebus sic stantibus, "if there be one, can ever be translated into a formulated norm of general international law." Under such circumstances "the actual outcome of controversies will continue to be determined more by political than by legal considerations."

737
Mallison, W. T. THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE JURIDICAL CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS. George Washington law review, v. 36, Dec. 1967: 308-346.
LL

Appraises the laws of war as instruments to control the violence and destruction to human and material values caused by international military conflicts. Effective laws of war, embodying a compromise between humanitarianism and military necessity, must also include some measure of enforcement--otherwise the label "law" is rather illusory. Although the laws of war can be used to provide at least a minimum standard of protection to humanity even in an era of nuclear weapons, additional measures must be taken to improve world order; prevention of general wars and effective juridical control, of limited conflicts are not enough. The first step in building optimum world order is maintenance of the present--however imperfect--world order system.

738
Schwarzkopf, Dietrich. [THE IDEA OF THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE. AN ELEMENT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S NEW EASTERN POLICY] Die Idee des Gewaltverzichts. Ein Element der neuen Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Dec. 25, 1967: 893-900.
D839.E86, v. 22

Studies the December 13, 1966, renunciation by Bonn of the use of force toward Germany's eastern neighbors. Schwarzkopf analyses the declaration in international legal terms from the standpoint of existing schools of thought, from the Soviet view, among others.

739
Steiniger, Peter A. [THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION HAS CREATED A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW] Oktoberrevolution schuf neues Völkerrecht. Einheit, v. 22, no. 10/11, 1967: 1328-1340.
HX6.E4, v. 22

The main contributions by the Soviet Union to international law are respect for, and application of, the principles of self-determination of peoples, equality of states, and national sovereignty. As long as capitalist states still exist, international law comprises two contradictory sets of rules, the Socialist and the capitalist. Expansion of the Socialist rules depends on the strength and cohesion of the Socialist camp, on development of solidarity between Socialist states and "democratic nation-states," and on the success of the world-wide struggle for peace and collective security.

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

740
Bailey, Gerald. UNITED NATIONS--DECLINE AND FALL? Socialist commentary, Jan. 1968: 5-7.
HX3.S74, 1968

The 2d regular session of the U.N. General Assembly cannot boast any notable achievement; it merely performed the functions expected of it, and that is not enough to dispel apprehensions about its future among U.N. opponents as well as its dedicated supporters. While its sudden expiration is unlikely, a gradual decline of U.N. influence is not, and the end, however slow, could come just the same. The tendency to bypass the United Nations has been increasing, and a rapid devaluation of the organization in the public eye is clearly apparent--for a number of reasons. First, U.N. membership today is 123 compared to 51 in 1945, but business is still conducted in "committees of the whole" with each of the 123 members speaking, in theory, on every issue. Then there is the gap between the real power and the voting power of the small U.N. members; although they need a great deal from the United Nations, their financial contribution to the organization is insignificant, and yet "by sheer weight of numbers" they can determine policies for the United Nations as a whole. These microstates should not be denied the right to sovereignty, but a distinction should be made between this right and the right to full U.N. membership--a revision of the criteria for membership proposed by U Thant in his annual report would benefit both the organization and the small states as well. The third factor impairing U.N. influence is the increasing tendency of the General Assembly to commit the organization to policies which cannot be carried out. The Assembly has a duty to express the conscience of the world on matters which defy the Charter's basic principles, yet precise commitments should be pledged only when there is a "reasonable chance" that they can be honored. The most serious U.N. shortcoming is, however, its inability as a peacemaker to anticipate and forestall conflicts in this nuclear age when an effective system of preventing wars is more than imperative. But against these weaknesses stands the U.N. record of positive achievements in economic, social, and humanitarian fields--and the very fact that statesmen convene makes the world "a marginally safer place," which is a good reason for wishing the United Nations "reformed, strengthened--and saved."

741
Bailey, Sidney D. VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1968. 66 p. (International conciliation, no. 566) JX1907.A8, no. 566

Reviews the record of the veto in the United Nations Security Council since 1946, the variety of cases in which the veto has been applied, and the attempts made to curtail its use. In the first two decades the

U.S.S.R. used the veto 104 times, France four times, the United Kingdom twice, and China once. Today the Council, increased to 15 members, is more representative, and its role in keeping the peace has been enhanced in many ways. Its responsibilities may further increase if a nuclear nonproliferation treaty is adopted and proposals that armed forces be placed at the Council's disposal are considered. The concluding chapter stresses the importance of "preliminary consultation to avoid inviting unnecessary exercise of the veto."

742
Bargman, Abraham. CAN THE U.N. ACT ON VIETNAM? War/peace report, v. 7, Oct. 1967: 12-13.
P&GP RR

"Can the United Nations have a role in bringing the Vietnam hostilities to an end?" Many Americans are frustrated by the failure of the United Nations to exert its influence in the Vietnam conflict either through the Security Council or the General Assembly. Although the Secretary General has kept the Organization in the picture through his private diplomacy, he has not succeeded in restricting the conflict. Because of political considerations the Security Council has been unable to implement the charter provisions for settling disputes. However, the General Assembly could attempt to influence the political attitudes of the combatants by issuing a counsel of moderation. Even a modest effort, such as a recommendation to the Security Council to reconsider the Vietnam question, could help promote peace by making the Assembly a focal point for the public expression of concern over the danger implicit in the war's continuation.

743
Eden, Sir Anthony. FREE "DANGEROUSLY" AT ODDS NOW. Freedom & union, v. 22, Nov. 1967: 8.
JX1901.F6, v. 22

The leading Western nations and the strong Pacific powers should unite in an organization to determine in an orderly fashion their global defense strategy and aid programs. At the moment the free nations are wasting valuable time and resources by not coordinating their political and economic efforts to fight Communist expansionism. Smaller countries would be less likely to participate in an arms race if they were assured of the protection of a strong union of free nations. It is time for the leaders of the free world to forget their international rivalries and share the responsibility for finding solutions to the world's problems.

744
Furniss, Edgar S. WESTERN ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION. International studies quarterly, v. 11, Dec. 1967: 339-352.
D839.B2, v. 11

Decries military cooperation within the Western alliance as minimal and economic cooperation as downright dismal. NATO is merely an alliance and not a "collective security system" able to smooth frictions between its members or solidify links to make frictions impossible. As an international system the alliance "needs infused vitality" which cannot come from larger stockpiles of weapons, development of new weapons, or intricate systems of supervision. The author discusses forms of participation and sponsorship, stressing that the alliance is not an end in itself and should not be "confused with the goals to be attained thereby." It cannot be developed on a "quasi-monopoly of authority or of cost." All must subscribe; all must receive. A viable alliance must contribute to peace and welfare; technological cooperation will allow it to attack two of mankind's greatest evils--poverty and ignorance. "Only lack of imagination" and not lack of money hampers a dramatic revitalization of the alliance. American thinking about the Western alliance, too, is in need of change. A U.S. pledge of "not power for its own sake" but vigor to further peace, freedom, and welfare among nations should be applied to the Western alliance, "signed in Washington, made possible by the United States, and kept alive by American strength."

745
Hatfield, Mark O. UNITED NATIONS: VOLUNTEERS FOR PEACE. Vital speeches of the day, v. 34, Oct. 15, 1967: 7-10. PN6121.V52, v. 34
"Delivered at United Nations 'We Believe' Dinner, New York, September 19, 1967."

Peace can be achieved only through international cooperation, trust, and understanding. It will depend on mobilization of the power of all the peoples of the world to build international cooperation rather than on amendment of the U. N. Charter. The functionalist concept that the United Nations will be able to foster cooperation in sensitive political areas if it is given more social and economic functions is weakened by the concept's encouragement of cooperation between national governments and concentration on "broadening the commitments of these authoritative bodies to the United Nations." The United Nations should go beyond governments to sponsor a greater sense of community among the peoples of the world. This can be done by initiating programs that would specifically relate to the United Nations, involve the lives of influential people, and bring tangible rewards to members. A conference to appraise the United Nations would identify the accomplishments and weaknesses of the organization and anticipate the scope of future world problems. Such a conference could develop a sense of world community by allowing man to realize that all people share common problems.

746
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 19, Nov. 1967: 475-476.
JX351.A3, v. 19

Highlights Canada's role in the functioning of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the occasion of the Agency's 11th General Conference, held in Vienna, September 26 to October 2, 1967. International safeguards received considerable attention at the Conference, in connection with both future safeguards systems that might be needed if a nonproliferation treaty is concluded and existing safeguards arrangements.

747
INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS: A SYMPOSIUM. Iowa law review, v. 53, Oct. 1967: 268-365.
LL

Partial contents.--Human rights enforcement issues of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, by John Huston.--Procedures for international protection of human rights, by John Carey.--

Forcible self-help by states to protect human rights, by Richard B. Lillich.

Papers from a symposium on international procedures to protect human rights, conducted by the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute at Syracuse University in anticipation of the International Human Rights Year in 1968. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been recognized for two decades, yet it still remains just a declaration: There may be agreement on principles, but "practice and enforcement have not kept pace with pronouncements." In the first paper, John Huston discusses the recognition of an international organization's competence in matters of human rights. He admits that the means of guaranteeing these rights were not clearly stipulated in the United Nations Charter, but that its language and history permit the development of effective United Nations "intervention techniques." John Carey categorizes "most of the international organizational strategems" that promote and protect human rights, giving them a rather poor rating and calling for improvement. Richard Lillich points out the permissibility of forcible self-help "only on those rare occasions when the danger to the individuals concerned is imminent and the state whose duty it is to protect them is unable or unwilling to do so"; he analyzes the extent of human rights violation, comments on cases of "invitation to use forcible self-help" and on the degree of coercive measures employed as well as on the motives, other than humanitarian, of the acting state. Recognizing the dangers in coercive practice, he rejects unilateral justification and appeals for "the enhancement of old, and the creation of new, international structures for the protection of human dignity throughout the globe."

748
Millionshchikov, M. JUBILEE PUGWASH CONFERENCE. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, Sept. 25, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 3, 1-3.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, Sept. 25, 1967.
Slav Rm

The Pugwash movement celebrated its 10th birthday at its 17th meeting, which was held this year. The 200 delegates from 40 countries differ in their philosophical and political views, but they are united in their attempts to solve the problems of promoting peace, disarmament, international security, and large-scale scientific cooperation. During debates on the international situation, the scientists from the Soviet bloc demanded the cessation of American aggression in Vietnam, the withdrawal of the Israelis from Arab territories, and the ending of "local wars" designed to justify colonialist attacks on the national liberation movement. The delegates discussed the problem of European security. The statement of the permanent Pugwash Committee emphasizes that all boundaries in today's Europe must be recognized and that both German states must be included in the United Nations. Among other issues the Conference dealt with the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, stressing that "control within the framework of this treaty must be based on a system of guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has been accepted by more than 90 states"; the delegates agreed that technical developments now make it possible to extend the nuclear test ban treaty to underground explosions. It was also proposed that the bottom of the ocean be internationalized and a ban be imposed on its use for military purposes. The question of a treaty prohibiting the use and proliferation of chemical and bacteriological weapons by all governments was also raised. The Conference confirmed a previous plan on the establishment of a scientific fund, which would aid scientists of the developing countries, and acknowledged the need for young, active scientists in the Pugwash movement.

749
Monnet, Jean. ORGANIZING FOR PEACE. European community, no. 108, Dec. 1967/Jan. 1968: 3-4.
HD9525. A2. E52, 1967/68
"Excerpts from remarks on receiving the Family of Man Award."

The problems of international conflict can be solved by a realistic policy of establishing organized equality within common institutions; the Common Market is a first step toward the integration of smaller nations into larger ones. This policy depends on the continued effort of the countries of Europe to achieve union, the economic development of other parts of the world, U.S. approval and help for a uniting Europe, and on the Soviet Union. The United States, the U.S.S.R., and Europe must develop a climate of peace so that "the other nations of the world can achieve their aspirations." The Common Market, for example, identifies a common economic interest among six nations. It is hoped that future relations among these countries will engender a form of political equality. As European unification progresses, the United States and Europe should build common institutions that will enable them to discuss not only economic matters but also international and defense questions.

750
[AN OVERWROUGHT UNITED NATIONS] L'O.N.U. débordée [by] J.G. Perspectives, v. 23, Sept. 23, 1967: [item 1] 2-3. HC10. P4, v. 23

The agenda of the 22nd General Assembly has become a cause for pessimism and disenchantment among the delegates to the United Nations. The Middle East, Vietnam, the admission of Red China, disarmament, and nonproliferation are issues that are given little chance for successful resolution. The solution to these world problems is complicated by the attitude of the superpowers, above all of America. The United States views the United Nations as a platform from which it can impose its own law upon the rest of the world. Hypocrisy is the rule and was most evident during the Arab-Israeli War. The U.N. resolutions of peace represented the dichotomy of superpower foreign policy: peace on the one hand, oil interests on the other. Indeed the only advantage of the United Nations is its indispensability as a forum of expression for all world powers. The disenchantment is particularly alive among the newly independent nations that look to the United Nations for guidance to a progressive material and political world. No man has felt the weight of these issues as much as U Thant, the Secretary-General. In his annual message he pleaded for world peace and the abstinence of the use of force. He emphasized that when force and military rivalries are substituted for cooperation, negotiation, and diplomacy the nightmare of world war III draws dangerously close.

751
Rostow, Eugene V. CONCERT AND CONCILIATION: THE NEXT STAGE OF THE ALLIANCE. NATO letter, v. 15, Nov. 1967: 15-19. illus.
D845. 2. A44, v. 15

The Atlantic alliance is a living organism which can be adapted to changing world conditions. NATO's military mission to deter aggression against Western Europe and North America is still valid, and until the East and West resolve their political differences NATO must maintain a strong military arm. The coming together of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Europe, and the United States will be a long process--one that NATO can greatly facilitate by coordinating a Western campaign of conciliation. Eventually Western Europe may emerge as a strong political unit and assume a more responsible place in world politics. The Atlantic alliance will then tackle the problem of coordinating its members' common interests outside of Europe, and it will probably become involved in a program of economic assistance to developing countries on an entirely new scale. Thus over the years the Atlantic alliance may be transformed into a system of concerted action for the betterment of mankind.

752
Whetten, Lawrence L. PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN DEFINING THE LEGAL STATUS OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. International review of history and political science, v. 4, Dec. 1967: 1-15.
D839.I54, v. 4

Studies the problems of defining the legal status of a new international body joining the community of established organizations. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] case shows that a precise evaluation of global needs and actual international capabilities ought to be made during the legislative period of a new agency's development to avoid delay in its integration into the family of organizations and in the fulfillment of its statutory duties. Such an appraisal would have allowed U. N. members to foresee the long-range implications of their various proposals for the IAEA; their expectations that it would be highly autonomous within the U. N. system were not realized because exposure of the agency to administrative routine soon reduced its "special" status.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

753
Ahmed, Muslaihuddin. THE COST OF PEACEKEEPING. Radical humanist, v. 31, Nov. 5, 1967: 509-510, 512.
DS401.R27, v. 31

Describes U. N. peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and details the cost of maintaining U. N. troops in that area since 1956. When it was formed on November 5, 1956, to patrol the borders between Egypt and Israel, the U. N. Emergency Force [UNEF] consisted of 6,615 men. UNEF was gradually reduced and by 1967, when it was withdrawn from the Gaza strip and Sinai peninsula, it numbered 3,400. During this decade the cost of maintaining UNEF came to $213 million.

754
Bittner, Egon. THE POLICE ON SKID-ROW: A STUDY OF PEACE KEEPING. American sociological review, v. 32, Oct. 1967: 699-715.
HM1.A75, v. 32

Following the distinction proposed by Banton, police work consists of two relatively different activities: "law enforcement" and "keeping the peace." The latter is not determined by a clear legal mandate and does not stand under any system of external control. Instead, it developed as a craft in response to a variety of demand conditions. One such condition is created by the concentration of certain types of persons on skid-row. Patrolmen have a particular conception of the social order of skid-row life that determines the procedures of control they employ. The most conspicuous features of the peace keeping methods used are an aggressively personalized approach to residents, an attenuated regard for questions of culpability, and the use of coercion, mainly in the interest of managing situations rather than persons. (Abstract supplied)

755
Cox, Arthur M. PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING. Washington, Brookings Institution [1967] 178 p.
JX1981.P7C66
Bibliography: p. 167-169.

Partial contents. --Peacekeeping and United States policy. --Soviet policy and practice. --The alternatives to United Nations peacekeeping. --The peacekeepers. --Authorization, financing, and direction. --Prospects for the future.

Examines the problems of international peacekeeping and suggests measures to improve the peacekeeping machinery. Cox feels that the future role of the United Nations in peacekeeping operations depends a good deal upon U. S. and Soviet policy. Both powers should act in the interests of world security, and neither should use the United Nations as an instrument of one-sided interests. In spite of its present imperfections, the United Nations offers the best alternative unilateral action for settling international disputes. "And as the machinery for peacekeeping improves, it should become a progressively more attractive alternative."

756
Fountain, Lawrence H. PEACE KEEPING EMERGENCIES. Vital speeches of the day, v. 34, Jan. 15, 1968: 200-203.
PN6121.V52, v. 34
"Delivered to the United Nations General Assembly, November 28, 1967."

The United Nations is primarily "an impartial and effective guardian of peace" and the responsibility for keeping the peace rests on all--on the collective of sovereign states that honor their political as well as financial commitments for peacekeeping operations. For effective administration of such operations the Secretary General needs "latitude and staff and tools" as well as skilled and well-equipped standby forces. The United States supports the Secretary General's suggestion for a study of standby forces, of the U. N. relationship to governments providing them, and of constitutional as well as financial aspects of employing them. In all peacekeeping matters the United States is ready to help; however, it has specific reservations to the recent proposals for a scale of assessments for peacekeeping operations. It cannot "subscribe to a plan which could require the United States either to pay up to 50 per cent of the cost of any operation that it supported or to opt out entirely." Along with peacekeeping the United Nations should be equally concerned with peacemaking--examining the underlying causes of conflicts and bringing them to settlement. The best peacekeeping machinery, however, will be of little service to peace without political and financial support by all members, rededicated to the hard task of keeping peace.

757
Fountain, Lawrence H. UNITED STATES URGES RENEWED DEDICATION TO U.N. PEACE AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, Jan. 1, 1968: 20-25. JX232. A33, v. 58
Statement "made in the Special Political Committee on Nov. 28," 1967.

Summarizes the U.S. position "on three practical requirements for a workable and durable system of collective action for peacekeeping." Representative Fountain's statement deals with finance, increased responsibility and authority for the Secretary General, and the need for a ready force. The United States urges that a study of peacekeeping forces, with an eye to creating a standby force, be conducted by the Secretary General. Peacemaking--the peaceful settlement of disputes--is an integral part of peacekeeping, according to Congressman Fountain.

758
Gagnon, Mona H. PEACE FORCES AND THE VETO: THE RELEVANCE OF CONSENT. International organization, v. 21, autumn 1967: 812-836. JX1901.I55, v. 21

Finding a formula for peacekeeping activities acceptable to all major factions in the United Nations is not a semantic problem: the problem is to find a way of operating that would be effective, "guaranteed harmless to the interests of the Great Powers," and consistent with the U.N. Charter, which grants the power of recommendation to the General Assembly and that of action to the Security Council. An attempt to meet these criteria was made in the formula devised for the Suez peace operation and used also in the Congo and on Cyprus. The formula's three principles are consent to the operation by the parties to the dispute, U.N. nonintervention in their domestic affairs, and nonuse of force by the United Nations except in self-defense. Yet nations will not act together to serve international interest that are basically opposed to national interests. A planned peace operation can be vetoed by a Great Power in the Security Council and will then have little chance of gaining authorization in the General Assembly. Thus U.N. peacekeeping operations will neither settle disputes nor foster their solutions as long as the major powers cannot agree on the terms of peace and justice. Still, the United Nations can, through its peacekeeping operations, accomplish what no state or alliance of states can do: step between the disputing parties if they at least consent to suspension of fighting and, interposing a neutral force, act as a buffer and a symbol of authority.

759
Hudson, Richard. THE U.N. AND THE MIDDLE EAST. War/peace report, v. 7, June/July 1967: 3-6. P&GP RR

"What is the meaning of the Middle East war for the future of the U.N.?" Nasser's demands for the removal of the U.N. Emergency Force [UNEF] from Egyptian soil and the subsequent blocking of the Strait of Tiran precipitated the crisis. Regardless of their denials the Israelis probably launched a preemptive attack on the Arabs after realizing that strong pressures from either the United States or the United Nations to open the Gulf of Aqaba were not forthcoming. U.N. Secretary General U Thant was severely criticized for his prompt withdrawal of UNEF. Recalling Dag Hammarskjöld's resurrected "aide memoire" suggesting that Nasser understood U.N. troops would not be withdrawn unless the General Assembly decided that the task of UNEF was completed, critics at first felt that U Thant could have avoided war. However, it was later apparent that U Thant had no alternative but to pull the U.N. forces out of Egypt since Hammarskjöld's "good faith" agreement with Nasser did not provide any specific limitations on Egypt's right to request the withdrawal of UNEF, and the General Assembly did not have the authority to "request the United Nations Emergency Force to be stationed or to operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the government of the country." Because UNEF was established under Chapter VI of the U.N. charter, which permits the United Nations to ask countries to voluntarily settle disputes peacefully, it can exist only on a voluntary basis in the countries involved. A more effective method of achieving world order is summarized in the following proposal: "Binding and enforceable peacekeeping decisions would be made by a special [U.N.] Peacekeeping Majority [PKM], which would consist of three elements: 1) a majority of any nine of the 15 members of the Security Council, 2) a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, and 3) inclusion in the Assembly majority nations representing a majority of the population of the world." Under this proposal nations could have sought workable solutions, not just propaganda victories, during the Middle East crisis. Although difficulties can arise in achieving a compromise acceptable to the PKM, at least machinery to make binding decisions would exist. The PKM plan for a world authority may not be suitable at this time, but discussions should begin now regarding steps toward a more effective decisionmaking process for peacekeeping.

760
Lefever, Ernest W. THE LIMITS OF U.N. INTERVENTION IN THE THIRD WORLD. Review of politics, v. 30, Jan. 1968: 3-18. JA1.R4, v. 30

Uses the Congo operation as a case to demonstrate the "severe limits of the United Nations as an instrument for political reform and crisis management in the Third World, to say nothing of the more difficult tasks of state-building and nation-building." Lefever feels that the Congo intervention ensured that the cold war would be waged in that nation. Through internationalization "the mission magnified the crisis and probably prolonged the conflict, while at the same time muting the violence of the adversaries."

761
Martin, Paul. CANADA: COLLECTIVE SECURITY. Vital speeches of the day, v. 34, Dec. 15, 1967: 133-135. PN6121.V52, v. 34
"Delivered before the Canadian Club, Toronto . . . November 13, 1967."

Reappraises Canadian participation in collective security arrangements in view of the improving East-West relations. The present relaxation of tensions, however, must be kept in perspective; the Russians go on developing their military might, and their ardor for expansion may be rekindled if NATO defences are lowered. Strong Allied forces are essential for European stability. Canada has no alternative but to continue making appropriate contributions to NATO as the first line of Canada's defense and cooperating at the

same time in the defense of North America. While supporting collective defense arrangements, Canada should also strive "to increase the United Nations capacity to improve conditions of security in the world."

762
Michalak, Stanley J. PEACEKEEPING AND THE UNITED NATIONS: THE PROBLEM OF RESPONSIBILITY. International studies quarterly, v. 11, Dec. 1967: 301-319. D839.B2, v. 11

Analyzes the problem of balancing power within the United Nations with respect to responsibility for peacekeeping operations. Since international peacekeeping ventures are authorized by the General Assembly and the Security Council with the Secretary General acting as administrator, there is a problem of how to ensure that the "administrator's actions conform to the intentions and mandates of the policy issuing organ." The mechanism of the advisory committee was to bridge the gap; its use in the Middle East and in the Congo operation was hailed as a success, and it was recommended as a "viable responsibility-maintaining device" for the future. The author surmises that in these two instances the advisory committee did not fulfill their functions "in any meaningful manner." But, as long as the Secretary General continues to serve as "an initiator and executor of international security policies," advisory committees patterned on the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East and the U.N. operations in the Congo can provide a "cushion of insulation" between the Secretary General's actions and the organs authorizing peacekeeping operations.

763
Millar, Thomas B. INDIA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, AND THE SECURITY OF ASIA. Australian quarterly, v. 39, Sept. 1967: 7-19. DU80.A95, v. 39

Since Japan, India, and Australia all have a vested interest in maintaining peace in Asia, it would be worthwhile for them to explore the practicalities of forming mutual security arrangements among themselves. Each is now dependent on outside aid to defend itself against the principal common threat to peace, the Chinese People's Republic. Japan did not view China as a threat until the latter embarked on its nuclear weapons program. Although only a few Japanese openly advocate the immediate development of nuclear weapons to counter the Chinese menace, many want to reserve the option to do so. Japan now has the technical and industrial capacity to move quickly into nuclear weapons production and appears to want influence and respect in international affairs, although it is well aware of the tremendous costs of a rearmament program that would divert funds needed elsewhere. After the Chinese invaded India in 1962, New Delhi officials realized that nonalinement was no guarantee of safety and developed a strong awareness of Chinese hostility. The Indian Government is deterred from plunging into atomic weapons development by its poverty but wants to keep the option open and like Japan refuses to sign the draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty. India is too preoccupied with its own troubles to be interested in Southeast Asia, but it is attracted to the idea of cooperation with Japan. However, Japan sees no reason for looking for mutual aid to a country with one-ninth its per capita income. Because neither India nor Japan is concerned with containing China outside its own sector and Australia can do little to help either nation with its security problems, Australia probably could not foster an Asian security tripod that would include itself, India, and Japan. On the other hand, perhaps it could foster either bilateral or multilateral cultural and economic cooperation between the three democracies. Regardless of the desire or capacity of India, Japan, and Australia to "dampen down" the instability in Asia created by China, they are obligated to at least "assist whatever government there may be in China to modify its ambitions to upset the status quo, to accept international obligations, to take its proper place under terms acceptable to the majority of nations in the community of nations."

764
PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: CONSIDERATION BY SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Dec. 1967: 73-74. JX1977.A1U564, v. 4

Texts of draft resolutions submitted to the Special Political Committee on the question of international peacekeeping operations. One resolution suggests a system for apportioning the expenses of peacekeeping operations among the member states. Each state's share would be based on its ability to pay, and only those members of the Security Council who voted in favor of the operation would be assessed. The other resolution requests the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to continue its work and recommends that the Military Staff Committee prepare a report on the facilities, services, and personnel that member states could provide for U.N. peacekeeping operations.

765
Rosecrance, Richard N. DEFENSE OF THE REALM: BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR EPOCH. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968. 308 p. UA647.R73

Contents.--Major issues of British defense.--Demobilization, disengagement, and options for the future, 1946-1947.--The year of choice, 1948.--Deterrence, Europe, and the United States, 1949-1950.--Defense, Europe, and the United States, 1950-1951.--Strategic innovation and reversal, 1952-1953.--Deterrence, defense, and overseas interests: attempts at a multiple capability, 1954-1955.--The British deterrent, 1956-1957.--British defense in transition, 1956-1966.--Index.

Surveys British defense policies from 1946 to 1957 and discusses Great Britain's strategic role in the 1960's. Rosecrance notes that after 1957 Britain became the junior partner in the Anglo-American alliance and has since played a minor role in world strategy. He concludes that British defense policies in the nuclear era have been satisfactory; London gave up a far greater empire than France at a fraction of the social and political cost. Great Britain's failures as a strategic power are the result of "the defects of a virtue": moral rather than tactical considerations took precedence in its alliance with the United States.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

766
DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION: ASSEMBLY BEGINS CONSIDERATION OF ITEM. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Dec. 1967: 57-62. JX1977.A1U564, v. 4

General Assembly discussion on the "need to expedite the drafting of a definition of aggression." The Soviet representative pointed out the need for a clear-cut definition in order to prevent the reactionary forces from intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries and suppressing peoples' wars of liberation. He introduced a draft resolution that would have the Assembly establish a special committee to draft a definition of aggression for submission to the 23rd session. Representatives from Hungary, Rumania, the Ukranian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Algeria spoke up in support of the Soviet position; they felt a definition was necessary to restrain aggression like the U.S. armed intervention in Vietnam. U.S. and United Kingdom representatives denounced the Soviet proposal as pure propaganda. In their opinion, had the Soviet aims been genuine, Russia would not have excluded from the draft the question of subversion of one country by another and would have supported discussion of the matter in the U.N. Legal Committee.

767
Falk, Richard A., and Saul H. Mendlovits, eds. THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER. New York, World Law Fund, 1966. 4 v. illus.
JX1395.F3
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--v. 1. Toward a theory of war prevention.--v. 2. International law.--v. 3. The United Nations.--v. 4. Disarmament and economic development.

Materials drawn from the work of scholars and "offered as a step toward the creation of an autonomous academic discipline of world order." The editors conceive of world order as a strategy by which one system can be changed into another more compatible with established human values, such as peace, survival, welfare, and human dignity. They use as their guiding method the principles provided by what is known as "international systems theory."

768
Kuhns, Grant W. OUR SEARCH FOR PEACE. New guard, v. 7, Oct. 1967: 18-19, 26.
AP2.N6154, v. 7

To achieve a lasting peace the nations of the world must discard the concept of collectivism and embrace the concept of individualism. A society that is based on the protection of individual freedom, i.e., laissez-faire capitalism, would not risk the lives or the property of its people in war and would respect the rights of other nations. On the other hand, a collectivist or Socialist state can justify the plundering of foreign property in war by the same principle it justifies expropriating the property of its own citizens--the subjugation of the rights of the individual to the common good. Since collective societies appear to spawn war, the United States should be promoting the concept of individualism. Instead it is promoting collectivism by its foreign aid to Socialist governments and its advocacy of extensive Federal authority.

769
Kurtz, Howard, and Harriet Kurtz. GLOBAL COMPASSIONATE POWER. Renewal, June 1967: 3-17.
P&GP RR

Offers a vision of a world free from war and proposes a global safety authority, which would operate under "a revised and more effective United Nations." An aerospace force would scan the horizon, a marine force act as sentinel on all waterways, and a land force protect the integrity of national boundaries by nonlethal weapons and riot control methods. This concept, created in the church community, is to gain control over war through world cooperation in an era of technological advances.

770
Leahy, Michael J. JAPAN VS. THE BOMB. Canadian forum, v. 47, Nov. 1967: 176-177.
AP5.C125, v. 47

Since the three major Japanese antibomb organizations are directed and funded by political parties, the groups' activities are closely studied for indications of policy changes within the sponsoring party. Until the Japanese Communist Party [JCP] started pulling away from its close relationship with Peking, its Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs [Gensuikyo] closely followed the Chinese line. It is believed that the Soviets may be trying to strengthen their ties with the JCP since they did not send a delegation this year to the Gensuikyo's rival group, the Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs [Gensuikin], which is sponsored by the Japanese Socialist Party [JSP]. Gensuikin was formed in 1963 when the JSP delegates to a Gensuikyo conference could not win approval for a resolution condemning all testing of nuclear weapons, including that by Communist countries. At their meetings last August both Gensuikyo and Gensuikin adopted resolutions against nuclear weapons and the war in Vietnam, but, while Gensuikyo focused its attention largely on anti-American slogans, the Gensuikin meetings made a greater issue of "Israeli aggression." The third antibomb group is the National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Bombs [Kakkin Kaigi]. It reflects the policies of its sponsors, the Ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, by calling for Vietnam peace talks and criticizing nuclear testing by Communist China.

771
THE MYTH OF NAFTA. European review, v. 18, winter 1967-68: 16-17. AP4.E78, v. 18

Weighs the proposal for a North Atlantic free trade area [NAFTA] as an "alternative" for Britain, frustrated by a second failure to enter the Common Market. Like the Gaullist concept of an anti-American Europe the NAFTA idea would also "introduce a new division into the Atlantic world" and, as a way of undermining Atlantic unity, it would top "anything De Gaulle has proposed." The answer to the problem of Atlantic unity lies in a broader Common Market--an able U.S. partner in solving the world's economic, technological, and political problems.

772
Polianov, N. ATLANTIC PACT: PIRATE FLAG ON THE SEAS. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 19, Nov. 7, 1967: 41-42. D839.C87, v. 19
Translated and condensed from Izvestiia, Oct. 17, 1967, p. 5. Slav Rm

West Germany has ordered three missile-carrying destroyers from America, the first of which, the Luetjens, was completed at the naval shipyard in Bath, Maine. This ship with its guided missiles and 4,500 ton displacement will plow the seas under the West German and NATO flags. Ships equipped with guided missiles have a special role to play in Bonn's strategy

for North European waters. However, the construction of the destroyers, the revival of Nazi naval traditions, and the increasing activities of the Bonn militarists indicate a plan not only for Northern Europe but for the whole Atlantic sphere. Hence McNamara spoke "about special European naval formations" at Ankara in September, and the Western press is discussing a combined NATO naval force, which will be deliberated at the NATO meeting in December. The American and West German commanders of NATO want to create a multinational fleet, whose ships will be equipped with "conventional weapons"; i.e., missiles that could easily be equipped with nuclear warheads. The NATO naval forces would then become a multilateral atomic fleet. The U.S. motives for establishing a NATO multinational fleet are obvious: Washington wants to strengthen NATO's North Atlantic and Mediterranean flanks in order to pressure the political dissenters, Denmark and Norway; to protect the Israeli aggressors against the Arab peoples and the Fascist regimes of Greece, Spain, and Portugal; to prevent its NATO allies from withdrawing from the organization after 1969; and to obstruct the useful dialog between East and West in which many NATO countries are participating. The implementation of this strategy would benefit the Pentagon and its Bonn friends and instead of stability and security would create more tension in Europe.

773
REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE; with introductory material by Leonard C. Lewin. New York, Dial Press, 1967. 109 p. JX1963.S6458

Abridgment published in Esquire, v. 68, Dec. 1967: 129-137. AP2.E845

In 1963 a report was produced by a special study group set up by an unidentified U.S. federal agency at Iron Mountain, N.Y., to "determine the nature of problems that would confront the United States if and when a condition of 'permanent peace' should arrive, and draft a program for dealing with this contingency." In human terms the report is an outrageous document. But it represents a serious and challenging effort to define enormous unsolved problems and to explain some otherwise incomprehensible aspects of American policy. The group concluded that "lasting peace while not theoretically impossible, is probably unattainable; even if it could be achieved it would almost certainly not be in the best interest of a stable society to achieve it . . . . War fills certain functions essential to the stability of our society; until other ways of filling them are developed, the war system must be maintained--and improved in effectiveness." The Report recommends a replacement of war, whose economic, political, sociological, ecological and cultural-scientific functions are essential, by comprehensive social welfare systems, giant space research programs, permanent elaborate disarmament inspection systems; an omnipresent and omnipotent international police; an external, possibly extraterritorial menace; deliberate global environmental pollution; a sophisticated form of slavery not too different from today's system of military discipline; new religions or other mythologies; or socially oriented blood games. Since there is a probability that the present war system will become obsolete and a danger that a possible disarmament agreement might plunge the world or parts of it into an inadvertent peace, preparations for peace must be made. A permanent war-peace research agency is recommended. It would operate on the basis of the report's findings through an unlimited period of time or until the direction of social survival is no longer in doubt and the function of the agency is superseded by historical developments that it will have, at least partially, initiated.

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

774
Mayer, Peter, ed. THE PACIFIST CONSCIENCE. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1966] 477 p.
JX1963. M428
Bibliography: p. 440-472.

Anthology of peace classics that is intended "to show something of the variety of viewpoints and approaches in which the pacifist conscience has manifested itself and hopefully to indicate new approaches." Although the peace proposition was largely inspired by religious principles, ideas on the virtues of nonviolence are found in writings of ancient China which date three to six centuries before the birth of Christ. Early pacifists stressed the importance of individual acts of conscience; however, by the 18th century proposals for governments to concern themselves with peacekeeping machinery became increasingly popular, and the concept of internationalism evolved. The development of internationalism split the pacifist movement, since absolute pacifists objected to the principle of an international force to ultimately guarantee the peace. The pacifists have deterred few wars in the past but since the policy of armed deterrence has been equally unsuccessful, Mayer feels it might be worthwhile in this nuclear age to reinvestigate nonprovocative approaches to world problems. He includes a bibliography of books on pacifism and related issues, compiled by William Robert Miller, to help the reader gain further insight into the subject of nonviolence.

B. GENERAL ANALYSES

775
Russett, Bruce M., and Carolyn C. Cooper. ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE: PROPOSALS AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS. Denver, University of Denver, 1967. 85 p. (The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies. Monograph series in world affairs, v. 4, monograph no. 2)
JX1974. R72
Bibliographical footnotes.

A study of French, German, American, and British proposals for an arms control and disarmament agreement in Europe. Among the obstacles to an agreement are the reunification of Germany, the Oder-Neisse boundary dispute, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Included are outline listings of opinions and proposals of the leaders and strategists of the respective countries.

776
Schmidt, Helmut. ARMS CONTROL AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: A GERMAN VIEW. In Arms control for the late sixties. Editors: James E. Dougherty [and] J. F. Lehman, Jr. Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand [1967] p. 52-57.
JX1974. A75

The question of arms control in Europe must be resolved in the context of both an overall quantitative and qualitative military equilibrium and a stable power balance in each tension area throughout the world. Furthermore, arms control schemes must coincide with progressive attempts to reunify the two Germanies. Any conclusion of an arms control agreement between the Soviet Union and the West to Germany's political disadvantage would call for immediate claims for compensation, i.e., for German reunification. If arms control is to be meaningful, the Atlantic alliance must continue to serve as a viable catalyst in the maintenance of the strategic balance of power. The Germans view NATO with cautious optimism. Despite friction between participating countries NATO is reliable--U.S. commitments in Asia would not prevent it from defending Europe--and proposals for major changes in its structure would not alter the basic policies of the member states, particularly France. On the question of a nonproliferation treaty no fundamental change in NATO's present nuclear strategy should be made, especially if it involves physical possession of nuclear weapons. In fact it is not necessary to give all partners who wish to participate in nuclear planning the opportunity to do so. However every member should have the right of veto should the alliance decide to launch missiles as part of a counteroffensive--most missiles and tactical targets are located on German soil.

777
Siegler, Heinrich, Freiherr von, ed. [DOCUMENTATION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY. v. 3. 1964-1965] Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit. Bd. 3. 1964-1965. Bonn, Siegler, 1967. 410 p.
JX1974. S52, v. 3
Issued as v. 5 of the Dokumentationen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik.

Contents. --Chronology of events combined with chronological index of contents. --List of sourses. --Documentation. --Subject index. --Review of proposals submitted so far for nuclear-free zones and the relaxation of tensions.

Quotes German, British, Soviet, Red Chinese, Czechoslovak, Finnish, Polish, and other official pronouncements on the problem. The book includes official and unofficial sources for relevant documents of the United Nations, the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, and other international organizations. All texts are in German.

778
Siegler, Heinrich, Freiherr von, ed. [DOCUMENTATION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY. v. 4. 1966] Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit. Bd. 4. 1966. Bonn, Siegler, 1967. 404 p.
JX1974. S52, v. 4
Issued as v. 6 of the Dokumentationen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswartige Politik.

Contents. --Chronology of events combined with chronological index of contents. --Documentation. --Subject index. --List of sources.

Gives full texts in German of official pronouncements in 1966 by every interested nation in the world on: renunciation of antiballistic missiles systems; the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty; arms control and disarmament; a freeze of the nuclear arms race; the problem of international inspection of civilian nuclear energy projects; nuclear guarantees; the Gomulka Plan; the nuclear test ban treaty; European security; the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO; nuclear-free and detente zones; a world disarmament conference; and the treaty on the peaceful use of outer space. The bibliography also includes official reports by the United Nations, the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and other international organizations and meetings.

779
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL; REPORT TO THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY. [Cambridge] East Asian Research Center [and] Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1966. 2 v.
JX1974.S557

Vol. 1 was presented at a conference held in Cambridge, Mass., March 18-19, 1966; v. 2 consists of papers presented at a conference held at Airlie House, Warrenton, Va., Aug. 30-Sept. 4, 1965. Both conferences were part of a project undertaken jointly by the Center for International Affairs and the East Asian Research Center of Harvard University under contract with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents. --1. An Analysis by Morton H. Halperin. Approaches to arms control. Sino-Soviet relations and arms control, 1957-1966. The interaction between the nuclear test ban and Sino-Soviet relations. The future impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Implications for American arms control and disarmament policy. --2. Collected papers. The test ban and Sino-Soviet relations, by Walter C. Clemens. Front meetings and Sino-Soviet dispute on disarmament and nuclear weapons, by Karl F. Speilmann, Jr. Arms control: Can China be ignored? by Jeremy J. Stone. Japanese attitudes toward the Chinese nuclear programs, by Kei Wakaizumi. Chinese views on the spread of nuclear weapons, by Oran R. Young. Sino-Soviet relations in a U.S.-China crisis: The Chinese attitude, by Harold Hinton. The Soviet attitude, by Malcolm Mackintosh. The American attitude, by George H. Quester.

Appraises implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute for U.S. security policies in general and specifically for present and future arms control measures and concentrates on opportunities for and problems of arms control negotiations and agreements with China and Russia created by the Sino-Soviet rift. Halperin recommends a world disarmament conference to which both the United States and Communist China would be invited and to which China would be prepared to go, even after its refusal to participate at the Geneva 18-Nation Disarmament Commission. The agenda of this conference might include the following topics: nonproliferation, problems of war by accident or miscalculation, strategic force interaction, renunciation of the use of force, the test ban, and a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons. The articles in the second volume confirm that the nuclear test ban treaty, signed in Moscow in 1963, remains a major irritant in Sino-Soviet relations because of both its contents and symbolic meaning, as Clemens emphasizes. Young focuses on the development of China's policies concerning the spread of nuclear weapons; for example, on the distribution of nuclear weapons to Socialist states as opposed to non-Socialist countries. Hinton is skeptical about the Soviet Union's full strategic support and protection of China in a U.S.-China crisis, if, for instance, China and West Germany collaborated to pressure the Soviet Union or used the Chinese nuclear force to threaten the American continent. Mackintosh argues that Soviet planners would first of all consider the safety of the Soviet borders, and, if the U.S.S.R. did act in a Sino-American war, it would be exclusively in the Soviet national interest. Quester traces the evolution of the Sino-Soviet military alliance since 1945 and states that despite the Sino-Soviet rift, China and the U.S.S.R. agree that it would be foolish for either to operate alone against the West. Any widening of the split should be balanced by the West against holding down the military strength of both Communist powers.

780
Stanford University. Arms Control Project. ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FAR EAST. Stanford, Calif., A report of the Arms Control Project, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University [1967] 191 p. (IR-53)
JX1974.S658
----- ----- Annex. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University [1967] 349 p. (IR-53)
JX1974.S658 Annex
----- ----- Summary. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University [1967] 21 p. (IR-53)
Also has been made commercially available in the Hoover Institution Publications series.
JX1974.S658 1967b

Partial contents. --Conceptual framework: Acceptability of ACD measures based on ease of adjustment. --Principal ACD measures since World War II and their relevance to the Far East: Major regional proposals. --General characteristics of the regions and subregions which might affect ACD. --The extra-regional powers. --Conflicts, tensions, and ACD: a country survey. --Attitudes of regional nations toward ACD. --Limitations and possibilities of arms control and disarmament in the Far East. --Implications for the national interests of the United States: Proposal I: a guarantee of defense aid to India by one or more of the nuclear powers, excluding Communist China. Proposal II: a series of voluntary renunciations on the part of the regional countries. Proposal III: the formation of a regional or subregional joint defense or mutual assistance arrangement. Proposal IV: regional police force for limited peacekeeping functions such as observation of border armistices and so forth. Proposal V: a series of joint technical, economic, and scientific programs. Proposal VI: sponsorship of regional informal discussions and educational programs with regard to ACD problems. --Appendices: Major nonregional ACD proposals.

Investigates three major categories of problems: the possibilities and limitations of arms control and

293-980 O - 68 - 6

disarmament [ACD] arrangements in the Far East, the interaction of regional settlements with ACD arrangements that might be concluded among the Great Powers, and the organizational and procedural aspects of ACD measures. The authors do not advocate a reduction of arms in a region where no country is free from fear of attack. Neither do they advocate an increase in arms but rather believe that an increased sense of regional security is imperative for world peace. The Annex includes specific regional studies. The authors note that Australia and New Zealand, because they are on the periphery of an unstable area, are vulnerable to Chinese communism and cannot be expected to develop initiatives for the development of ACD measures. The Summary details the conclusions the authors have reached with respect to ACD measures in the Far East.

C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

781
Wiesner, Jerome B. HOPE FOR GCD? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Jan. 1968: 10-15.
TK9145. A84, v. 24

The cold war and the paranoid fears that have plagued U. S. -Soviet relations the past decade have virtually come to an end. However despite the more relaxed atmosphere that has ensued, disarmament discussions have not produced concrete results. A single comprehensive disarmament plan is unrealistic. Since societies change slowly and modify their structures very little, an all-encompassing plan ignores the evidence of how social evolution takes place. Such a plan would be feasible only after a nuclear war, when nations have been destroyed and "a completely new and more rational political and security structure [has been] created." Long-range objectives such as general and complete disarmament [GCD] are not viewed seriously by societies that put such a high value on survival they are willing to sacrifice all other objectives for continued existence. The strategic weapons problem which is a major aspect of any disarmament discussion has been altered by the Russian and American ABM systems. The ABM only serves to intensify an already spiraling arms race situation and has also lessened chances for a freeze on total expenditures for defensive and offensive weapons. A related problem is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Today most nonnuclear nations, including India and Germany, are exhibiting their nearsightedness in believing that they will compromise their national security by signing a nonproliferation treaty. It is hoped that these nations will recognize that the ultimate welfare of all nations will best be served by a nonproliferation treaty. In order to plan for such a monumental task as GCD several changes in the present disarmament machinery should be made. The 18-Nation Disarmament Conference [ENDC] should be replaced by a more formal organization to study disarmament measures. The role of the U. N. should be increased; a Deputy Secretary General should be appointed to carry out independent studies on disarmament and head the reorganized 18-Nation Conference. When disarmament agreements are made they should be provisional and contain an escape clause similar to that of the nuclear test ban treaty. In this way signatory nations would not be trapped permanently by disadvantageous measures.

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION

782
Ahmed, M. Samir. THE NEUTRALS AND THE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NON-ALIGNED STATES' EFFORTS BETWEEN 1962-1963 [New York] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967. 120 p. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Occasional paper no. 4) D843.A39
Includes bibliographical references

Weighs the value of nonalined nations as mediator between Great Powers in disarmament matters.

783
Bartos, Otomar J. HOW PREDICTABLE ARE NEGOTIATIONS? Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Dec. 1967: 481-496. JX1901.J6, v. 11

The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate that negotiating behavior, under some circumstances, is quite unstable; that it is very easy to alter the relationship between a negotiator's background and his performance. In the study, student volunteers were trained for negotiating roles, paired in teams, and put through two experiments with an opposing team and an agenda for "international" negotiation (including money payoffs). Some negotiators were told that their opponents were tough, others that they were soft, and still others were given no information at all. Although the optimal strategy under the experiment's conditions was to become tough if one's opponent was believed to be soft, and vice versa, no clearcut relationship of this kind appeared. Three background variables--sex, race, and personality--were found to be important in determining subjects' own toughness, and played a similar role in subjects' reactions when the background variables were ascribed to the opponent. Furthermore, introducing any such information about the opponent tended to reverse the relationship between the subject's background and his toughness. A number of implications of the findings are discussed. (Abstract supplied)

784
Evan, William M., and John A. MacDougall. INTERORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT: A LABOR-MANAGEMENT BARGAINING EXPERIMENT. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Dec. 1967: 398-413. JX1901.J6, v. 11

A theoretical analysis of alternative bargaining strategies employed in resolving interorganizational conflicts resulted in the testing of the following principal hypotheses: (1) a bargaining strategy of bilateral dissensus reflecting intraorganizational conflicts will more frequently promote a resolution of interorganizational conflicts and will more frequently promote an integrative type of resolution than bargaining strategies of bilateral consensus or unilateral dissensus; (2) in accordance with the folk theory of bargaining, unilateral dissensus tends to generate a domination type of conflict resolution. A labor-management negotiation was simulated. Provisional findings: (1) a bilateral dissensus strategy tends to produce more terms of agreement than bilateral consensus or unilateral dissensus; (2) it also tends to produce more integrative terms of agreement than unilateral dissensus, but it is not clear whether it produces more such terms than bilateral consensus. (3) A mediation mechanism may have operated to help produce integrative terms of agreement. No evidence of mediation was found in the unilateral dissensus treatment. (4) The folk theory of bargaining (above) was not confirmed. (Abstract supplied)

785
Harrison, Stanley L. AN AMERICAN VIEW: A NEW ROLE FOR NATO. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Feb. 1968: 14-24. Z6723.U35, v. 48

Although NATO was established primarily to protect Europe from Soviet aggression, the alliance was also intended to coordinate Western political goals. As Europe becomes increasingly less dependent upon the United States, the political aspects of the alliance should be reemphasized. NATO was originally perceived as playing a major role in arms control and disarmament efforts, but it was not until 1957 that the NATO Council began to participate actively in coordinating Western arms control policy. However, the effectiveness of NATO consultations on arms control matters is questionable since the United States persists in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. Sidestepping of the NATO structure, as exemplified by recent secret U.S. talks with the Soviet Union about the nonproliferation treaty, could seriously weaken the alliance. If the United States wants NATO to attain new meaning, it must give its allies a more vigorous role in arms control negotiations. In order to convince its allies that it is genuinely interested in mutual policy coordination, the United States could encourage the establishment of an arms control affairs committee, which would provide a forum for open discussion on policy proposals. The West would then be able to achieve a truly unified position on arms control measures--thus brightening the hope for the reduction of world tensions.

786
PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE: GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS RESOLUTIONS. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Dec. 1967: 55-57. JX1977.A1U564, v. 4

Texts of resolutions adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on November 3, 1967, regarding international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. In the first resolution, the Assembly commended the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space and expressed its appreciation to member states for their cooperation. In the second, the Assembly urged all invited nations to attend the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to be held in Vienna from August 14 to 27, 1968, and reaffirmed its belief that the benefits of space technology should receive wider dissemination.

787
Smolenskii, P. [DIPLOMACY AND BOUNDARIES] Diplomatiia i granitsy. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1965. 83 p.
JX4111.S5

Contents.--National boundaries: when and how have they come into existence.--National boundaries: the present and the future.--The Soviet Union offers suggestions. . .--The world discusses. . .

Reviews the history of national boundaries established after bloody conflicts. Lenin's principle of the right of nations to self-determination guides the Soviet Union in solving its border problems. In 1963, the Soviet Union submitted to the heads of states proposals for settling territorial and boundary questions without the use of force. The Soviet bloc, the Arab countries, and some recently liberated countries supported the anti-imperialist Soviet proposals. The United States, the West European and other capitalist countries, and their press compared these proposals to the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 and considered them a "propaganda gesture."

788
Stone, Jeremy J. BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 23, Dec. 1967: 20-25. TK9145.A84, v. 23

Despite the pressures that have forced the administration to deploy a "light" ABM system there are several alternatives that could dampen the arms race that will almost certainly result from this decision. Negotiations could begin on unilateral inspection safeguards, and limits could be imposed on offensive and defensive launchers since the number of warheads is difficult to estimate in light of the new multiple warhead. Such an agreement would prevent one superpower from "push[ing] onward in an attempt to neutralize the other's offensive powers." In addition the avoidance of inflammatory statements by both Russia and the United States would serve to decrease the pressure for arms increases. It would also be to America's advantage to outline a specific proposal and send it to the Soviet Union; talks without a U.S. proposal would resolve little. When Russia was strategically inferior to the United States agreements were hard to come by; but, as a result of the Soviet Union's emergence as a world power, the two nations have, despite McNamara's decision, a real opportunity to negotiate.

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

789
Pražský, Jan. VIETNAM: CONTINUING ESCALATION. World Marxist review, v. 10, Sept. 1967: 15-16. HX8.P723, v. 10

The American press, the Pentagon, and other hawks continue to misinform the people of the United States about the Vietnam War. Instead of imaginary victories, as before, newspapers report human and materiel losses, and the fact that the war is deadlocked is emphasized. The aim of this propaganda is to influence the American public to accept the Pentagon's remedy: escalation. Forced by the necessity of finding a way out of the stalemate, military experts recommend a bigger draft, the formation of five new divisions, and more military spending. As a result of the joint efforts of the President and congressional and military leaders, General Taylor and Clark Clifford undertook a mission to the U.S. Asiatic and Australian allies for more auxiliary forces for South Vietnam, and the bombing of North Vietnam was stepped up. Dams, dikes, and roadside villages were the principal targets. This could be catastrophic for crops and for the population. International isolation of the United States is growing because of Vietnam, and a wave of protests has arisen on the domestic front against the war. Young men object to fighting, workers strike, and the Negro civil rights movement also reflects the tension created by the war. But the united forces of peace, democracy, and socialism actively support Vietnam, as was shown at the Stockholm World Conference on Vietnam this year. Only concerted action can prevent world war III.

2. Conventional Arms Transfers

790
Bácskai, Tamás. APARTHEID--A LOOK BEHIND THE FACADE IN SOUTH AFRICA. In International Institute for Peace. Active co-existence, no. 13, July/Sept. 1967: 1-13. P&GP RR

Examines the Republic of South Africa's apartheid system, including wage discrimination. South Africa has rich natural resources; however, the competitiveness of its industries depends largely on cheap labor. Steel production is less costly than in America because African wages remain low. Thus manufacturing is profitable, attracting foreign investments; "U.S. and world monetary institutions, which are so tardy in bringing aid to underdeveloped countries, are always quick to bolster up the discredited system of apartheid." There is close cooperation between the Verwoerd government and West Germany to turn South Africa into a military center "capable of bringing pressure to bear upon, and militarily threatening, large and decisive areas of Africa with the help of modern highly mobile fighting units and modern weapons." The two countries "are cooperating to prepare the production in South Africa of atomic bombs, chemical weapons, and guided missiles." These weapons "in the hands of the West German revenge-seekers and South African racialists are a grave danger to world peace."

791
Coleman, Herbert J. U.K. REJECTS SOUTH AFRICA DEFENSE ORDER. Aviation week & space technology, v. 87, Dec. 25, 1967: 20. TL501.A8, v. 87

Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that in spite of severe budget pressures the Government had decided to refuse a $620-million defense order from South Africa because of its apartheid policies. Conservative Party members denounced the move as hypocritical since South Africa is currently Britain's third largest customer for consumer goods and foolish

since it meant France would become the main supplier of arms to South Africa. The Labor Party's left wing, which had pressured for the arms ban, is also advocating defense cuts--including the cancellation of the Anglo-French Concorde supersonic transport and the agreement to purchase 50 F-111K variable-sweep aircraft from the United States. However, both projects will probably survive budget cuts since defense cutbacks will mostly involve manning commitments in overseas bases.

792
Grant, Zalin B. ALLIANCE AGAINST REVOLUTION: TRAINING, EQUIPPING THE LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY. New republic, v. 157, Dec. 16, 1967: 13-14. AP2.N264, v. 157

Special Forces war games now underway in the jungles of Panama point to a shift in U.S. military strategy throughout Latin America from that of coastal protection to internal defense against Castro-type guerrillas. There are three major areas of American involvement south of the border: the U.S. School of the Americas, the 8th Special Forces Latin American operations, and the Military Assistance Program, which has 43 missions in 17 countries. Since its establishment in 1955 the U.S. School of the Americas in the Canal Zone has graduated 21,294 Latin American military men. The 8th Special Forces, a Green Beret unit at Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone, specializes in counterinsurgency aid. Its mobile training teams are airlifted at the request of Latin American governments to assist the regular U.S. military advisers--be it for a 2-week inspection of military equipment or a 7-month mission to "wipe out guerrillas." Almost 800 men in uniform are assigned to the U.S. military missions in Latin American countries. And, although the Pentagon claims that military assistance is "deemphasized" and the new Latin American military aid appropriation bill was trimmed by $10 million, three helicopters were recently sent to the mission in Guatemala, probably to comb the mountains for pro-Castro bands. At the same time new Green Beret arrivals in Panama are welcomed with the familiar reminder that they are "not operational, just teachers."

793
Heymont, Irving. US MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Jan. 1968: 89-95. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

A basic explanation of the organization and functioning of U.S. military assistance to other nations. Funds for training and civic action will probably be emphasized, and "advanced weaponry for newly developing countries will be discouraged."

794
Hughes, David R. THE MYTH OF MILITARY COUPS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Dec. 1967: 3-10. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 47

That U.S. military assistance encourages government takeovers by the military in the underdeveloped world is a myth surrounding the military assistance program [MAP]. A hard look at the figures, however, demonstrates that MAP represents only a minor factor in military coups; much evidence exists to support the notion that these programs are associated "with long-term moderation of military tendencies to so intervene." The United States opposes tyranny in all forms, but military rule does not necessarily imply tyranny, and civilian rule does not necessarily exclude it. In changing societies the military may present the one clear road to transition without chaos. Of the 164 instances of internationally significant violence between 1958 and 1966, the overwhelming majority involved the very poor nations--Defense Department figures showed a better correlation between economic development and violence than communism or any other factor. MAP plays only a small role--of the military coups and attempted coups between 1961 and 1966, 19 occurred "where MAP was absent or insignificant, and 12 where it was present in substantial amounts." In many of the nations where coups occur, no constitutional provision even exists for an orderly change of government. In at least one Latin American country a civilian dictator was ousted by a military coup; that nation has suffered no illegal changes in government since the military takeover and the framing, under the direction of the ruling junta, of a new national constitution. Military establishments, rather than being uniformly repressive, probably tend to parallel the maturity levels of the rest of their societies. More powerful forces work to bring tyranny to developing nations; U.S. MAP may well present a moderating influence.

795
[NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SEVEN-DAY ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF JUNE 1967] Die Seeoperationen im arabisch-israelischen 7-Tage-Krieg (Juni 1967) [by] *** Marine Rundschau, v. 64, Oct. 1967: 264-279. illus.
V3.M3, v. 64
Pseudonym *** denotes Near East contributors to Marine Rundschau.

Inadequate technical training of Egyptian naval cadres by the Russians coupled with the Egyptian officers' lack of initiative, imagination, and responsibility, left the nation's Navy completely unprepared for a military confrontation with Israeli forces. A total Egyptian air defeat in the first hours of the war reduced the Navy's operational possibilities by 50 percent, and any remaining chances for victory were grossly neglected by the Egyptian naval command, which was composed largely of dilettantes and Nasser's political protégés. The Soviet Union provided Egypt with modern warships equipped in many instances with outdated weapons. (Egyptian crews would not have known how to operate electronic equipment.) The value of the warships is difficult to ascertain because most of them did not see action.

796
Sherman, George. THE PENTAGON'S MERCHANTS OF DEATH. Progressive, v. 31, Nov. 1967: 30-33.
AP2.P8655, v. 31

Critics of the U.S. arms export program contend that in its attempt to maintain a balance between American and Soviet arms shipped to underdeveloped nations the United States has ended up supporting both sides of almost every arms race in the world. After American arms were pitted against each other in the Arab-Israeli War, Congress began an examination of American arms policy abroad. The United States is the world's largest supplier of arms--averaging $3 billion yearly in

military grants and sales. Sales to developing countries increased from $34 million in FY 1962 to $444 million in FY 1966. The arms sales now amount to more than the grants and are mostly channeled through Henry J. Kuss, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistic Negotiations. Foreigners are eager to purchase American equipment because it saves them the expense of research and development and the U.S. Government provides a spare parts and maintenance guarantee, trains them in the use of the equipment, and provides easy credit. However, Congress was appalled by the large volume of U.S. Government-financed arms exports to poor countries and revoked the Pentagon's arms sales credit fund and placed a ceiling on total grants and sales to Africa and Latin America. The U.S. Government should take further steps to curb the global arms race, including the enforcement of "end use agreements" to prevent industrial nations from reselling obsolete American military equipment to developing countries.

797
Stähle, Peter. [IN THE ARMS TRADE JUNGLE. BONN'S DEALINGS IN WAR MATERIEL] Im Dschungel des Waffenhandels. Bonner Geschäfte mit Kriegsmaterial. Zeit, v. 22, Sept. 5, 1967: 6.
AP30. Z39, v. 22

There are three ways a foreign country may receive West German war materiel: through military aid from the Government, the purchase of military surpluses from dealers, or the purchase of new material directly from a West German producer. The export of weapons by Western Germany is subject to governmental regulations that forbid shipments to tension areas and bar transfer of military hardware from the recipient mentioned in the registered transaction to any other party. In spite of this, West German military jet airplanes, recently designated for Iran, are already being used by Pakistan, and those for Italy by India. The German Federal Republic has long had bad luck with arms sales in tension areas. Whenever a nation started receiving West German military hardware it almost invariably became involved in an acute or potential conflict and the Federal Republic had to stop deliveries, as in 1964 in the case of Greece and Turkey because of Cyprus, or in 1965 with Portugal because of Angola. Direct foreign sales of new war materiel by West German producers have sharply increased in recent years. A preceding rapid increase in the export of West German military surpluses paved the way to such a development; this seems to be the pattern for military exports. But governmental control over arms trade has remained as inefficient as ever.

798
Winston, Donald C. DOD PLAN WOULD SEPARATE CIVIL, MILITARY AID REQUESTS. Aviation week & space technology, v. 87, Dec. 25, 1967: 17-18.
TL501. A8, v. 87

Department of Defense officials are drafting legislation to separate military assistance from the civilian foreign aid program. While opponents to the move express the fear that an increasingly isolationist Congress will refuse to pass a foreign assistance bill unless it contains military aid provisions, backers of the separation argue that the foreign aid program has reached such low esteem with Congress that it severely weakens the military program. The record-low foreign aid appropriation for FY 1968 pared the $595 million originally requested by the administration for military assistance down to $400 million and could have long-term negative effects on the arms-export program. In addition to budget cuts, the FY 1968 legislation placed further restrictions on military aid to underdeveloped countries and abolished the Defense Department fund used to guarantee Export-Import Bank loans for arms purchases.

3. Nuclear Proliferation

799
[ASSOCIATION OF GERMAN SCIENTISTS FOR THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY] Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler zum Atomsperrvertrag. Physikalische Blätter, v. 23, Oct. 1967: 477. QC1. D415, v. 23

Statement by a West German scientists association on what the German people's attitude should be toward the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The urgent need for such a treaty is stressed. This, the authors hope, would foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy, hamper its military exploitation, and lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. West Germany should not entirely reject the draft treaty because of criticism of some of its provisions, nor should such criticism be motivated by hope for acquisition of nuclear weapons.

800
Becker, Kurt. [GUILLOTINE THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY? BONN'S INTERESTS ARE ALSO AT STAKE IN GENEVA] Guillotine Atomsperrvertrag? In Genf geht es auch um die Interessen Bonns. Zeit, v. 22, Oct. 17, 1967: 5.
AP30. Z39, v. 22

The draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons worked out jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to be approved by the U.N. General Assembly after the superpowers agree on control measures. This may happen shortly, because Washington has come closer to the Soviet view on measures controlling the nuclear activities of members of the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom]. Rather than supporting the notion of autonomous control by Euratom the United States now favors making Euratom control activities subordinate to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Renunciation of autonomous control by Euratom would spell the end of that organization. It would disrupt Euratom's common market for fissile materials, because France, which certainly will not sign the treaty, would withdraw from Euratom projects. Bonn also objects to the unlimited duration of the nonproliferation treaty, which would perpetuate the division of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear states with unforeseeable, as yet, political and technological consequences. The Federal Republic of Germany should do its best to effect the desired changes in the draft treaty. When it is approved by the U.N. General Assembly moral pressure to sign the treaty will be too strong for West Germany to oppose.

801
Cockcroft, Sir John D. CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY. Survival, v. 9, Nov. 1967: 349-351.
U162. S9, v. 9

An address on the peaceful uses of atomic energy presented at the 17th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs.

There is an urgent need for control of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Nuclear power development will reach enormous proportions by 1980; the United States by then will have 150,000 MW of installed nuclear power stations. The primary objective of such control is to prevent the diversion of civil nuclear energy to military purposes. There are two types of safeguards: those advocated by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and those referred to in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The ideal method of control would be IAEA supervision of plutonium separation plants. These plants are vital control points, since plutonium does not become usable for military purposes until it is separated from U-238. Control of enriched uranium is not necessary unless the portion of U-235 is high enough to make it suitable for military use. The most difficult task of the safeguards system is to keep track of the actual usage of the plutonium after it is extracted in the plants and distributed to other laboratories. This will be made more difficult with the advent of fast-breeding reactors, which should be made subject to the safeguards system, and the use of nuclear explosives for civil engineering would also increase the difficulty of control. These problems can be resolved, but until radioactive contamination can be controlled the civil application of nuclear explosives will not be acceptable to most countries.

802
Däniker, Gustav. [THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND SWISS NATIONAL DEFENSE] Atomsperrvertrag und schweizerische Landesverteidigung. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 133, Oct. 1967: 597-598.
U3.A43, v. 133

After long secret negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, both parties fully agreed on the nuclear nonproliferation draft treaty except for a yet-to-be-formulated clause on international inspection. The proposed treaty, now under discussion by the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, would commit the nonnuclear states to nonproliferation and the nuclear ones to nondissemination of nuclear weapons. In their own interest the latter are firmly resolved not to disseminate those weapons anyway. Practically, then, the treaty would mean a one-sided obligation on the part of the nonnuclear states. It would not commit the nuclear powers to nuclear disarmament; neither would it obligate them to guarantee the nonnuclear states' security. Even so, the treaty would stabilize world security if all nations signed it and would abide by it. The nuclear balance of power, which so far has prevented world war III, would thus continue at least until Red China embarked on "an aggressive nuclear policy." The positive aspects of the treaty are, however, overshadowed by its potential negative effects on the security, sovereignty, freedom of action, and international legal status of nonnuclear states--hence the many reservations among neutral and nonneutral countries about it. If Switzerland signed a nonproliferation treaty that did not have universal validity, it would have to seek foreign security guarantees. These would be incompatible, in the opinion of some critics, with Swiss neutrality. Yet because of its moral commitment to the cause of peace, Switzerland cannot adopt a purely negative attitude to the proposed treaty. It should try instead to win time for a thorough, cool examination of all the problems involved and for effecting desired changes in the draft treaty and not let itself be pressured.

803
Däniker, Gustav. [THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF A SMALL COUNTRY] Der Atomsperrvertrag aus der Sicht des Kleinstaates. Wehrkunde, v. 16, Sept. 1967: 469-472.
U3.W396, v. 16

Contends that the proposed nonproliferation treaty would put nuclear powers in a privileged position, discriminate against the "mass of sovereign states" without offering them any permanent security in exchange, and foreshadow new conflicts. Therefore nonnuclear nations, especially the small ones, should refuse to sign the treaty until it provides for adequate reciprocity of obligation on the part of nuclear powers.

804
[DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 4] Zur Diskussion über den geplanten Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen. 4. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Dec. 25, 1967: 562-586.
D839.E86, v. 22

A survey, based on official sources, of positions taken and proposals made by members of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in regard to proposed drafts of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Various versions of the draft treaty and article by article reservations to them by certain nations are included. In addition texts of (1) a declaration by the West German delegation at the 11th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, September 29, 1967; (2) a declaration of October 18, 1967, by the Commission of the European Communities; and (3) an aide memoire of November 17, 1967, by the Swiss Government to the United States and the Soviet Union on the draft treaty are given.

805
Dougherty, James. THE TREATY AND THE NONNUCLEAR STATES. Orbis, v. 11, summer 1967: 360-377. D839.O68, v. 11

Even if the superpowers agree on a form of inspection for article III of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, can they persuade the nonnuclear states that it is to their advantage to sign the treaty? The nonnuclear states such as India face several problems in connection with the treaty. India would like to sign a treaty that includes an obligation on the part of the superpowers to reduce their existing stockpiles; however it does not want the superpowers to decrease their nuclear armaments while China, its enemy, increases its nuclear power. India argues that its acquisition of nuclear weapons could deter China in the East. Nationalists in India believe that a treaty would relegate India to an inferior political-security position vis-à-vis China, while idealists feel that the signing of the treaty would be tantamount to forfeiture of whatever modest leverage neutrals have over the nuclear powers in disarmament talks. If India signs a treaty, it would have to have a security guarantee against China from both Russia and the United States. Aside from the guarantee, Indians are demanding that the treaty alow for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

India has joined Brazil in championing the right to peaceful explosions by nonnuclear states on their own soil, even though the nuclear powers have insisted that the treaty "would enable the nonnuclear states to concentrate their resources on the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology." At present India will probably not sign the treaty without some prerequisite such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Even then India would only sign a treaty that would maintain the validity of India's nuclear option in case the superpowers fail to provide an adequate defense for India and its political status in Asia against China.

806
KEEP YOUR POWDER CLEAN. Nature (London) v. 217, Jan. 27, 1968: 299-300.
Q1. N2, v. 217

Just a few weeks before the Soviet-American announcement of agreement on a draft nonproliferation treaty it appeared as though the history of the past 2 years had repeated itself and another insurmountable obstacle had been placed in the road of the treaty. The new draft finds a way around the obstacle, namely the West German argument that the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom] should be responsible for policing the agreement in Western Europe. The latest draft calls for signatories to accept control and inspection negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] within 6 months. Since nations will be able to deal with IAEA in groups, Euratom will presumably be able to retain responsibility for safeguards in Western Europe. The looseness implied in the draft's safeguards provisions could prove an asset rather than a liability. In order to prevent the independent, non-Euratom nations from feeling discriminated against, IAEA will conceivably have to encourage regional groupings of the Euratom type in other areas, a development which will go far to bolster nuclear energy production throughout the world. No guarantee exists as to final agreement on the treaty, however. Military nuclear power has become respectable among the major nations, and even "entirely peaceable countries" may be unwilling to give up their right to pursue the nuclear course. Such nations as India, for example, currently have no assurances of protection against attack without either nuclear weapons of their own or security guarantees from nuclear nations. These smaller nations could hold up the treaty for a year or more. Certainly it is not unreasonable that the treaty "should include some restriction on the right of nuclear powers to keep on manufacturing fissionable material for military purposes." Throwing open some civil nuclear plants for inspection, as in the case of Great Britain and the United States, will not suffice. And most observers agree that to include in the draft nonproliferation treaty a pledge to seek general and complete disarmament is little more than a formality. Whether or not the draft will survive should be clear within the next few weeks.

807
Klein, Peter. BONN'S STRUGGLE AGAINST NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. German foreign policy, v. 6, no. 5, 1967: 385-393.
DD261.4.D353, v. 6

Contrasts the Federal Republic of Germany's negative attitude toward the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty to the German Democratic Republic's support of the treaty. Klein lists Bonn's reservations on the treaty, especially on proposed international inspection, and stresses West Germany's delaying tactics, such as its "diplomatic offensive" against the proposed agreement, which he feels are largely responsible for the fact that the treaty has not been concluded yet.

808
Kray, Bruno. [THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY FOLLOWS SCHRÖDER'S LONGSTANDING POLICY. BONN STILL LONGS FOR THE BOMB] SPD folgt Schröders alter Politik. Bonn giert weiter nach der Bombe. Neue Politik, v. 12, Dec. 16, 1967: 3.
H5. N377, v. 12

The Federal Republic of Germany's coalition government aspires to a German "policy of strength" as did its predecessors. Since political strength today depends largely on nuclear weapons, a way to make the German voice count in world affairs would be--some Germans think--to control those weapons. The German Federal Republic has renounced nuclear weapons, but it has not renounced delivery means. Defense Minister Schröder opposes their renunciation, and the Social Democrats support him. The Federal Republic could find itself through its delivery means in physical possession of American nuclear bombs and able to decide according to its own judgement on their use. This is the most crucial question for the problem of European détente. The more so since Schröder insists that West German forces be armed the same way as their American counterparts in Germany. Bonn's obstinacy on these matters makes West German peace assurances incredible for Moscow and even in the West. In contrast, Japan has no problem in making its peace policy credible to the world.

809
McKnight, A. D. IAEA SAFEGUARDS INSPECTION. Neue Technik; nouvelles techniques; new techniques, v. 9, Oct. 1967: 198-204.
TJ212.N4, v. 9

Describes the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA's] safeguards system and the way it has been administered. McKnight sketches the histroy of the safeguards concept on the basis of the provisions of the IAEA statute and the agency's actions aimed at their implementation. Both technical and nontechnical aspects of safeguards administration are discussed.

810
Martin, Paul. ENDING THE ARMS RACE. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs, External affairs, v. 19, Oct. 1967: 400-404.
JX351.A3, v. 19

An address delivered before the Amherstburg, Ont., Rotary Club on Aug. 31, 1967.

The implications of the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, as explained by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. Martin considers disarmament highly important and feels that progress toward the goal of general and complete disarmament has been achieved; nevertheless the draft nonproliferation treaty represents only a small step on a lengthy road, though perhaps this step-by-step progress is the only feasible way of approaching disarmament. To Martin the arms race seens ominous, in both the area of regional, conventional arms compe-

tition and that of U.S.-Soviet antimissile-missile deployment. The arms race is also extremely expensive, and Martin cites the fact that the world's nations spend on armaments a figure more than twice Canada's gross national product every year. Canada and the United States, with their long experience in bilateral cooperation, can "give leadership in the search for world-wide arms-control and disarmament arrangements."

811
Matsumoto, Shichiro. JSP VIEWS ON THE DRAFT TREATY FOR THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Japan Socialist review, no. 140, Sept. 15, 1967: 40-43.
HX9.J3, 1967

Statement issued August 25, 1967, by the Foreign Affairs Bureau chief.

A worldwide agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and achieve nuclear disarmament is urgently needed. However, the draft proposal by the Soviet Union and the United States is not satisfactory because it restricts the activities of nonnuclear states but does not prohibit the production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons powers. Thus the nonnuclear nations are at the mercy of the nuclear weapons states, and this situation encourages a dangerous international system based on nuclear alliances. The draft treaty must guarantee the security of nonnuclear nations, and an international political climate must be created that will encourage the cooperation of all nuclear weapons states, including France and China.

812
Murata, Kiyoaki. JAPAN AND NONPROLIFERATION. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Jan. 1968: 86-88.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

Reprinted from the original, published in the Japan Times, June 10, 1967.
Newsp

Nuclear weapons are rightly anathema to Japan; yet occasionally circumstances require the Japanese people and their leaders to discuss atomic armaments. Most recently the nonproliferation treaty, put forth jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union, has provided such an occasion. This treaty, while apparently a clear good for Japan, actually provides many grounds for unfavorable Japanese reaction. It claims to limit nuclear weapons to as few nations as possible, and in so doing perpetuates the current monopoly held by the nuclear powers. To remedy this flaw the nuclear powers should pledge themselves "to work earnestly toward total nuclear disarmament as a condition of Japan's acceptance of the pact." The treaty's possible effects on peaceful nuclear energy programs present another consideration. "All agree that if accession to the treaty means that Japan cannot use nuclear devices, such as underground explosion for mining and other industrial purposes, then she should not sign the treaty." Japan is not alone in possessing a nuclear industry capable of handling weapons deployment. The increase in such states, in fact, has been the catalyst in world agitation for a nonproliferation treaty. Japan's problem among these states is unique, however, because of the nation's avowed policy of limiting nuclear development to civil uses. Thus Japan "will have to make public all the results of research and experiments except for commercial secrets." Will not more bellicose nations, those to whom peaceful uses are secondary, use this information for military purposes? Certainly few Japanese have advocated a Japanese nuclear arsenal. Yet even in the Diet it has been tentatively opined that strictly defensive nuclear armaments might not be contrary to the Japanese Constitution. The proposal for a nonproliferation treaty has shown Japan that the time has come to redefine and reexamine its attitudes concerning nuclear development. Many feel that only the scuttling of the so-called "nuclear taboo" can allow full and rational discussion of this vital national problem.

813
Myrdal, Alva. PROSPECTS FOR DISARMAMENT. Pax et libertas, v. 32, Oct./Dec. 1967: 46.
P&GP RR

The nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which is an important first step to total nuclear disarmament, must contain some commitment by the superpowers to pursue negotiations with speed and perseverance to arrive at further agreements, notably, a comprehensive test ban and cutoff agreement. The absence of assurances by the superpowers that they will limit nuclear weapons production has been a disappointment for the nonnuclear community. The preamble to the nonproliferation treaty should be amended to give greater emphasis to the sequence of disarmament negotiations. It should also include a declaration of intent that would recall the pledge made by the signatory powers to the partial test ban treaty that they would seek "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions."

814
NUCLEAR DICTATORSHIP VS. NONPROLIFERATION. Minority of one, v. 10, Jan. 1968: 4-5.
AP2.M55985 v. 10

The only common interests shared by the United States and the Soviet Union are in the negotiation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, retention of their supremacy vis-a-vis all other countries and their particular concern about China's development of the hydrogen bomb and ballistic missiles. Otherwise the United States would prefer to freeze its present nuclear force relative to that of the Soviet Union, whereas the U.S.S.R. has no reason to voluntarily remain at its present nuclear disadvantage and therefore continues to develop its offensive and defensive nuclear weapons at full speed. Whether the Russo-American differences can be reconciled is uncertain. A softer attitude toward East Germany is one of the inducements the United States can offer. But Soviet Russia has many advantages in the present situation and is not likely to bargain them away. If the nonnuclear countries sign the nonproliferation treaty, they certainly will come under a joint American-Soviet nuclear aegis, which could easily result in an anti-Chinese nuclear coalition. The question of whether this is enough to induce Russia to become a somewhat junior partner or the United States to share its nuclear supremacy with the Soviet Union remains unanswered.

815
NUCLEAR HOAX CANNOT SAVE US IMPERIALISTS, SOVIET REVISIONISTS, SAYS JEN-MIN JIH-PAO. Survey of China mainland press, no. 4016, Sept. 7,

1967: 25-27. DS777.55.U52, 1967
Jên min jih pao, Sept. 3, 1967.
HX389.J38, 1967
Hsin hua t'ung hsün shê [New China News Agency] release, English, Peking, Sept. 3, 1967.
DS777.55.H656, 1967

The so-called draft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation is the latest hoax concocted by the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists to betray the interests of the revolutionary peoples of the world. The treaty would permit the United States and Soviet Union to maintain their special status as nuclear overlords while depriving nonnuclear nations of developing nuclear weapons to resist U.S.-Soviet threats and aggression. Since the warmongering U.S. imperialists and their lackeys would retain their nuclear forces, the treaty would not lessen the threat of nuclear war. It is only a treacherous attempt to wreck the revolutionary movements of the world and realize the Soviet-U.S. pipedream of world domination. The revolutionary peoples of the world will not be cowed, however, and nothing can save the imperialist-revisionist collaborators from their inevitable doom as enemies of the people.

816
THE NUCLEAR TIME BOMB: REPORT TO U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT BY THE TASK FORCE ON NUCLEAR ARMS ESCALATION. Saturday review, v. 50, Dec. 9, 1967: 16-19, 70-72, 74-75. illus. Z1219.S25, v. 50

Points out the enormous destructive potential within the world's nuclear armories. The report gives figures on casualties in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and comments on the aftereffects of radiation in terms of disabilities in future generations. It also paints a picture of a city with a population over 1,000,000 bombed with the more powerful hydrogen, or fusion, bomb and refers to studies of hypothetical nuclear attacks on an industrial region, a small country, and metropolitan areas in the United States, estimating immediate losses and long term somatic and genetic effects. Theoretical studies of nuclear weapons use in a field war reveal that physical destruction would amount to six times the damage of all Second World War bombing. The report elaborates on the cost of further development of nuclear weapons and their economic and security implications and concludes that the security of all countries will be promoted by international agreements against further proliferation of nuclear weapons and accord on arms control and disarmament measures.

817
Richardson, James L. CONTROLS OVER PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS: A REVIEW. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Dec. 1967: 497-503.
JX1901.J6, v. 11

Compares and reviews Lawrence Scheinman's Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965) and Wayland Young's collection Existing Mechanisms of Arms Control (Oxford, New York, Pergamon Press, 1966). Both books deal with past experience, something of a novelty "in a field where most writing is oriented to the future." Richardson is thus able to discuss safeguards systems in historical perspective, reaching the conclusion that "the recent past does not offer simple lessons for the present." Safeguards can probably not halt proliferation if nations are determined to acquire nuclear weapons, yet the nations of the world are intensely interested in safeguards systems in relation to the rapid proliferation of nuclear power stations.

818
Sinha, K. K. REPORT FROM INDIA. Socialist commentary, Dec. 1967: 15-17.
HX3.S74, 1967

China's nuclear weapons and its unwillingness to accept any form of international discipline make a viable India "essential for both the West and the Soviet Union." And India's image today is rather disturbing. The two decades of Nehru's Congress Party control have come to an end and the country's future is dim. The change in the domestic power balance coincided with a period of economic recession--2 years of drought, starvation, unrest, and violence. India's present foreign policy is affected by distrust abroad and discord at home; the Middle East crisis has split the country along the Moslem-Hindu dividing line. In defense matters, intellectual opinion for the most part favors nuclear weapons. And although Indira Gandhi's party at the center still holds off, Indian chauvinism is rising in the face of China's hydrogen bomb and rumors of possible missile tests across Indian territory. Long-range defense strategy--if there is any--is obscure. In nuclear matters India will probably try to be self-reliant and, left alone, would choose the French way, except that there would be no NATO to come to its aid in case of a crisis. What India, a country of 510 million, needs today is a firm leadership divorced from regional ties, earnest labor, and stepped-up productivity to overcome the economic crisis. Otherwise it may split into the Right and the Left and its economy and law and order may slip even further.

819
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY; WHY? [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967] 9 p. (Its Publication 44)
JX1974.A1U52, no. 44

Outlines briefly the significance of the draft nonproliferation treaty proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva on August 24, 1967, and answers some of the questions that are raised most frequently about the projected treaty. The booklet also includes the text of President Johnson's statement urging ratification of the treaty. U.S. policymakers feel the spread of nuclear weapons would increase the danger of international armed conflict and would monopolize an unreasonable portion of the world's technological and economic resources. Measures to ensure that the nuclear activities of nonnuclear-weapon states remain peaceful would remove the fears that might cause rival states to acquire nuclear weapons and could provide an important first step toward reducing the arsenals of existing nuclear-weapon states.

820
Umanskii, D. [THE REVANCHISTS HAVE DESIGNS ON AFRICA] Revanshisty zariatsia na Afriku. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 11, Oct. 1967: 32-33.
DS1.S7, v. 11

The "anticolonialist" West German ruling circles in reality support colonialism and racism, in collaboration with reactionary regimes in Africa. Bonn's revanchist strategists foresee the strategic utilization of Africa, the "underbelly" of Europe and NATO's "hinterland." Africa has to remain in the Western camp and kept from becoming Communist. Otherwise communism will expand into the Indian Ocean area. To penetrate into Africa, the West Germans are using economic aid to the developing African countries; for the credits granted to them, the Africans are obliged to buy German industrial products on which they pay excessive interest. In addition to Bonn's open diplomatic overtures, over 250 German organizations are conducting intelligence operations in Africa under the cover of cultural and technical work. Bonn is also supplying arms to the Congo and other "hot spots," as well as South Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. The German National Democratic Party has renewed Nazi connections among South African leaders. The West German concerns Krupp and Siemens-Schuckert, among others, have made arrangements with Pretoria for producing atomic weapons. The West German rocketry specialist T. Schuman has an important position on South Africa's atomic energy organization board. An exchange of visits and negotiations between Germany's Minister of the Interior, and Pretoria's Defense Minister, have taken place recently, and Bonn has a military base near Tsumeb, "an ideal training polygon for war in the desert."

4. Other (Accidental War, Command and Control of Weapons, etc.)

821
Rothenberg, Jerome. STRATEGY, ARMS CONTROL, AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS. In Issues in defense economics. Edited by Roland N. McKean. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research; distributed by Columbia University Press, 1967. p. 67-104. (Universities-National Bureau Conference series, 20)
HC110. D4I8

A theoretical examination of "the two-way relationship between the size and composition of military forces on one hand, and appropriate military strategies for employing them (which includes not using them) on the other." The author analyzes the relationship of U.S. arms control and disarmament [AC and D] policies (current and hypothetical) to its nuclear strategies (also both current and hypothetical). Problems of symmetry and asymmetry in AC and D agreements and structure and stability of deterrence are also discussed.

822
Telfer, Jonathan. OBLIVION INCORPORATED. Freedom (London) v. 28, Oct. 21, 1967: 1.
HX821. F825, v. 28

The latest additions to Great Britain's weapons stockpile, the death ray bomb and the electronic gun, leave little doubt that those governing us have reached the psychopathic stage. The death ray bomb is an almost perfect battlefield weapon. It produces no radiation and has minimal heat and blast effects. Scientists claim that the bomb would be used for peaceful purposes, while the electronic gun, designed to cause the loss of control of the bowels, is being perfected in the hope of stopping not only riots but world wars. If the money--the major bulk of which comes from the taxpayer--spent for these weapons were to go for worthwhile projects the world could be rid of all disease, poverty, and malnutrition. Instead the mad race toward thermonuclear war continues while the world waits for some crackpot to hurl it into nuclear oblivion. Anarchists, liberals, and every intelligent human being must unite to protest and demonstrate against "this system which spawns on monetary greed." The younger generation must be won by the sensible anarchist philosophy, which extols freedom, not the antifreedom of capitalism and communism.

C. REGIONAL

1. Tension Areas

823
Achminow, Herman F. [THE MEDITERRANEAN--A SOVIET-ARAB SEA? SPACE, TIME AND SOCIAL PROCESSES] Das Mittelmeer--eine sowjetisch-arabische See? Raum, Zeit und soziale Prozesse. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Nov. 10, 1967: 567.
U3. W38, v. 11

Many a Western observer concluded from the spectacular Israeli victory over the Arabs in June 1967 that this was also a crushing defeat for Soviet Mediterranean policy. The developments that followed entirely disprove this judgment. Almost immediately after the Arab-Israeli armistice, on Nasser's invitation, the Soviet Navy established a base in Port Said, a strategic point in the Mediterranean. Although it is not a de jure base, it is nevertheless the realization of an age-old Russian dream,--and it was obtained without direct involvement in the war. The Russians instigated the war, anticipating that it would bring misery to the Arab peoples and thus foster the replacement of present Arab governments by Communist regimes. Interestingly enough, at the same time that the Soviet Navy established its base in Egypt, pro-Western Libya asked Great Britain and the United States to vacate their bases on Libyan territory. Removal of the Americans from the Mediterranean is one of the Soviet Union's main objectives. Since the war Moscow has become a Mecca for Arab statesmen even from those nations that did not take part in the war. Over the past few months a number of Arab countries (e.g., Egypt, Sudan, Iraq and Jordan) have made cabinet changes; in each case the new cabinet is friendlier to the Soviet Union than was the old. In Marxist fashion Soviet Near East policy carefully considers elements of time, space, and social process and is long-range in concept.

824
Apel, Hans. [EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE GERMAN QUESTION] Europäische Integration und deutsche Frage. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Dec. 25, 1967: 886-892. D839. E86, v. 22

Gives economic and political reasons for the integration of Western Europe. For Germans the paramount political reason is that only integration, not a nation-state policy, can bring about German reunification.

825
Badgley, John H. BURMA'S CHINA CRISIS: THE CHOICES AHEAD. Asian survey, v. 7, Nov. 1967: 753-761. DS1. A492, v. 7

Traditionally Burma has never alined itself with a foreign power outside the Irrawaddy-Salween region, but it is on the verge of modifying its isolationist policy because its relations with China have become "bankrupt." In 1967, after almost 20 years of "détente" between Burma and China, the paukpow (kinfolk) relationship broke down, and Radio Peking commenced unprecedented propaganda attacks against the Burmese Government. Burma was forced to reenter the international arena, a move that has greatly displeased China. General Ne Win decided to visit the United States to renew a small military aid program and India to negotiate a longstanding boundary dispute. Burma also allowed correspondents from major Western newspapers to enter the country for the first time in 4 years and sponsored a technical team that toured India to analyze radio and telecommunication facilities. The deterioration of relations between China and Burma parallels the experiences of some of Burma's neighbors and is part of a global tactic to undermine unfriendly governments directed by China. In its new international role Burma must now decide whether it should seek association with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, join a mutual defense pact with Japan and Indonesia, or ask for large-scale Soviet aid. The United States must not ignore Burma's plight. To ignore it would save money in the short run but would create far greater long-run costs on the Asian mainland if the Maoists prevail in China.

826
Beaufre, André. [A MODERN CONVENTIONAL WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR] Une guerre classique moderne: la guerre Israelo-Arabe. Strategie, no. 13, July/Sept. 1967: 7025. illus.
U162. S78, 1967

Although Israel won the war in the Middle East last June its Arab neighbors are holding the political trump cards in its aftermath. Israel failed to break up the Arab coalition and indirectly bring about Nasser's downfall and has yet to negotiate a political settlement in the wake of its superbly executed military victory. Within the realm of "total strategy" or cold-war politics and nuclear deterrence the United States was unable to help Israel negotiate a favorable political settlement because of America's involvement in Vietnam and its need to maintain peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand the Arab States have the support of Russia and Red China and wield a tremendous influence in the West because of their valuable oil resources. Israel's primary objective, its survival, has been attained, but its military victory--which appears to have been aimed at purely military goals--has up to now precluded any peaceful political settlement in the Near East.

827
Berner, Wolfgang. [THE KARLOVY VARY PROGRAM OF ACTION. A BALANCE SHEET ON THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF EUROPE ON QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY] Das Karlsbader Aktionsprogramm. Eine Bilanz der Konferenz der kommunistischen Parteien Europas über Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, June 10, 1967: 393-400.
D839. E86, v. 22

The main goal of the 1967 Karlovy Vary Conference was to denounce the Atlantic alliance as a tool of American ambitions for world domination and of German revenge-seeking imperialism and as a major obstacle to European peace and security. The Budapest Declaration, which called for a meeting of all European governments to establish a system of collective security, was accepted as the Conference platform. Twenty-four of the Communist parties at Karlovy Vary adopted a new declaration supporting the political and territorial status quo in Europe--which is tantamount to permanent partition of Germany into two states--as the basis for a collective security system. This action of course would not prevent the Soviets from later changing the status quo to Communist advantage. The declaration called for the simultaneous dissolution before 1969 of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, support of the Gomulka plan, and a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The Communists want the treaty in order to restrict the German Federal Republic; without Bonn's signature it would be worthless to them.

828
Boog, Peter. THE PEOPLE'S WAR. Far Eastern economic review, v. 58, Nov. 16, 1967: 314-323.
HC411. F16, v. 58

Burma will be the next victim of Chinese aggression in Asia; its Ne Win regime has already become an open prey of the Mao-inspired Communist Party of Burma. Peking's new belligerence toward Burma is believed to be only a part of a broader Chinese strategy in Southeast Asia. Three vital issues bear on China's present behavior--its ideological rift with the Soviet Union, its new attempt to win the support of overseas Chinese, and the power struggle within its leadership. A direct Red Chinese invasion of Burma, however, is unlikely; instead, a coordinated campaign from within to overthrow the Ne Win regime is expected; it will probably include subversive activities by Chinese Communist agents, full support of the outlawed Communist Party of Burma, and backing of separatist movements in Burma's minority states. With all these threats from within and without, the Ne Win government has turned for help both to the United States and to the Soviet Union. The United States has responded by extending and broadening its aid. The Soviet Union has also pledged to help Burma in its troubles with China. And here the Soviet position is unique. While in Vietnam Moscow is aiding a "war of national liberation," its offer to aid Ne Win puts Moscow in the position of suppressing a "war of national liberation," for in Burma the Soviet national interest--in its ideological clash with China--is at stake. Thus in Burma, for the first time since the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the United States have the same aim--containment of China.

829
Braham, Mark. The Gordian knot of the Israeli-Arab problem. Issues, v. 21, autumn 1967: 27-30.
E184. J5A327, v. 21

The Arab-Israeli deadlock has posed a threat to world peace for almost 20 years. Finding a solution acceptable for both Jews and Arabs requires, however, that the issues be properly defined and the core of the problem confronted. Most of the world's Jews who call themselves Zionists are not Zionist by definition, for they do not plan to go to Israel. Jewish migration from the West is almost nonexistent, while there is a steady stream of Jews leaving Israel for

countries in the West. Zionism survives only because anti-Semitism remains; if the latter vanished and Arab pressure on Israel ceased, "Zionism as a world-wide political movement would slowly die." The 11 million Jews outside Israel would cease to support it, and Israel would become another Levantine state, Jewish only in the sense that America is Christian. The Arabs do not realize that one way to destroy both political Zionism and the "Jewish state" character of Israel is "to leave the Jews and Israel alone." Jewry has not faced up to the religious side of Zionism and several questions remain unanswered--whether it is a Jew's duty to settle in Israel, how to perpetuate its Jewishness when the present Arab birth rate is four times higher than the Jewish, and how to accommodate Israeli racist measures with Jewish teachings. Yet the main problem is to decide "what Zionism means in terms of practical politics." It will then become evident that the only kind of state Zionism can make acceptable to Jewish teaching will also be acceptable to Arabs. But the Arabs dread Israeli expansion, and Israel sees in the Arabs' return a danger of a fifth column--thus to quell their fears is the first step toward a solution in the Middle East. Then justice must be done to the refugees, and Jews everywhere must be guaranteed entry into Israel if they wish to go there. Beyond this there are "utopian" solutions: extension of the Israeli Law of Return to all refugees, including Palestinian Arabs; a United Nations guarantee of the existence of the State of Israel "in its present delimitation" and, in return, assignment of the Israel Armed Forces to the U. N. peacekeeping force in the Middle East; and transformation of the Zionist movement into an international interdenominational welfare organization, with Jerusalem made into an ecumenical capital for Jews, Arabs, and Christians working together to provide "the most effective challenge to militant atheism in the world." Certain U. N. activities would also be transferred to Jerusalem, which would then become an international center of organizations working for peace.

830
Brandt, Willy. AFTER TWO WORLD WARS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 34, Dec. 1, 1967: 106-111.
PN6121. V52, v. 34

"Delivered by Willy Brandt in the Auditorium Maximum of the Free University in Berlin on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Walther Rathenau, October 6, 1967."

The only chance for Europe to play an important role in world development lies in unification. To find Germany's place in such a framework requires an understanding of its limited possibilites in international affairs. Germany lost both world wars, which left it mutilated and with an uncertain future. But the Germany of 1919 had statesmen like Walther Rathenau, who understood that one can further the interests of one's country better through understanding the interests of other countries. His thinking on the constructive and peaceful organization of European relationships is closely linked to German efforts toward European unification today. French-German reconciliation is at last a reality, but the time is also ripe for inviting into the European community others who wish to cooperate. In the process of being organized, however, Europe should not "turn its back on the United States." At the same time West Germany must and will oppose any Soviet export of its ideas on the organization of society when they interfere with German internal affairs. The logical result of the German peace policy is renunciation of the use of force. This the Federal Republic of Germany is ready to "embody in a form binding in international law." Such a treaty would ease tension and also include both parts of Germany in a process of rapprochement and cooperation in Europe. Germany can help win the peace by settling "the bill for Hitler's war"--a Germany without delusions of greatness, free from the eternal yesterday; a Germany which has proved itself through peaceful achievements.

831
CHINESE ATTACK ON BURMA. Intelligence digest, no. 349, Dec. 1967: 7-9.
D410. R47, 1967

The Communist Chinese may be attempting to overthrow the Burmese Government and create a second Vietnam. There are indications of large-scale Chinese infiltration into Burma--the infiltrators are disguised as refugees--and a "resistance army," which is being trained in China. Burmese-Chinese relations have deteriorated, and with American ascendancy in Vietnam the Chinese may be organizing a diversionary revolution in Burma. The increase in terrorist activity there may be evidence that the "war of liberation" has already begun; whether Burma has the capacity to fight back will be severely tested in the coming months.

832
Christ, Hans. [THE ROLE OF NATIONS IN EUROPE. YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW? A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION ON "EUROPE, YES, BUT HOW?"] Die Rolle der Nationen in Europa. Gestern, heute, morgen? Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zum Thema "Europa, ja, aber wie?" 3., überarbeitete und erw. Aufl. Andernach, Pontes-Verlag [1967] 93 p. (Kleine Europabibliothek, Bd. 3)
JC311. C4578

Partial contents. --What is a nation [a people] really?--The genesis of nations in Europe. --The German people, a special case. --Nationalism and a nation. --The role of nations in a United Europe.

Feels that an age-old trend toward "national differentiation" in Europe has already given way to one of European integration. A united Europe by no means need replace the ethnic groups and states that now exist in Europe. Christ argues that an integrated Europe may give them fuller expression than present states do.

833
Cook, Chris. EMPIRE AT WAR. Socialist commentary, Jan. 1968: 24-25. HX3. S74, 1968

Comments on the futile struggle of Portugal, the last of Europe's old colonial powers, to preserve its African possessions. The war against the rising wave of African nationalism cannot be won. and it is tragic for both Africa and heavily taxed Portuguese. In the three African colonies some 165,000 Portuguese troops are trying to defend the "Portuguese way of life." The outcome of the struggle, however, will be of major importance not only for Portugal but for all of Africa south of the Zambezi.

834
Decalo, Samuel. AFRICA AND THE MID-EASTERN WAR. Africa report, v. 12, Oct. 1967: 57-61. illus.
DT1.A217, v. 12

Although a U.N. vote is not a perfect yardstick for measuring a nation's amity, the support in the General Assembly that Israel received from the majority of sub-Saharan African countries following the Arab-Israeli War seems to indicate that its efforts to make friends in Africa have paid off. Over a 10-year period Israel has invested in large-scale technical cooperation programs in Africa, established diplomatic missions, and encouraged high-level political contacts mainly because Israeli policymakers consider Africa to be a source of moral backing for negotiations between the Arab states and Israel. Africa qualifies for the role of negotiator since it is friendly with both the Arab States and Israel and is free from prejudices regarding the "fratricidal struggle" in the Middle East. Most sub-Saharan African states were sympathetic to Israel at the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War. However, only 20 of the 32 sub-Saharan nations fully or equivocally supported the pro-Israeli resolution in the special session of the General Assembly. This support is impressive, though, when one considers all the pressures brought to bear on delegations at the emergency session. None of the resolutions reflected just the Arab or the Israeli positions in the dispute. They all carried overtones of broader cold war issues that many Africans wished to avoid, and the major powers exerted their influence to obtain support for the resolutions they favored. Some Africans who were initially partial to Israel could have changed their minds because of sympathy for the Arabs in their humiliating defeat. Finally, a number of African delegates could have been influenced by their Arab comrades to vote for the pro-Arab resolution even though their home governments were pro-Israel.

835
Doernberg, S. [EUROPEAN SECURITY AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES] Normalisierung der Beziehungen zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten und die europäische Sicherheit. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 19, June 1967: 1-3.
DD261.D4, v. 19

The Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (East Germany's ruling party), held in April 1967, offered a constructive program for European security. It called for normalization of relations between the two German states, their renunciation of the use of force against each other, their recognition of the European status quo, their mutual reduction of military expenditures, and their eschewal of acquisition, possession, sharing, and use of nuclear weapons in any form. Despite its assurances to the contrary, the Kiesinger government pursues, in fact, a policy of aggravating East-West tensions. Its proclaimed goal is a change in the European status quo. It has not renounced its claims to sole representation of all Germany or to the territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. Motivated by revenge seeking, it aspires to the possession of nuclear weapons or the right of co-determination of their use.

836
Eban, Abba. RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Jewish frontier, v. 34, Dec. 1967: 7-10.
DS149.A324, v. 34

Excerpts "from Foreign Minister Eban's address at the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 25."

If the United Nations is to play a constructive role in the achievement of peace in the Middle East, it must pave the way for negotiations between Israel and the Arab States. To do this the United Nations must avoid the tendency to make its existence a substitute for negotiation and a barrier to direct settlement. Negotiations are the only insurance of peace, and, as long as the Arab States refuse to negotiate, Israel will never regard the state of belligerency as terminated. By rejecting the principles of negotiation, recognition, and conciliation the Arab Governments have placed their relations with Israel outside the U.N. Charter context and "thus forfeit their moral and legal right to invoke the Charter in their own cause." The primary responsibility for the aggravation of hatred and rancor in the Middle East belongs to the Soviet Union, which as a result of its program of one-sided arms importation must take the blame for much of the tension that led to the war in June. Peace in the Middle East can only be attained if the Arab States recognize the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign state and to remain secure as a lawful member of the international community.

837
Erkelenz, Peter. [THE PRESENT SECURITY POLICY SITUATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. A CONTRIBUTION TO A SITUATIONAL APPRAISAL FROM THE GERMAN STANDPOINT] Die sicherheitspolitische Lage der Bundesrepublik heute. Beitrag zu einer Lagebeurteilung aus deutscher Sicht. Wehrkunde, v. 16, Sept. 1967: 454-465.
U3.W396, v. 16

West Germany's geopolitical situation predisposes it to play a key role in Europe. For Moscow the Federal Republic of Germany is the number-one European enemy, since it stands in the way of Soviet efforts to disarm Western Europe militarily and technologically. The Soviets will more and more use the East German Communists to undermine West Germany's role in Europe. It is not danger of all-out war that the Federal Republic now faces, but the threat of "limited intervention" in West German affairs by the Communists. American interests in Europe are mostly economic, and for their recognition by the Soviet Union Washington would agree on denuclearization of Europe. NATO as a military alliance is still essential for West German security, but it is increasingly becoming America's instrument for achieving East-West détente, arms control, and disarmament. It is not through NATO that the Federal Republic can pursue its policy of German reunification.

838
[FOR THE JUST CAUSE OF THE ARAB PEOPLES] Za pravoe delo arabskikh narodov. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 11, Oct. 1967: 25.
DS1.S7, v. 11

Events in the Near East after June 1967 demonstrate that the conflict was not local but was a plot by international imperialist reactionaries to use Israel's war machinery to overthrow the progressive Arab States. In the war Arab nations fought to preserve their social and economic achievements and for the freedom and integrity of their territories and

their sovereign right to solve their internal and foreign problems. Today confidence is growing in the possibility of a political settlement that would ensure the withdrawal of the aggressors from the Arab territories and guarantee peace and security in the Near East. The leading Arab States reject slanderous conjectures about inadequate Soviet assistance to the Arabs in their fight. The Arabs are grateful to the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries for their moral and political help, which strengthens the Arab position in the international forum, and their material aid, which increases the Arab defensive power in case of new military provocation. Peking's anti-Soviet intrigues, are nothing but talk and abuse of the imperialists.

839
Geiss, Imanuel. THE GERMANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. Midstream, v. 13, Nov. 1967: 3-10.
DS149.A336, v. 13

Reactions to the Arab-Israeli conflict in West Germany reflected the political division of the country, the traditional German anti-Semitism and sympathy for the Arabs, the cold war, and the war in Vietnam--all influencing German sentiment on the Middle East question to varying degrees. The June 1967 Middle East war flushed the emotions of West Germany's four major political blocs into the open. Intellectuals on the extreme left, who oppose America's involvement in Vietnam, supported the Arabs against Israel, because it was protected by the United States. The moderate left, however, remembering the crimes committed by the Third Reich against the Jews, rose against the Arab attempt at genocide, disregarding the stand of the Socialist camp. This group backed Israel in spite of the Vietnam War but remained highly critical of Dayan's annexationism, bearing in mind Germany's own nationalistic blindness during the imperial and Nazi eras. The core of the "respectable" right, which represents a latently anti-Semitic segment of German society, was naturally for the Arabs, having in common with them nostalgia for past glories and dreams of future unity. But because the Arabs were supported by the Soviets, the rightists made a sudden about-face to admiration of Israel's blitzkrieg. The extreme right grasped the opportunity provided by the war to strike against its democratic enemies and, although staunchly anti-Communist, found itself on the side of the Soviet Union and China. The Middle East conflict has indeed thrown together rather strange bedfellows.

840
Girling, J. L. S. NORTHEAST THAILAND: TOMORROW'S VIET NAM? Foreign affairs, v. 46, Jan. 1968: 388-397. D410.F6, v. 46

Although years of extreme poverty and official neglect make northeast Thailand a prospective seat of insurgency, the Communists have not yet succeeded in promoting open rebellion in that area. The majority of its inhabitants are not interested in armed rebellion against the Government but, instead, want Government aid to improve their standard of living. Many who join the guerrilla bands in search of a better life soon become disillusioned and give themselves up to the authorities. Unlike the Vietcong, the Thai Communists do not have political control of the rural areas. Their military activities are severely curtailed by Government security forces and the lack of easily defensible geographic strongholds. Furthermore, they lack the effective leadership and popular appeal needed to expand the insurgency. None of the Thai Communists possesses the talent of either Ho-chi-Minh or Mao Tse-tung, nor is there any real rallying point, such as "feudal oppression" or the presence of an external enemy, to incite the Thai people to rebellion. However, the Communists can still exploit the economic discontent and sense of isolation in northeast Thailand if the Government does not step up its programs to remedy these conditions. By improving its development programs and increasing its military strength in the area, the Government could easily stop any threat of a Communist takeover.

841
Gritz, Sidney. THE JORDAN WATERS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Dec. 1967: 56-64. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 47

Capsules the conflict over the waters of the Jordan River, one of the crucial issues of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Colonel Gritz analyzes the nations involved and the uses to which the river can be put. He concludes that political factors offer little hope for a peaceful solution but that technology may yet provide an answer. If Israel can desalinate Mediterranean Sea waters, it can create an artificial Jordan River within its boundaries.

842
Guggenheim, Willy. [BOURGUIBA'S BASIC TRUTH] Bourguibas elementare Wahrheit. Weltwoche, no. 1770, Oct. 13, 1967: 1.
AP32.W4, 1967

At a time when the "honest broker" Marshal Tito compares the Israelis with the Nazis, when anti-Semitic caricatures of the Stürmer era are being refurbished, President Bourguiba of Tunisia recommends Arab-Israeli cooperation. Bourguiba believes that the Arabs understand the language of reason, despite opinions to the contrary, and that the Arab leaders should guide their people, not follow them, and start direct negotiations with Israel in order to find out its plans and intentions. If President Nasser does not understand this he must resign. Cooperation between the Arabs and Israelis is possible, and during their collaboration the Arabs will learn that the "Jews are human beings just the same as other people." The "voice of reason" is the only way out of the Near East crisis because no delegate to the U.N. General Assembly would dare in public to consider direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, and President Johnson will not, a year before elections, pressure Israel to accept doubtful U.N. guarantees. Moscow is pleased with the muddled situation in the Near East; and guarantees of free navigation to Eilat given by Paris and London lost their meaning after the Gulf of Aqaba blockade.

843
Hinterhoff, E. GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND POLAND'S INTERESTS. Poland & Germany, v. 11, Jan./June 1967: 7-13.
DK418.5.G3P55, v. 11

Considers Poland's opposition to German reunification to be motivated by fear of a reunited Germany's political and military power in Europe. A Germany

reunited on a bilateral basis, even with its eastern frontier along the Oder-Neisse line, would pose an enormous danger to peace and stability in Europe. It would then be worthwhile for Moscow to lure Germany to its own side by a new Rapallo with "sinister implications" for Poland. Given the "mischief-making methods of Soviet diplomacy," the possibility of a bilateral German-Soviet accord on German reunification at the expense of Poland cannot be excluded. A broad East-West settlement embracing the whole area of central and eastern Europe would be most satisfactory for Poland.

844
Kabel, Rudolf. [MILITARIZATION OF THE SOVIET-OCCUPIED ZONE OF GERMANY. REPORT AND DOKUMENTATION] Die Militarisierung der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands. Bericht und Dokumentation. Bonn, Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1966. 316 p. illus. (Bonner Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschland)
UA719.3.K25

Partial contents.--Development of military organizations in the Soviet-Occupied Zone (SBZ) before 1965. --Militarization of the SBZ by legislation.--Ideological alinement of the armed forces.--Inclusion of other organizations and institutions in the militarization process.--Agitation for militarization.

Contains the full-texts of East German documents and official pronouncements. The accompanying report shows the advanced stage of militarization of the East German social fabric, which includes military training of school children.

845
Karnow, Stanley. THE LOOKING GLASS WAR. Far Eastern economic review, v. 58, Dec. 21, 1967: 539-542, 547. illus. HC411.F18, v. 58

Thailand is not a fertile field for another war of national liberation. Unlike the peasants of Vietnam, who owe their lot to the French colonial rule and later the "heavy-handed Saigon Governments," Thailand's poor owe their poverty to barren soil, droughts, and floods. Moreover, the Thais were never subjected to European domination--thus the most important element in Asia, the national theme, is lacking, and there are few converts to communism among the Thais. Although the Peking- and Hanoi-planned insurrection made little headway, Bangkok is taking the insurgency problem seriously, dramatizing the menace, to justify political moves. The effort against the insurgents is becoming increasingly Americanized, and the Thais may be tempted to let the Americans handle the more tiresome tasks. At present, however, Communist guerrillas in Thailand are no more able to wage an insurgency campaign than its Government is to resist one.

846
Langer, Paul F. LAOS: SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDST OF WAR. Asian survey, v. 8, Jan. 1968: 80-86. DS1.A492, v. 8

1967 was a relatively good year for Laos despite floods and ruined crops, friction among the three leading political faction--the rightists, neutralists, and the Communist Pathet Lao--and clashes between the Prime Minister and the National Assembly. Neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is consolidating his political position and remains, although precariously, the dominant figure in Laotian politics. He met with President Johnson to get more military aid in the hope of bolstering neutralist forces against the Pathet Lao. In addition a famine was recently averted and efforts are being undertaken to improve tax collection and communications; progress is being made in the reduction of graft and corruption. Attempts to give the country a national identity were made: the Crown Prince traveled to several hamlets so that Laotians could see their next King, and the Luang Prabang royal house was renovated to provide a symbol of national unity. The U.S. economic aid program has played an influential role in the improvement of Laotian education and the economy in the building of new schools and feeder roads. Although the Communists hold about half the country, they control not more than 20 percent of the total population. The Laotian Armed Forces have repulsed several Pathet Lao attacks in the north, but neither side has the strength to attack major enemy positions. However, the positive political and military factors in Laos are overshadowed by political inefficiency and lack of internal security, and it is doubtful whether Souvanna Phouma's diplomacy can preserve peace in this tiny kingdom.

847
Liska, Ladislav. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS. Disarmament, no. 15, Sept. 1967: 5-8. illus.
JX1981.P7D5, 1967

Although the nuclear stalemate has created relative stability in Europe, it has stood in the way of European security and cooperation. The Socialist countries are striving to replace the military blocs and achieve general and complete disarmament, thus establishing a system of all-European security. Two main problems directly affect European security: the normalization of relations between West Germany and the East European countries and nuclear proliferation. Normalization of relations is hampered by West Germany's positions, especially its pretended right to exclusively represent the whole of Germany. West Germany must abandon these positions if diplomatic relations are to be restored. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty will not be signed until the questions of inspection and security are resolved. Czechoslovakia considers the International Atomic Energy Agency, because of its international character, the only competent organization for inspection. If European cooperation is going to be realized, statesmen must avoid intensifying or complicating the situation, and they must clarify ideas on the permanent safeguarding of European security and strive for agreement on partial security measures.

848
THE MEDITERRANEAN MENACE. La menace méditeranéenne. Orde français, v. 11, Sept./Oct. 1967: 62-64. DC1.O72, v. 11

Deplores the French turnover of the Mers-el-Kebir base to Algeria because the base may become a springboard for Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean. The Mers-el-Kebir arsenals, workshops, barracks, command posts, and even roads are underground, protected against nuclear attack. The base, equipped with American help, was so important to General de

Gaulle that he made Algerian independence conditional on 15 additional years of French control at Mers-el-Kebir. Now, however, the base is being evacuated; Frenchmen are leaving, and the most likely new occupant will be the Soviet Navy. Twice in one month a Soviet naval unit has made unofficial visits to Algiers. According to Western sources Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean have trebled in the past 3 years, and Europe is getting nervous. But instead of simply worrying about the Mediterranean, Europe should strengthen NATO's conventional forces and be on guard for possible Soviet aggression from the south.

849
Mestrovic, Matthew M. CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S NOVOTNY: FALL OF A COMMUNIST CZAR. Commonweal, v. 87, Jan. 26, 1968: 488-489.
AP2.C6897, v. 87

The downfall of the Czechoslovak "unrestricted Stalinist boss" confirms the continuing ebb of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Communism today has nothing positive or new to offer to the nations in this area. The struggle within the Czechoslovak Communist Party was not an ideological one, but a clash between the younger technocrats and the old party veterans put in power by the Soviet-managed coup of 1948. In a broader context the Czechoslovak events were parallel to developments in Western Europe, where France has refused to cooperate in NATO. They indicate the general European desire to overcome the division of Europe into American and Soviet spheres and belief that the superpowers cooperate to maintain a divided Europe. The U.S. rejection of the imaginative Rapacki Plan for the neutralization of central Europe and withdrawal of both Soviet and U.S. troops has been partly responsible for the slow retreat of the Russians from Eastern Europe and the unrelenting Soviet fight against the evolution of East European regimes.

850
Mezerik, A. G. ADEN: NEWEST MIDDLE EAST COCKPIT. War/peace report, v. 7, Oct. 1967: 13-16.
P&GP RR

When the British pull their troops out of oil-rich Aden in January 1968, there will be a race between many Arab political and tribal factions and almost all the major world powers to fill the vacuum in this highly strategic area. President Nasser of Egypt had just maneuvered into the best position for takeover--by occupying Yemen which borders South Arabia--when his defeat in the Sinai forced him to withdraw most of his troops from Yemen and to agree to a plebiscite there. However, he still has a foothold in Aden with his allies among the nationalist groups that are assuming power in South Arabia. Until the South Arabian Army mutiny last June, the main nationalist organization was the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, which was openly allied with Egypt. At that time its main rival, the National Liberation Front, which has no ties with Egypt, appeared to have the greatest influence with the South Arabian Army and people and emerged as the leader of the nationalist groups. The British now have admitted the failure of their attempts to design a British-dominated federal government for South Arabia and recognize that nationalist forces control most of the Federation of Arabia. With the race for control of South Arabia between rival foreign and national political factions, the imminent British military withdrawal from Aden, and the unresolved fate of the little island of Perim, which dominates the southern entrance to the Red Sea, the explosive potential in that area is very high.

851
Piszczkowski, Tadeusz. THE GERMAN PROBLEM. Poland & Germany, v. 11, Jan./June 1967: 21-39.
DK418.5.G3P55, v. 11

Describes Great Power policies regarding the German problem since early in World War II. Piszczkowski considers the influence of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences and decisions on the present situation and its future solution. The author regrets that West German political leadership has not yet reconciled itself to Germany's postwar boundaries and thus has obstructed the eventual reunification of Germany. Formal renunciation by Bonn of territorial claims against Germany's neighbors is a prerequisite for the solution of the German problem, including German reunification.

852
Politicheskii konsul'tativnyi komitet gosudarstv - uchastnikov Varshavskogo dogovora o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi pomoshchi. MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES, BUCHAREST, JULY 4-6, 1966. MEETING OF THE LEADERS OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES AND OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MUTUAL ECONOMIC AID COUNCIL MEMBER COUNTRIES, BUCHAREST, JULY 7, 1966. [Bucharest] Agerpres [1966] 15 p. D847.P6

Partial contents.--Communique on the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States [text].--Declaration [by the Committee] on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe [text].

European peace and security has been most seriously threatened by West German territorial claims and revenge seeking. Only through "gradual rapprochement between the two sovereign German states" can German reunification be achieved and a solution to the German problem found that would permanently eliminate the German threat to European security. The Committee suggests the convocation of a "general European conference" to deal with the European peace and security problem. While stressing "the most important aspects of ensuring European security," the declaration does not purport to limit its signatories' freedom to individually explore, in bilateral or multilateral talks with other nations, other means for solving the problem.

853
Roucek, Joseph S. AFRICA IN GEOPOLITICS. International review of history and political science, v. 4, Dec. 1967: 76-96. D839.I54, v. 4

No other part of the world has experienced such striking political changes as Africa in the past decades. There were only four sovereign states in Africa in 1951--by October 1965, 36 African nations had achieved independence, although transformation of "traditional African tribal values into the modern concept of new national governments has been difficult." The geopolitical advantages of Africa were once apparent to European colonial powers as is its strategic impor-

293-980 O - 68 - 7

tance to world powers today--the closeness of Europe and Asia as well as the mere 1,800 mile distance between the western bulge of Africa and the easternmost part of South America. "Africa now figures in the Communist designs for world domination." However cries of alarm about the Communist danger there are exaggerated. The term communism "has come to mean little more than purposeful opposition to any existing regime." The Russians started focusing on Africa only in the late fifties. Then they tried to identify with all "liberation" movements--the wave of subversion that spilled across Africa in 1963 was hardly a coincidence. Yet Communist activities in Africa are split: the Chinese being non-Europeans enjoy greater advantages with their 16 diplomatic missions (1965) than the Russians with their two dozen. While Communist interest in Africa contributes to Africa's sense of importance, it also leads to African awareness of the true Communist objectives there, which conflict with the national interests of African nations. U.S. policy toward Africa is based on self-determination; unfortunately it is sometimes "clumsy" and to black Africans often seems malicious. A great deal depends on the American attitude toward the white African governments: if the United States "sits on its hands or appears to side" with them, then Afro-American relations may again take a plunge--the ideological elements appearing stronger than ever "in the geopolitical framework of Africa's international and internal situation."

854
Rupen, Robert A., and Robert Farrell, eds. VIETNAM AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. New York, Published for the Institute for the Study of the USSR [by] F. A. Praeger [1967] 120 p. (Praeger publications in Russian history and world communism, no. 198)
DS557.A6V413

Contents.--Background to the Vietnam War: an introduction, by Milton Sacks.--North Vietnam's model of strategy and tactics for revolution, by P. J. Honey.--Military considerations in Vietnam, by David Galula.--Relations between the USSR and Vietnam, by Joachim Glaubitz.--The influence of the war in Vietnam on the economy of Communist China, by Bernhard Grossmann.--Repercussions in Japan, by Richard Storry.--Panel discussion: the applicability of the policy of containment in Asia.--Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet dispute: a summary, by Robert A. Rupen.

Investigates the ramifications of Sino-Soviet relations for the Vietnam War. North Vietnam's stresses are increased by the dispute, with pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions warring for supremacy within Ho's government. However, little indication of Chinese entry into the war exists because, among other reasons, Peking cannot count on Soviet support. North Vietnam sees the Soviet Union as a potential counterweight to China, and Moscow wields an increasingly strong influence in Hanoi. All the parties involved in the war, of course, "face severe problems and limitations." The United States will probably achieve its aims in Vietnam, but this will not decisively determine the future course of the East-West, democracy-communism struggle.

855
Rutherford, Evan. ISRAEL AND THE BOMB. Cambridge review, v. 89A, Dec. 2, 1967: 157-160.
LH5.C2C3, v. 89A

Contrary to popular belief the present Middle East situation is not one of peace but of smoldering conflict. An equilibrium has been reached in conventional fighting, but the war is being continued by other means--by Arab terrorism, passive resistance in Israeli-held areas, and Egypt's closing of the Suez Canal to pressure Israel through the Western powers. Some 80 percent of Arab war losses have been restituted and Arab forces now function as a deterrent to Israeli counteraction as does the presence of Soviet warships in Port Said and Alexandria. The Arabs seem to have changed their goal from eliminating Israel to "removal of the consequences of Israeli aggression." Nuclear weapons could bring the situation to a head, but there is no evidence that either side intends to acquire or develop a nuclear bomb, though they both have the potential. This temporary balance is being upset by the apprehension that the opponent may acquire the bomb first. But "nuclear weapons would work to Israel's disadvantage," confronting it with a choice of striking first or being eliminated by a surprise attack. Thus the wise course for Israel may be to forestall the issue by refraining from building a nuclear deterrent, by international nonproliferation arrangements, and by elimination of the "underlying sources of conflict" with its neighbors. The last, an issue which will command attention for the next decade, concerns pr.marily the Palestinian refugees and the Arabs in Israeli-occupied territories. Israel could take a number of steps that may seem one-sided concessions but would actually bolster its security: permit inspection of Israeli nuclear reactors, accept international supervision in East Jerusalem, and withdraw from all but strategically vital conquered areas. This would by no means bring a final solution to the Middle East problems, but the present situation cannot exist indefinitely without grave risk.

856
Schramm, Werner. [THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND RUSSIA'S STATE REASON] Deutschlands Wiedervereinigung und Russlands Staatsräson. Zeitwende, v. 38, Dec. 1967: 793-796.
BR4.Z83, v. 38

A belief that West German legal and moral arguments for German reunification can make the Kremlin act justly and "philanthropically" on the question is as utopian and unrealistic as an idea now propounded by "official Bonn" that Soviet interests in removing tensions from central Europe require the reunification of Germany. A reunited Germany in military alliance with the West is clearly undesirable from the standpoint of Soviet security interests. The Russians can also hardly accept an "Austrian neutrality solution" to the problem. And it is not altogether certain that Moscow would welcome a reunited Communist Germany under Ulbricht's regime, for instance. Continuation of central European tensions, with West Germany as a perfect scapegoat, considerably abates tensions within the Soviet bloc. There are, however, in the present division of Germany four factors that grievously harm Soviet interests: the Berlin situation, West Germany's "provocatively high" standard of living, the German Federal Republic's superiority over the German Democratic Republic in political power, and the North German flatland's key strategic position for naval warfare. At some opportune moment Moscow may "take the risk of making adequate correction."

857
Springmann, Reimar. [NEW TINDERBOX] Neuer Zündstoff. Weltwoche, v. 35, Dec. 8, 1967: 1.
AP32.W4, 1967

The 129 years of British rule in South Arabia ended without fanfare. The allegedly Nasserite National Liberation Front has seized power in the transformed South Yemen People's Republic after bloody fighting against the Front for Liberation of occupied South Yemen. Nasser's plans to expand his influence to South Arabia following the British departure from the area were foiled by Egypt's defeat by the Israelis in June. However, Nasser likes his role of protector of the new radical nationalist Arab state, which could serve as a bridgehead for entry into royalist Yemen and access to Muscat and Oman and the oil resources of the Persian Gulf. South Yemen's future is gloomy. Aden has lost its source of income as a British military base and supply harbor for East Asiatic navigation, and England cannot assist it financially, so South Yemen will accept loans from anybody. Israel is watching events in Aden because South Yemen could use its strategic position on the island of Perim in the Bab el Mandeb Strait to block Israeli ships from entering the Red Sea, although to carry out such a plan, South Yemen must have the cooperation of the French-Somali authorities on the opposite shores. Israel's anxiety is justified, because the radical Arabs are adventurers.

858
SUEZ: TEN YEARS AFTER. Introduced by Peter Calvocoressi. Edited by Anthony Moncrieff. New York, Pantheon Books [1967] 160 p.
DT107.83.C27, 1967

Contents.--Foreword.--A chronology.--Crisis 1956.--Egyptian outlook.--Israel and the Middle East.--Some evidence of collusion.--Political echoes.--Meanwhile in Hungary.--Progress at the United Nations.--The end of an era.--Bibliography.

Studies contemporary history in reprints of the British Broadcasting Corporation's programs prepared in 1966 on the 10th anniversary of the Suez crisis.

859
UAR REFLECTIONS ON ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on the Near East. no. 208; Oct. 17, 1967. Washington. 94 p. (Its JPRS 42,987)
AS36.U57, no. 42,987

"Translations of selected articles from the Arabic-language periodical al-Tali'ah (The Vanguard), Cairo, August 1967." AP95.A6T3, 1967

A series of articles analyzing the Arab-Israeli War and its implications for the Arab world. The discussions conclude that the war was basically an imperialist aggressive movement led by the Americans, who have thus closed the road for peaceful coexistence between America and the Arab world. Now the Arabs should strive for unity among themselves and join with the Socialist world to form a strong progressive force to oppose the imperialist and Zionist enemies. The anti-imperialist movement needs a broad base of popular support in order to succeed, so its first step must be to liberate citizens from the reactionary forces within their own countries. Various tactics and programs are enumerated that would contribute to a Socialist victory.

860
Vandevanter, E. COMMON FUNDING IN NATO. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1967. 122 p. (Rand Corporation. Memorandum RM-5282-PR)
Q180.A1R36, no. 5282

"Research . . . supported by the United States Air Force under Project RAND - contract no. F44620-67-c-0045."

Partial contents.--Purpose and background.--Pro rata contributions and procedures for monitoring the infrastructure.--Component infrastructure programs and their status.--The performance of the infrastructure system.--Stimuli and disincentives affecting the infrastructure.--Operating arrangements and consortia.--Burden-sharing concepts.--Toward a United States policy.

Analyses the financing of NATO top-level governing structure and cooperative ventures managed on an international basis. Vandevanter contends that "participation in future funding activities will be advantageous to the United States as long as American strategic policy favors a strong local defense capability in Western Europe."

861
Vernant, Jacques. [POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN EUROPE] Perspectives politiques en Europe. Revue de défense nationale, v. 23, Dec. 1967: 2055-2060.
D410.R45, v. 23

Discusses major problems in Europe today: the admission of Great Britain along with Ireland, Norway, and Denmark to the Common Market, and relations between the East and West European countries. The latter problem entails a discussion of West Germany's relations with East Germany, the long-term political objectives of France, and the attitude of Eastern Europe toward France's foreign policy. Vernant notes that before Europe can be politically unified Great Britain must be admitted to the Common Market. He concludes that West Germany has created an impasse in relations between East and West Germany because of its refusal to recognize the Oder-Neisse boundary and East Germany and its claim that it represents the whole of Germany.

862
Vernant, Jacques. [THE BOTTOM OF THE PROBLEM] Le fond du problème. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, Jan. 1967: 142-146.
D410.R45, v. 24

Comments on several factors basic to the German problem and compares Germany and Cyprus. The animosity between the two Germanies has been created by their divergent patterns of social, economic, and political life and stands in the way of European cooperation and security. Any solution to the problem must be preceded by reunification, but the prospects for reunification are very dim.

863
Vu-van-Thai. A REGIONAL SOLUTION FOR VIET NAM. Foreign affairs, v. 46, Jan. 1968: 347-361.
D410.F6, v. 46

Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia should be encouraged since it would contribute significantly to world stability and provide a framework for the peace-

ful emergence of China as a world power. Steps should be initiated as soon as possible to soothe the tensions that are manifested most acutely in Vietnam but are present throughout the entire region. An improved political climate could help produce the conditions needed for a satisfactory Vietnam settlement; an end to the hot confrontation in that area would provide a strong impetus for the slow evolution toward regional cooperation. For Hanoi, a negotiated Vietnam settlement would mean cooler relations with China. Thus the leaders in Hanoi would probably look for new economic contacts in Southeast Asia; they might decide it would be temporarily to their advantage to follow a course of peaceful coexistence rather than persevere in promoting armed subversion. On the other hand, China would probably step up its subversive activities in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of a Vietnam settlement, and the Soviet Union would attempt to strengthen the influence of its brand of "goulash communism" with the governments of Southeast Asia. The best course of action for America may be "to encourage the diversification of external influences in Southeast Asia and regional cooperation among the countries of the area, leading toward a system of collective security and a policy of coexistence." Although the obstacles are formidable, effective regional cooperation is feasible in Southeast Asia. Perhaps in time national rivalries could be tempered, and diversification of external assistance under the aegis of an international body such as the United Nations could help to overcome difficulties created by the differences in international alinements of the Asian nations.

864
WAY OUT FOR WEST BERLIN: OFFICIAL GDR STATEMENT. Democratic German report, v. 16, Nov. 17, 1967: 162. DD261.D3, v. 16

Excerpts from the November 2, 1967, declaration by the East German Government on normalization of relations between West Berlin and the German Democratic Republic. It requests the West Berlin Senate to stop considering West Berlin as West Germany's province and to enter into direct political negotiations with East Germany. The East German Government considers West Berlin "an independent political entity, situated in the middle of the GDR and on the territory of the GDR, in which the USA, Britain and France still maintain an occupation regime."

865
WHERE WAR THREATENS NEXT. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Dec. 11, 1967: 44-46. JK1.U65, v. 63

The Eastern Mediterranean area carries as much explosive potential as Southeast Asia. The recent crisis in Cyprus barely missed being the tinder to set off the world's next major war, and much tension still exists in this strategic region. Hostility between Arabs and Israelis smolders, Britain has just withdrawn from Aden, and Russia is building up its naval forces in the Mediterranean as well as rearming the Arabs. Despite the fact that most of Europe's oil comes from the Mediterranean and Middle East the European nations seem largely unconcerned about events in the area. American officials fear that a Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus would escalate quickly, bringing both superpowers to a dangerous clash of interests. Likewise, if Moscow incites a renewal of the Arab-Israeli war or if Morocco and Algeria (the former aided by the United States and the latter by the Soviet Union) go to war over their disputed border, serious East-West complications would result. The United States must not only maintain its supremacy in the Middle East but must also strive to solve the problems of that region, problems that the Russians are trying to exacerbate.

866
Yool, W. M. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1967. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 7, winter 1967: 275-278. UG635.G7A1252, v. 7

The Balfour Declaration, which promised a Jewish national home, has been disowned by the Arab world. Indeed the Arab land that was given to the Jews for the creation of the state of Israel was done so without Arab consent. Most of the turmoil in the Middle East stems from that declaration. Consequently the British Government must bear the main responsibility for the present situation. The long-term future of this area is obscure, but clearly neither side will voluntarily terminate its deep-seated bitterness and hatreds. Possession of a nuclear capability by one or both sides will bring the greatest danger.

867
Zoller, Henri. [THE SOVIET FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: WEAPONS AGAINST BASES] Sowjetflotte im Mittelmeer: Waffen gegen Stützpunkte. Weltwoche, v. 35, Oct. 20, 1967: 15. AP32.W4, v. 35

The appearance of the Red fleet in the Mediterranean is not an indirect consequence of the Arab-Israeli War but a logical step in the new Soviet military doctrine developed in the beginning of the 1960's by Admiral Gorshkov. In implementing this strategy, the Soviet fleet is capable not only of inflicting crushing blows on the imperialists in a global war but also of moving into any area of limited conflict. The Soviet fleet in the Egyptian harbors after the 6-Day War had to prove this ability and simultaneously threaten the NATO countries. The Soviet fleet, crusing between Cyprus, Crete, and Malta with stopovers in friendly harbors, is not a menace to the superior American 6th Fleet, but to the NATO countries' southern flank. Forty Soviet units, including missile-bearing cruisers, destroyers with aircraft carriers, "Komar" guided missile ships, attack submarines, and the enormous "Alligator" landing craft, are operating in the Mediterranean. Five hundred long-range bombers could assist the fleet in an emergency. In case of war, the Soviet presence would threaten Greece, Turkey, and Italy, which depend on supplies by ship. The Russians have solved their logistics problems with "floating bases" on tankers and supply ships. But they now want bases, to be their own masters, not visitors; they are therefore sending generous amounts of war materiel to the Mediterranean countries with no strings attached. However, the real Soviet goals are bases in the Algerian Mers-el-Kebir, the Egyptian Port Said, and the Syrian Latakia. Any illusions that the Mediterranean is an American inland lake have been dispelled; NATO's and Israel's strategists have misgivings that someday the southern Levant will be entirely within the Soviet sphere of influence. This danger may force NATO to change its defense policy before the scheduled revision of the NATO pact. According to Vice Admiral Martin the Russians are in the Mediterranean to stay.

2. Disengagement, Neutralization, etc.

868
DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA: CONSIDERATION IN FIRST COMMITTEE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Nov. 1967: 18-22.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 4

The chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America introduced a draft resolution before the U. N. Political and Security Committee that proposed that the significance of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America be discussed in the General Assembly. The resolution urged the members of the Assembly to cooperate with the terms of the treaty, recognize the treaty's great contribution to world peace and security, and appeal to the nuclear powers to sign protocol II of the treaty, which guarantees that they will not use the area governed by the treaty for the manufacture, testing, or use of nuclear weapons. Many delegates commended the Latin Americans for their peace-loving nature and praised the treaty for its inclusion of control mechanisms to ensure that Latin American countries develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. While some representatives felt that the treaty could serve as a model for denuclearized regions in other parts of the world, others pointed out the obstacles to such an agreement between countries that border hostile territories. The Soviet Union declared its willingness to respect the status of the nuclear-free zone if other nuclear powers accepted similar obligations. However, the Russian representative objected to the lack of provisions to prevent the transportation of nuclear weapons through the denuclearized zone and to the exclusion of U.S. military bases from the atom-free zone. Unlike France, which postponed commitment on the treaty until further study, the United Kingdom promised to sign the protocol very soon. The U.S. representative said that the treaty met the basic requirements for a nuclear-free zone but before signing protocol II the U.S. Government would have to carefully consider its implications for overall U.S. security arrangements.

869
Hickmott, J. R. DISARMAMENT MEANS DANGER. Contemporary review, v. 211, Oct. 1967: 169-171.
AP4.C7, v. 211

Despite the growing dangers of the world situation Britain has chosen a policy of disarmament and withdrawal from its international commitments. In its latest Defence White Paper the British Government has presented an incredulous China with gains Peking failed to achieve militarily. Certainly the United States cannot hold out against the forces of communism alone--the combined might of China and Russia totals 6 million fully trained troops and 13 to 14 million militiamen, while the United States has only 3 million men regularly under arms. Communism respects only strength, and with British forces no longer east of Suez, what will happen to India and Australia? The Labour government appears to think Britain is not threatened by events in Southeast Asia, whatever they may be--but will it not be in danger if communism creeps through North Africa and along the Mediterranean coast? Only two alternatives face Britain, no matter how politically unpalatable they are: to stand militarily with the United States or watch the free world, Britain included, succumb to communism.

870
THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 19, Nov. 1967: 468-470. JX351.A3, v. 19

Reports the conclusion and signature of the treaty creating a Latin American nuclear-free zone. The treaty is summarized briefly, and the attitudes of the various nuclear powers are mentioned. Canada, according to this brief report, though not directly concerned considers the treaty "a constructive step along the road to disarmament and international security."

D. OUTER SPACE

871
ORBITAL WEAPONS. Nature (London) v. 216, Dec. 2, 1967: 848. Q1.N2, v. 216

On November 3, 1967, U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara announced evidence of the Soviet development of an orbital weapons system, in which warheads would be launched into earth orbit and dropped on predetermined targets. Nine recent Soviet launches, as well as a 1962 prediction by Khrushchev, are the basis for Mr. McNamara's belief. Orbital weapons have the primary advantage of surprise. From their relatively low orbits they would be visible on direct radar from the target for only 3 or 4 minutes, a quarter of the warning time for a ballistic missile. Moreover, an orbital weapon could attack from any direction, and since its point of impact depends solely on when its retrorockets are fired its target would be difficult for the defense to predict. But considerably higher launch velocities are needed for orbital weapons and result in reduction of the available payload. An eastward launching direction would compensate to some degree by providing a gain of 10 percent of payload but would sacrifice some of the surprise element. Inaccuracy is the major disadvantage of orbital weapons systems—the inaccuracy "due to the inertial guidance system during the launching phase and the period of travel in a low orbit about the Earth, and the inaccuracy of the retro-rocket." Launch errors would affect orbital systems to a far greater degree than they do ballistic missiles. "The errors due to the retro-rocket itself are likely to be greater." All potential errors combined would give miss distances of "more than seven nautical miles for the orbital system compared with 1.2 nautical miles for a ballistic missile." Use of guidance stations near the point of impact would help, as would allowing the weapon to complete one full earth orbit before homing in on its target, but the element of surprise would then be lost. "Therefore, the chances are that such devices will be for some time impracticable." Russia has categorically denied any intention of building orbital weapons, a denial that certainly must be taken into consideration, for this whole analysis may thus be purely academic.

872
Soraghan, Joseph R. RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES: LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION AND POSSIBLE UTILIZATION FOR PEACEKEEPING. McGill law journal, v. 13, no. 3, 1967: 458-493.
LL

Hails the January 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, as the "most important instrument to date for the ordering of man's activity in space," but notes its flaws: the treaty outlaws nonpeaceful activities and military installations on celestial bodies yet fails to extend these restrictions to reconnaissance activities conducted from space. "While the locus of the activity is space, the function or intended effect of the activity is . . . intrusion into the social, political and military processes of society to gain information." Hence, a proper legal characterization of reconnaissance satellites is necessary. The author offers the views of the two main space powers on this subject, analyzes the political and technological foundation for these views, and examines "the prospects for legal characterization and utilization to keep the peace and police arms control measures."

873
Thomas, Paul G. SPACE TRAFFIC SURVEILLANCE. Space/aeronautics, v. 48, Nov. 1967: 75-86. illus.
TL501.A786, v. 48

Discusses the 496L spacetrack system, a "lashup of sensors in non-optimum locations," which tracks objects in outer space, especially Soviet nuclear weapons such as the fractional orbiting bombing system. There is trouble ahead for space surveillance systems because expanding traffic of "all origins threatens to saturate the surveillance network" today, when U.S. air defense forces need it most.

874
Turner, C. R. THE AIMS OF EUROSPACE. European review, v. 18, winter 1967-68: 24-26.
AP4.E78, v. 18

Reports on Eurospace and its promotion and development of space activities and studies of related technical, legal, and economic problems. Eurospace is a nonprofit industrial association for which 10 countries provide about 100 companies; among the associate members are Israel Aircraft Industries and 13 U.S. aerospace companies. There are five groups within Eurospace, one of them concerned with legal and administrative problems, another with a documentation service similar to the one operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, but the largest is the technical group. The chief object of Eurospace is an overall, balanced European space program coordinating all efforts nationally and internationally.

875
WHITE HOUSE CEREMONY MARKS ENTRY INTO FORCE OF OUTER SPACE TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 57, Oct. 30, 1967: 565-568. JX232.A33, v. 57

Statements made by the Soviet and British Ambassadors to the United States, the Secretary of State, and President Johnson on the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies on October 10, 1967.

E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violation, Inspection, Verification

876
Carpenter, G. B., and others. VLF AMPLITUDE PERTURBATIONS IN THE ANTARCTIC DUE TO THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OF JULY 9, 1962. Journal of geophysical research, v. 73, Jan. 1, 1968: 393-403. illus. QC811.J6, v. 73

Broadband VLF magnetic tape recordings were obtained at Byrd, South Pole, and Cape Hallet in the Antarctic and onboard the U.S.N.S. 'Eltanin' near Valparaiso, Chile, during the Starfish high-altitude nuclear event of July 9, 1962. Amplitudes of selected VLF transmitter signals are presented, confirming the existence of disturbed ionospheric conditions over a wide geographical area. Comparison of signal perturbations on various pairs of paths from common transmitters provides evidence of disturbed conditions at L values greater than 6. (Abstract supplied)

877
Gilinsky, Victor, and Glenn Peebles. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RADIO SIGNAL FROM A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN THE ATMOSPHERE. Journal of geophysical research, v. 73, Jan. 1, 1968: 405-414. illus.
QC811.J6, v. 73

The dipole radio signal from a low-altitude atmospheric nuclear explosion of low yield is computed by numerically integrating Maxwell's equations. The source is described by a simple model. The function describing the time history of the rate of gamma output is taken to be an isosceles triangle with a base equal to a fraction of a microsecond. The asymmetry necessary for radiation comes entirely from the variation of air density with altitude. The dipole fields are shown as functions of position for various times after the explosion. These curves form, in effect, a motion picture of the development of the signal. (Abstract supplied)

878
Kiefer, H., and E. Piesch. [A NEW METHOD FOR DETERMINING RADIATION QUALITY AND DIRECTION OF RAY INCIDENCE BY PHOSPHATE GLASS DOSIMETERS] Neue Methode zur Ermittlung der Strahlenqualität und der Strahleneinfallsrichtung mit Phosphatglasdosimetern. Atompraxis, v. 13, Nov./Dec. 1967: Direct Information Strahlenschutz 10/67. unpaged, diagrs. TK9001.A9, v. 13

"A differential evaluation" of a multiscanning technique for determining radiation doses in humans.

879
Klinker, Louis G. DEMONSTRATED DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Army research and development, v. 8, Oct. 1967: 40-41.
U398.A8, v. 8

Describes project Cloud Gap-34 [CG-34], which was created in 1962 to establish test inspection procedures to monitor weapons destruction. Under the auspices of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] in conjunction with the Department of Defense, CG-34 is a specific test of the Cloud Gap program whose purpose is to obtain information to support the U.S. proposal on destruction of nuclear weapons "to obtain fissionable materials for transfer to peaceful uses." It tests various systems of verication and inspection that will someday ensure compliance with arms control agreements and develops "a body of experience and data to support negotiations." Through a steering committee, ACDA provides the project manager with long-range guidance in identifying arms control objectives that would require physical inspection against violations.

880
Kramish, Arnold. [THE CONTROLLED AND THE UNCONTROLLED. THE INSPECTION PROBLEM IN A TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Die Kontrollierten und die Unkontrollierten. Das Inspektionsproblem in einem Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Nov. 25, 1967: 825-838.
D839.E86, v. 22

Based on the author's study for the London Institute for Strategic Studies published under a similar title as no. 36 of the Adelphi papers.

Outlines different positions taken within the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the problem of international inspection and compares the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA's] safeguards measures with those of the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom]. Kramish thinks the nuclear nonproliferation treaty should be flexible enough to "harmonize" Euratom control measures with the IAEA's.

881
Kramish, Arnold. THE WATCHED AND THE UNWATCHED. INSPECTION IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. 13 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 36)
U162.A3, no. 36

Negotiators face many technical and political problems in devising an acceptable formula for an international safeguards system to guarantee the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. American thinking on inspection was quite permissive in 1965 when it proposed that all signatories merely facilitate the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] or its equivalent. However, by 1967 the United States had revised its position and agreed to a Soviet-American draft that provided for the obligatory inspection of all peaceful nuclear activities of nonnuclear-weapon signatories solely by the IAEA. The United States took a stronger stand on the inspection issue because it was no longer the sole source of nuclear assistance in the world and thus could not always police the flow of nuclear materials between nations. Americans feared that other donor nations might institute weak bilateral controls and felt a reliable standard inspection system should be instituted. However, many European nations oppose revealing their commercial nuclear power developments to competitors through IAEA inspectors and prefer remaining under the control of the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom]. Euratom currently applies a comprehensive system of nuclear safeguards; and if it were to surrender its powers to the IAEA, France's nuclear activities would no longer be inspected. In order to prevent the negotiations on the nonproliferation treaty from collapsing over the inspection issue, the participants may reach a compromise by reverting to a more permissive stand on inspection. Actually the effectiveness of the nonproliferation treaty in its present form will lie mainly in its declaration aspect; a powerful inspection system is not needed to detect the open manufacture of nuclear weapons, and any clandestine manufacture of weapons would probably be detected by diplomatic and political sources other than the IAEA. However, regardless of its specific role in the nonproliferation treaty, an inspection system should be encouraged that will eventually extend its control over the construction of peaceful nuclear devices by nonnuclear-weapon nations to include worldwide nuclear installations. Future technological innovations should produce inspection instruments that would minimize the infringement upon a nation's right to privacy.

882
MICROSEISMIC NOISE-DETECTION SYSTEM. CAR research review, v. 6, July 1967: 17-18. illus.
P&GP RR

Describes a newly developed device for "measuring small-scale earth vibrations." This operational, portable device is capable of measuring "the relative intensities of environmental seismic noise at various locations," including vibrations induced by heavy surf, trains, rocket and missile launches, and aircraft operations. Developed by scientists at the U.S. Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, the new system has made feasible the identification of various aircraft through "their take-off and landing seismic signatures."

883
QUESTIONS OF NON-PROLIFERATION [by] Commentator [pseud.] International affairs (Moscow) Oct. 1967: 72-74. D839.I465, 1967

The identical texts of the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament on August 24, 1967, were welcomed by Pope Paul VI and other world leaders and roused fresh hopes universally. But disagreement on article 3, on control, is blocking the completion of the treaty. The Soviet Union and other countries support the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] safeguards system, which will ensure that fissile materials and special equipment are used for peaceful purposes only. However, West Germany and other states of the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom] object to the IAEA control system; Euratom's integrated atomic industry is capable of producing weapons and is subject to its own internal control systems. Therefore Euratom's members--except France--backed by the United States, demand that Euratom countries be allowed to inspect themselves. West German critics and the press have raised fears that the treaty would hinder the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by nonnuclear powers and prevent nonnuclear countries from using atomic blasts for civil engineering operations. However, these points are covered by the treaty, and nonnuclear

signatories of the treaty are protected against discrimination. Supporters of the proliferation of nuclear weapons have proposed some conditions for inclusion in the treaty: that signatories should be free to withdraw at any time from their commitment under the treaty; the period of operation of the treaty should be limited; and a joint European force equipped with nuclear weapons should be set up in the future. Furthermore, some nations are confused and others are calculating the price they could get for their signature to the treaty. The U.S.S.R. asserts that the nonproliferation treaty is not an end in itself but a link in a series of plans for disarmament and the alleviating of international tensions.

884
Verguèse, Dominique. DETECTION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. Disarmament, no. 15, Sept. 1967: 9-11, 16. illus.
JX1981.P7D5, 1967
Translated from Le Monde, May 11, 1967.
NEWSP

Discusses the two problems of detection of underground nuclear explosions: distinguishing between seismic movements and continuous movements or background noises that affect the planet at all times and differentiating between an earthquake and an artificial explosion. The first problem involves placement of recording instruments in optimum locations and improvement of the sensitivity of these instruments. Verguèse concludes that today, despite technical progress, seismologists "do not yet have sufficient knowledge of seismic problems to be able to detect with certainty every secret explosion or to distinguish such an explosion from an earthquake."

2. Enforcement

885
Australia. Atomic Energy Commission. REPORT. 15th; 1966/67. Canberra, Govt. Print. Off. 1967. 107 p. HD9698.A8A3, v. 15

Deals with the problems of nuclear power and related subjects such as civil uses, research, reactors, production, and services. Included is a study of the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and the kind of safeguards it administers with respect to an IAEA project, a bilateral or multilateral agreement, or individual states that submit to inspection. IAEA safeguards apply only to countries that complete a safeguards agreement with the agency. This agreement prohibits the use of nuclear materials and equipment for any military purpose. The report notes that international controls over the distribution of nuclear materials and equipment are becoming widespread--a positive trend in the face of the world's ever-increasing plutonium production.

886
Seifart, Werner. [FEDERAL STATES' LAWS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY. DIVISION AND COORDINATION OF STATE DUTIES IN PROMOTION AND SURVEILLANCE] Atomenergierecht in Bundesstaaten. Verteilung und Koordination staatlicher Förderungs- und Überwachungsaufgaben. Göttingen, Institut für Völkerrecht der Universität Göttingen, 1967. 196 p. (Studien zum internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht und Atomenergierecht, Bd. 29)
LL
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents. --The nuclear energy law in individual federal states. --Federal problems faced by the nuclear energy law. --Division of particular tasks between the federation and its component states in the nuclear energy area. --Surveillance of the use of nuclear energy.

Considers nuclear energy laws in West Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Canada, and Australia. Seifart discusses the powers of federal governments and federated states in the control and inspection of the nuclear energy industry, partly from the standpoint of national security. Because of the example of the United States and the need for national security, most of the control authority in these nations is vested in the central government.

887
Viney, D. E. CONSTRAINING CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Disarmament, no. 15, Sept. 1967: 1-4, 20. JX1981.P7D5, 1967

Although little attention has been paid to gas warfare since the Geneva Protocol of 1925, recent Egyptian air raids on Yemeni villages have opened to question the Great Powers' right of "defensive research" and retaliatory capability within the realm of chemical and biological warfare [CBW]. The unconstrained use of poison gas in Yemen in violation of international law has brought about a necessary reassessment of present and future CBW constraints. Biological weapons, which do not have to be "manufactured" since they are self-reproducing bacteria, viruses, etc., comprise an ample spectrum of destructive capabilities ranging from 90-percent-lethal pneumonic plague to mildly incommoding Q-fever. Chemical weapons can be "generated from munitions either explosively or by controlled pressure, as vapours, clouds of droplets or suspended particles." In terms of cost, both weapons could be more effective than the bomb. The only defenses against these weapons are protective masks and clothing and resources for postattack treatment. The probability of CBW will depend on the character of specific confrontations; limited nuclear war, war between nonnuclear states, and revolutionary or guerrilla war are the most likely candidates for CBW. Furthermore CBW constraints, from unavailability to respect for the Protocol, are of diminishing force today. Chemical and biological [CB] weapons constraint agreements have been weakened by the insistence of some countries on the right of retaliation against violators while restrictions against them are based on the belief in a "customary ban" by international opinion. Because BW and CW lend themselves to surprise attack and erode stability, restrictions are needed against the use of CB weapons. A no-first-use pledge applicable to chemical weapons is the best one can hope for. BW should be prohibited under an international "total non-use" agreement. This could in itself create a prejudice favoring nonpossession. Acqusition of CB weapons should be discouraged except in three cases: for civil use, military reprisal, and stockpiling against possible resumptions of first-use options. The change most urgently needed is abolition of the reprisal right in the biological field. This could be done by distinguishing chemical from biological weapons in the Protocol and attaching the greater stigma to biological weapons.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

888
Glick, Edward B., and Lewis A. Frank. ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Feb. 1968: 31-38. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

Summarizes three representative arms control plans and discusses their possible impact upon U.S. defensive capabilities. All three plans are found to suffer from the same basic flaw--they assume a bipolar world by 1972. In concentrating on a reduction of Soviet and U.S. forces, they do not take into consideration the proliferation of nuclear-weapon capabilities among smaller nations. Thus arms control arrangements may provide protection from the major threat but do little to ensure against a low-level attack. They must be modified to permit the superpowers to maintain effective defenses, including an ABM system, if they are to inhibit "unsophisticated" attacks and discourage the acquistion of nuclear weapons by third parties.

889
Inglis, David R., and Carl L. Sandler. A SPECIAL REPORT ON PLOWSHARE. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS: THE NONMILITARY USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 23, Dec. 1967: 46-53.
TK9145.A84, v. 23

Although nonmilitary applications of nuclear explosives can make substantial contributions to national and world economy, the effect these applications (as in Project Plowshare) can have on diplomatic efforts to limit the arms race must be carefully weighed. Plowshare could prove invaluable in negotiations for the limitation of arms. As a result of its promising technical and economic potential, it can be offered to other nations to induce them to cooperate in arms control treaties. Or it can be set aside if it becomes an obstacle to agreement. If a nonproliferation treaty is signed, the next logical step might be continuation of the present test ban with resource-recovery sharing. Other alternatives might be an almost-complete test ban with no nuclear digging, extension of the test ban to all development tests after an initial period, or a complete test ban that would eliminate Plowshare.

890
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Economics Bureau. WORLD-WIDE MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND RELATED DATA: CALENDAR YEAR 1965. Washington [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1967. 24 p. (Its Publication 6)
P&GP RR

Partial contents.--Military expenditures and related data, by country, 1965.--Military expenditures and related data for less developed countries, by region, 1965.--Military expenditures and gross national product for selected less developed countries, 1961, 1964, 1965.--Military expenditures and gross national product in purchasing power equivalents, 1964 and 1965.--Ranking of major countries according to GNP and military expenditures, 1965.

Tabulation of military expenditures in 120 countries that compares the amounts spent by each country with its gross national product [GNP] and expenditures on public education, health, and foreign aid as well as with other nations' outlays. The data, which were estimated as closely as possible, indicate that global defense spending in 1965 reached an all-time high of about $140 billion. NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries accounted for 84 percent of the total expenditures, while the developing countries accounted for only 13 percent. However, the defense burden was greater for the poorer countries because of their limited resources--they only "have 18 per cent of the world's total GNP but 71 per cent of the world's population."

G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

891
CONVENTION ON PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CONSIDERATION BY FIRST COMMITTEE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Dec. 1967: 69-72.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 4

Debate within the Political and Security Committee on the Soviet proposal to adopt a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Proponents of the proposal felt it would ease international tensions and would slow down the arms race since there would be no point in developing nuclear weapons if they could not be used. Since the convention would be based on good will and requires no control measures, it would be easy to implement and would be a concrete step toward more complete disarmament measures. Those opposed felt the convention was deceptive and dangerous since it would breed the false impression that aggression could be undertaken with conventional forces without the risk of nuclear war. Until steps can be taken to decrease the means of waging war, mutual deterrence remains the most effective barrier to nuclear war. "In today's troubled world, any solemnly proclaimed moral prohibitions would not remove mistrust and might even increase it."

892
TOWARD NATIONAL UNITY OVER VIETNAM [editorial] Saturday review, v. 50, Dec. 2, 1967: 20-21.
Z1219.S25, v. 50

The American people are "entitled to a full accounting of what is happening in Vietnam"--not as a special favor but as a matter of indisputable right. This is the root of national "disunity" over Vietnam. Prominent figures who only a year ago supported the President's policy have drifted into opposition to it, and public opinion polls show growing disenchantment with it--for several reasons. For a long time American involvement in Vietnam was minimal and then, step by step, the country was phased into a full-scale war--without debate, without a congressional declaration of war, and without a frank admission from the Government "as to where its decisions were taking a free society in which the ultimate power belongs to the people." President Johnson declared that America would not blunder into a major land war in Asia--but this is precisely what is happening. The nation was told that cities in North Vietnam would not be bombed,

and then the cities were bombed without an adequate explanation for the policy reversal. The country was assured that the American goal in Vietnam was a negotiated peace. Yet the American public was never informed of the South Vietnamese Government's opposition to negotiations nor of the 1964 agreement obtained from Hanoi by U. N. Secretary General U Thant "to engage in direct talks with the United States." Washington replied 4 months after the offer of talks--negatively --and the American public was given a twisted story of Hanoi's unwillingness to talk. The American people were also told that the United States is in Vietnam to halt the march of Chinese communism, although today China's neighbors, so deeply antagonistic to China 6 years ago, are less anxious to be independent of China. Another reason the Americans are in Vietnam is to help its people have a government of their own selection and to shield it from inner or outer subversion. But the United States was "a silent partner in the overthrow of the Diem government and the assassination of Diem himself." These facts deepen the Nation's concern over the Vietnam War. And while the President keeps calling for closed ranks behind the American fighting men in Vietnam, his critics feel that the best way to support American soldiers is to work out policies to end the war.

893
WATER FOR PEACE. Looking ahead, v. 15, Nov. 1967: 5-6. P&GP RR

Highlights the International Conference on Water for Peace held in Washington, D. C., in May 1967. The meeting brought together specialists from 90 countries and 24 intergovernmental organizations to deal with "the entire spectrum of world water problems" and to look for means to promote international cooperation in solving them. Sessions were organized at two levels: one for cabinet-level ministers in charge of water policy and development, the other for specialists in water resources development. Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced at the closing session that a Water for Peace Office would be set up in the U. S. Department of State "to help carry out the U. S. share in international efforts in the water field."

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